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Abstract
Healthcare reform, regulation, and adoption of technology such as wearables are
substantially changing both the quality of care and how we receive it. For example,
health and fitness devices contain sensors that collect data, wireless interfaces to
transmit data, and cloud infrastructures to aggregate, analyze, and share data. FDA-
defined class III devices such as pacemakers will soon share these capabilities. While
technological growth in health care is clearly beneficial, it also brings new security
and privacy challenges for systems, users, and regulators.
We group these concepts under health and medical systems to connect and em-
phasize their importance to healthcare. Challenges include how to keep user health
data private, how to limit and protect access to data, and how to securely store and
transmit data while maintaining interoperability with other systems. The most criti-
cal challenge unique to healthcare is how to balance security and privacy with safety
and utility concerns. Specifically, a life-critical medical device must fail-open (i.e.,
work regardless) in the event of an active threat or attack.
This dissertation examines some of these challenges and introduces new systems
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that not only improve security and privacy but also enhance workflow and usability.
Usability is important in this context because a secure system that inhibits workflow
is often improperly used or circumvented. We present this concern and our solution in
its respective chapter. Each chapter of this dissertation presents a unique challenge,
or unanswered question, and solution based on empirical analysis.
We present a survey of related work in embedded health and medical systems.
The academic and regulatory communities greatly scrutinize the security and privacy
of these devices because of their primary function of providing critical care. What
we find is that securing embedded health and medical systems is hard, done incor-
rectly, and is analogous to non-embedded health and medical systems such as hospital
servers, terminals, and personally owned mobile devices. A policy called bring your
own device (BYOD) allows the use and integration of mobile devices in the work-
place. We perform an analysis of Apple iMessage which both implicates BYOD in
healthcare and secure messaging protocols used by health and medical systems.
We analyze direct memory access engines, a special-purpose piece of hardware to
transfer data into and out of main memory, and show that we can chain together
memory transfers to perform arbitrary computation. This result potentially affects
all computing systems used for healthcare. We also examine HTML5 web workers as
they provide stealthy computation and covert communication. This finding is relevant
to web applications such as personal and electronic health record portals.
We design and implement two novel and secure health and medical systems. One is
iii
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a wearable device that addresses the problem of authenticating a user (e.g., physician)
to a terminal in a usable way. The other is a light-weight and low-cost wireless device
we call Beacon+. This device extends the design of Apple’s iBeacon specification with
unspoofable, temporal, and authenticated advertisements; of which, enables secure
location sensing applications that could improve numerous healthcare processes.
Primary Reader: Dr. Aviel D. Rubin
Secondary Readers: Dr. Anton Dahbura and Dr. Christoph U. Lehmann
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The recent Apple Watch is a health and fitness device that contains a heart rate
sensor and a pedometer to collect, disseminate, and display health data to its user.
HealthKit is the application that operates on this data and provides extensions to
third-parties to access and aggregate data over a large number of users and tertiary
sensor plugins (e.g., a digital sphygmomanometer). Cloud platforms are used to per-
form data aggregation, and thus, private health data is distributed and fragmented
across geographical regions. Further, regulatory bodies must decide how to classify
health and fitness devices as they integrate into health information exchanges and
become comparable to FDA-defined class I, II, and III medical devices (e.g., pace-
makers).
While technological growth in health care is beneficial, it also brings new security
and privacy challenges for systems, users, and regulators. The Apple Watch, for
1
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example, collects private health information from its wearer, performs some local
computation on it, and then transmits it to the cloud or a third-party. This health
information is confidential and private. Thus, it needs to be encrypted at rest and
transmitted over a secure channel such as SSL/TLS. Moreover, cloud providers must
enforce access control on all collected health information, and third-parties (e.g.,
a physician at a local clinic) must authenticate before accessing and manipulating
aggregate health information.
There exist many security and privacy challenges to the Apple Watch as a health
and fitness device. These challenges extend to all healthcare-related devices. As such,
we group these concepts under the term of health and medical systems to connect
and emphasize their importance to healthcare. This grouping also includes the most
critical challenge unique to healthcare, balancing security and privacy with safety and
utility.
This dissertation examines some of these challenges in health and medical systems
and introduces new systems that improve security, privacy, and usability. We present
a survey of related work in implantable medical devices (IMDs) and body area net-
works (BANs), otherwise referred to as embedded health and medical systems. The
publications reviewed in this survey aim at improving security and privacy, but as
we find in our analysis of common themes and trends, systems are hard to design.




This finding is analogous to non-embedded health and medical systems such as
hospital servers, terminals, and BYOD. For example, Apple iMessage is one of the
most widely deployed end-to-end encryption messaging protocols. It is used by BYOD
devices to send confidential messages between nurses, and other practitioners.7 We
perform an analysis of Apple iMessage and find that it has significant vulnerabili-
ties that can be exploited by a sophisticated attacker. This finding exemplifies the
challenges of BYOD and protocol development in health and medical systems.
Modern computer systems contain a variety of special purpose processors designed
to offload specific tasks from the CPU such as graphics rendering for oncology imag-
ing.8 Direct memory access engines perform the copying of data from main memory
to the other processor. We show that the ability to chain together memory copying
is sufficient to perform arbitrary computation. This means, in the context of health-
care, that an attacker can perform any function on a health and medical system (e.g.,
ultrasound equipment) with the capabilities we describe in Chapter 4.
Epic, a healthcare software company, and other related businesses implement a
suite of software for patient engagement, clinicals, portals, and third-party extensions
such as billing. This software is useful as it provides access to electronic health
records (EHR) and health information exchanges (HIE). Typically, these softwares
interact with users via an HTML-driven user interface (UI). There exists an entire
community dedicated to expanding the knowledge of web application vulnerabilities,
which would affect these UIs, with a particular focus on the new HTML5 APIs. We
3
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examine the Web Workers API and find that it provides stealthy computation and
covert communication.
Stealthy computation can affect the computer systems of patients and physicians
visiting a compromised web application. In particular, we can use their computational
resources to perform a distributed operation such as password cracking. We can
mount a denial-of-service (DoS) attack that causes OS X systems to halt, and we can
perform a resource depletion on mobile devices, again affecting BYOD. Also, health
and medical systems that expose a full operating system, such as the Baxa ExactaMix
2400 pharmaceutical compounder,9 are susceptible to these stealthy computations.
The most common method for a user to gain access to a system is to authenticate
(i.e., verify her identity), with a password. It’s important that systems in a healthcare
environment, for example, a workstation-on-wheels (WOW), require authentication.
However, complex password requirements and policies can be perceived as inhibiting
care and thus users may try to circumvent them. Examples include never logging
out of systems and sharing user credentials with others. Moreover, the invention of
systems to improve security while not hindering usability is often circumvented if not
properly implemented. Sinclair and Smith10 describe a proximity-based deauthenti-
cation system that uses cameras to determine when if a system is in use. In a hospital
setting, users were frustrated with bugs where the system misinterpreted movements
and logged off users, so the users simply covered the cameras with cups.
We introduce an authentication system that addresses the problem of complex
4
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passwords and poor usability by prompting the user to enter a password as infre-
quently as once a day. We design a wearable bracelet that stores authentication
information for the user upon logging in and then transmitting that information to
each system upon use. The bracelet is not a component in multi-factor authenti-
cation, rather a mechanism for enhancing usability and workflow while maintaining
stringent access control policies.
Tracking and managing assets in real-time are critical for hospitals as they impact
patient care. In particular, tracking needs to be secure against both active and passive
attacks that misappropriate assets. We implement a real-time tracking system using a
Bluetooth low-energy (BLE) device we call Beacon+. This device enables other secure
location sensing applications such as location-based access restrictions, whereby a
physician or nurse can only access the medical records of nearby patients. Location
in this application is one factor in a multi-factor access control scheme. For example,
physicians who step away from their personal computer system (assuming she can
access all records here) take a hospital-issued tablet with them, log in to the tablet,
and be within close physical proximity of a patient to access her records.
1.1 Our Approach
This dissertation examines the aforementioned security and privacy challenges in
health and medical systems and presents new systems that are usable and secure.
5
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These systems also enable new applications that could improve numerous healthcare
processes. For brevity, we describe each challenge and system independently and
summarize our approach in the below.
1.1.1 SoK: Security and Privacy in Implantable
Medical Devices and Body Area Networks
Balancing security, privacy, safety, and utility is a necessity in the health care do-
main, in which implantable medical devices (IMDs) and body area networks (BANs)
have made it possible to continuously and automatically manage and treat a num-
ber of health conditions. In this work, we survey publications aimed at improving
security and privacy in IMDs and health-related BANs, providing clear definitions
and a comprehensive overview of the problem space. We analyze common themes,
categorize relevant results, and identify trends and directions for future research. We
present a visual illustration of this analysis that shows the progression of IMD/BAN
research and highlights emerging threats. We identify three broad research categories
aimed at ensuring the security and privacy of the telemetry interface, software, and
sensor interface layers and discuss challenges researchers face with respect to ensuring
reproducibility of results. We find that while the security of the telemetry interface
has received much attention in academia, the threat of software exploitation and the
sensor interface layer deserve further attention. In addition, we observe that while
6
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the use of physiological values as a source of entropy for cryptographic keys holds
some promise, a more rigorous assessment of the security and practicality of these
schemes is required.
1.1.2 Dancing on the Lip of the Volcano:
Chosen Ciphertext Attacks on Apple iMes-
sage
Apple’s iMessage is one of the most widely-deployed end-to-end encrypted mes-
saging protocols. Despite its broad deployment, the encryption protocols used by
iMessage have never been subjected to rigorous cryptanalysis. In this paper, we con-
duct a thorough analysis of iMessage to determine the security of the protocol against
a variety of attacks. Our analysis shows that iMessage has significant vulnerabilities
that can be exploited by a sophisticated attacker. In particular, we outline a novel
chosen ciphertext attack on Huffman compressed data, which allows retrospective
decryption of some iMessage payloads in less than 218 queries. The practical impli-
cation of these attacks is that any party who gains access to iMessage ciphertexts
may potentially decrypt them remotely and after the fact. We additionally describe
mitigations that will prevent these attacks on the protocol, without breaking back-





Copying data from devices into main memory is a computationally-trivial, yet
time-intensive, task. In order to free the CPU to perform more interesting work,
computers use direct memory access (DMA) engines — a special-purpose piece of
hardware — to transfer data into and out of main memory. We show that the ability
to chain together such memory transfers, as provided by commodity hardware, is
sufficient to perform arbitrary computation. Further, when hardware peripherals
can be accessed via memory-mapped I/O, they are accessible to “DMA programs.”
To demonstrate malicious behavior, we build a proof-of-concept DMA rootkit that
modifies kernel objects in memory to perform privilege escalation for target processes.
1.1.4 MalloryWorker: Stealthy Computation and
Covert Channels using Web Workers
JavaScript execution and UI rendering are typically single-threaded. Consequently,
the execution of some scripts can block the display of requested content to the browser
screen. Web Workers is an API that enables web applications to spawn background
workers in parallel to the main page. Workers support long-lived and computation-
ally expensive operations that might otherwise block the UI. Despite the usefulness
of concurrency, users are unaware of worker execution, intent, and impact on system
resources. We show that workers can be used to abuse system resources by imple-
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menting a unique denial-of-service attack on OS X and resource depletion attack on
Android. Further, we show that workers can be used to perform stealthy computation
by developing a distributed password cracker, and covert channels exist by exploit-
ing controllable CPU and memory fluctuations. We discuss potential mitigations
(i.e., fine-grained control) and implement a lightweight browser extension to increase
awareness of worker execution.
1.1.5 KBID: Kerberos Bracelet Identification
The most common method for a user to gain access to a system, service, or re-
source is to provide a secret, often a password, that verifies her identity and thus
authenticates her. Password-based authentication is considered strong only when the
password meets certain length and complexity requirements, or when it is combined
with other methods in multi-factor authentication. Unfortunately, many authenti-
cation systems do not enforce strong passwords due to a number of limitations; for
example, the time taken to enter complex passwords. We present an authentica-
tion system that addresses these limitations by prompting a user for credentials once




1.1.6 Applications of Secure Location Sensing in
Healthcare
Secure location sensing has the potential to improve healthcare processes regard-
ing security, efficiency, and safety. For example, enforcing close physical proximity to
a patient when using a barcode medication administration system (BCMA) can miti-
gate the consequences of unsafe barcode scanning workarounds. We present Beacon+,
a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) device that extends the design of Apple’s popular
iBeacon specification with unspoofable, temporal, and authenticated advertisements.
Our prototype Beacon+ design enables secure location sensing applications such as
real-time tracking of hospital assets (e.g., infusion pumps). We implement this ex-
act real-time tracking system and use it as a foundation for a novel application that
applies location-based restrictions on access control.
1.2 Outline of This Work
We group the concepts of security and privacy challenges for systems, users, and
regulators spurred by technological growth in health care under the term health and
medical systems. Each chapter of this dissertation presents a unique challenge, or
unanswered question, related to health and medical systems. Challenges presented in
Chapters 3 through 7 are motivated by concepts and challenges in embedded health
and medical systems described in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2 surveys research publications aimed at improving security and pri-
vacy in implantable medical devices and health-related body area networks. It
also categorizes themes, results, and trends that motivate challenges in subsequent
chapters.
Chapter 3 conducts a thorough analysis of iMessage to determine the security of
the protocol against a variety of attacks. The result of which implies the difficulty
of implementing protocols securely, and exposing security and privacy implications
for BYOD and messaging protocols in health and medical systems.
Chapter 4 shows the ability to chain together direct memory transfers, as provided
by commodity hardware, is sufficient to perform arbitrary computation. All health
and medical systems could be potentially vulnerable to this class of attack.
Chapter 5 uses HTML5 web workers to abuse system resources, perform stealthy
computation, and create a covert channel for unauthorized communication. Health
and medical systems that allow web browsing and EHR portals could be potentially
vulnerable to this type of attack.
Chapter 6 presents an authentication system that addresses the limitation of
complex passwords by using a wearable bracelet and authentication module. This
system’s intent is to be usable and easily integrated into healthcare workflow as to
avoid poor security workarounds.
Chapter 7 presents a device called Beacon+ that extends the design of Apple’s
11
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popular iBeacon specification with unspoofable, temporal, and authenticated ad-
vertisements. Beacon+ enables secure location sensing applications that could
improve numerous healthcare processes.
12
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SoK: Security and Privacy in
Implantable Medical Devices and
Body Area Networks
The integration of computing devices and health care has changed the landscape
of modern medicine. Implantable medical devices (IMDs), or medical devices embed-
ded inside the human body, have made it possible to continuously and automatically
manage a number of health conditions, ranging from cardiac arrhythmia to Parkin-
son’s disease. Body area networks (BANs), wireless networks of wearable computing
devices, enable remote monitoring of a patient’s health status.
In 2001, the estimated number of patients in the United States with an IMD
exceeded 25 million;11 reports from 2005 estimate the number of patients with in-
13
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sulin pumps at 245000.12,13 IMDs have become pervasive, spurred by the increased
energy efficiency and low cost of embedded systems, making it possible to provide
real-time monitoring and treatment of patients.14 Low power system optimizations,15
ultra-low-power wireless connectivity,16 and the development of numerous lightweight
communication protocols (e.g., on-demand MAC)17–19 have helped make small-scale
sense-actuate systems like IMDs and BANs a reality. Through sensors, these systems
can collect a range of physiological values (e.g., heart rate, blood pressure, oxygen
saturation, temperature, or neural activity) and can provide appropriate actuation or
treatment (e.g., regulate heart rate or halt tremors). On-board radios enable wireless
data transfer (or wireless medical telemetry20) for monitoring and configuration with-
out sacrificing patient mobility or requiring surgical procedures to physically access
the devices.
The need for security and privacy of medical devices has received increasing at-
tention in both the media and the academic community over the last few years—a
perhaps telling example is the recent revelation that Vice President Dick Cheney
had the wireless telemetry interface on his implanted pacemaker disabled.21 In the
academic community, the seminal work by Halperin et al.,22 which introduces a class
of wireless threats against a commercial implantable cardiac defibrillator (ICD), has
been followed by numerous papers researching techniques to improve the security and
privacy of medical devices.
Even though the likelihood of targeted adversarial attacks on IMDs and BANs
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may be debatable, the consequences of an insecure system can be severe. Indeed,
Fu and Blum23 observe that while the hacking of medical devices is a “red herring”,
poor security design can result in real vulnerabilities. For example, the existence
of malware on networked medical devices can result in unreliable data or actuation,
impacting both the integrity and availability of the systems in question. Any private
data on the system may be exposed, leading to a breach of confidentiality.
Although traditionally there has been little incentive for medical device manufac-
turers to incorporate security and privacy mechanisms for fear of inhibiting regulatory
approval,24 the FDA has recently called for manufacturers to address cybersecurity
issues relevant to medical devices for the entire life cycle of the device, from the ini-
tial design phase through deployment and end-of-life.25 Although these calls are in
the form of draft guidelines for ensuring appropriate medical device security, there
is evidence that the FDA means to use these guidelines as grounds for rejection of
premarket medical device submissions.26
Ensuring security and privacy in the context of safety-critical systems like IMDs,
however, is more nuanced than in the traditional computer science setting. As
Halperin et al.27 observe, the security and privacy goals of IMDs may at times
conflict with the safety and utility of these devices. For example, eavesdropping on
communications between an IMD and its programmer may reveal a sensitive medi-
cal condition, or querying an IMD with an unauthenticated programmer may allow
clandestine tracking, both of which compromise the privacy of the affected patient.
15
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Unauthenticated communication can lead to denial of service attacks, in which legit-
imate communication is prevented from reaching the device or the device’s battery
is needlessly depleted,22 as well as replay and injection attacks, in which potentially
dangerous commands sent to the device can alter the patient’s therapy.22,28,29 On
the other hand, using traditional cryptographic mechanisms to ensure secure commu-
nication and storage of data can compromise the safety of the patient. If the patient
needs treatment outside of his normal health care context (e.g., at the emergency
room), it is necessary for health care professionals to have the ability to identify and
access the IMD in order to diagnose and treat the patient.
Balancing security, privacy, safety, and utility is a necessity in the health care
domain.24 Multiple academic disciplines (e.g., embedded systems, computer security,
and medicine) have independently explored the IMD/BAN problem space. We go
beyond related work27,29,30 by providing a comprehensive overview of security and
privacy trends and emerging threats, in order to facilitate uptake by research groups
and industry.
Moreover, we provide a more formal adversarial model and classification of threats
than the work of Halperin et al.27 and Zhang et al.30 By identifying and analyzing
popular research trends in this space, we observe that current work may be roughly
subdivided into three classes: the security of the wireless telemetry, detection and
prevention of software vulnerabilities, and the security of the hardware architecture
and sensor interface. Our categorization allows us to easily trace the evolution of
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IMD/BAN research, connect current work to related notions from the field of RFID
security and privacy, and identify emerging threats in this space.
We identify challenges computer science researchers face in examining the security
and privacy of medical devices, including the lack of reproducibility of research re-
sults. Access to medical devices is a common problem that limits researchers’ ability
to validate prior results; food-grade meat as a phantom also complicates reproducibil-
ity due to its inaccurate approximation of a human body.18,31 In addition, we provide
clear definitions of IMDs and BANs and describe the relevant communications stan-
dards, including clarifying the term medical device, which is strictly defined by the
FDA. The distinction between a medical device and a device used in the context of
health (e.g., FitBit, a popular tool to track physical activity) is a common source of
confusion.
In the IMD/BAN space, we need to achieve trustworthy communication, trust-
worthy software, and trustworthy hardware and sensor interfaces. While the security
of the wireless telemetry interface has received much attention in academia, both
the threat of software exploits in medical devices and the security and privacy of the
sensor interface are areas of research that deserve further attention. Subtle eavesdrop-
ping and injection attacks on sensor inputs, such as the work by Foo Kune et al.32
on cardiac implantable electrical devices (CIEDs), which include pacemakers and de-
fibrillators, and Bagade et al.33 on compromising the privacy of physiological inputs
to key generation mechanisms, are a promising avenue of future work.
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2.2 Background and Definitions
Advances in embedded systems34 and wireless sensor networks (WSNs)35 have
made modern IMDs and BANs possible. Current embedded systems trade computing
performance and memory resources for energy efficiency and lower costs. Wireless sen-
sor networks link both homogeneous and heterogeneous autonomous devices. WSNs
have been used for health care monitoring via the introduction of both wearable and
implanted sensor networks,15,36 giving rise to modern healthcare-related BANs.
2.2.1 Implantable Medical Devices and Body Area
Networks
The U.S. FDA has a broad, albeit relatively strict, definition of medical devices,
which range from tongue depressors to MRI machines. The U.S. Federal Food Drug
& Cosmetic Act [37, Section 201(h)] defines a medical device as an instrument, ap-
paratus, machine, or other similar article which is a) officially recognized by national
registries; b) intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, or prevention of a disease; and
c) intended to affect the structure or function of the body. We emphasize that in
order for a device to qualify as a medical device, it must undergo substantial review
by the FDA before being released on the commercial market; we use this definition of
medical device in this chapter. The FDA also has significant global influence through
arrangements with numerous foreign government organizations;38 therefore devices,
18






















Figure 2.1: Example IMDs and ICD/Programmer communication.
standards, and protocols used in the U.S. are likely to be of interest to other countries
as well.
The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) defines wireless medical
telemetry in FCC 00-211 [39, Section 3B] and FCC 47 CFR 95.40120 as the measure-
ment and recording of physiological values via wireless signals. The wireless medical
telemetry system is comprised of sensors, radio-based communication, and recording
devices. In this chapter, we use the phrase wireless telemetry, or simply telemetry,
to mean radio-based communication, as in the FCC definition; this is distinct from
the traditional RFID definition of telemetry, which comprises data collection and
transmission.
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2.2.1.1 Implantable medical devices
We define an implantable medical device (IMD) as one which is surgically placed
inside of a patient’s body. Figure 2.1 provides examples of IMDs and an IMD pro-
grammer (or simply, programmer), and shows the high-level communication protocol
of an ICD. The programmer in this context is an external device with an interface
(usually a radio frequency (RF) transceiver) for communicating wirelessly with an
IMD and relaying data to a device used by clinicians or other health care providers.
An IMD system supports:
• Analog front end, the signal conditioning circuitry for application-specific sens-
ing and actuation;
• Memory and storage, for storing personal health information and sensed data;
• Microprocessor, for executing device-specific software;
• Telemetry interface, often radio-based, for transmitting data between the device
and a programmer or other sensor/actuator on the patient; and
• Power management, for monitoring and managing battery use for increased
longevity.
IMDs are resource-constrained, requiring reduced size, weight, low peak power
and low duty cycle. Past research uses resource-constrained hardware platforms such
as an 8-bit Atmel-AVR and a 16-bit TI MSP43040 to model IMD configurations. The
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TI MSP430F1611 consumes energy at approximately 0.72nJ per clock cycle. Typical
IMDs are designed to last 90 months on a single battery with 0.5Ah to 2Ah of bat-
tery life.41 These requirements minimize the impact of invasive surgeries to replace
depleted implants. Furthermore, modern IMDs rely on low-power radio communica-
tion and network connectivity to provide a remote-monitoring system.24 The FCC
has allocated the 401MHz to 406MHz band for Medical Devices (MedRadio),42 some-
times called the Medical Implant Communication Service (MICS) band. This band
is currently used for IMD wireless telemetry.
The MICS band allows for reasonable signal propagation through the human body
without interfering with other devices. Additionally, it allows for a greater distance
between the patient and external transceiver, unlike previous IMDs (e.g., a pacemaker
transmitting at 175kHz, which required a proximity within 5cm19).
2.2.1.2 Body area networks
We define a body area network (BAN) as a wireless network of heterogeneous com-
puting devices that are wearable. This network enables continuous remote monitoring
of patient physiological values in the medical setting. In this work, we are mainly
concerned with BANs as they relate to IMDs.
BANs typically include three types of devices: sensors, actuators, and a sink. In
Figure 2.2, sensors are placed at various locations on the body, support multiple net-
work topologies, and forward sensed data to a more computationally powerful device
21








Sensing and Transmitting Forwarding Data Remote Care
Figure 2.2: Body area network architecture.
(e.g., a smartphone). Although related to wireless sensor networks, BANs exhibit
some notable differences43 with respect to wearability (e.g., size and power), battery
availability, and transmission (i.e., the human body is a lossy medium). Moreover,
reliability requirements may be stricter than in a typical wireless sensor network,
depending on how safety-critical the application.
As we are most interested in BANs as they relate to IMDs, we only give a brief
overview of the communication standards for clinical environments.44 The ISO/IEEE
1107345 standard spans the entire BAN communication stack, while Health Level 7
(HL7),46 Integrating the Health Enterprise (IHE)47 and the recent ASTM F2761 (MDPnP)48
standard only describe the application layer. While at least some security mechanisms
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are mentioned in these standards, most are optional, presumably to ensure interop-
erability. Foo Kune et al.44 find that by enabling these security mechanisms in
combination with known security protocols, a vast majority of security requirements
could be satisfied. The Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation
(AAMI) is working on TIR-57, a draft guidance document to start standardizing se-
cure Information Technology (IT) practices for clinical environments; at the time of
this writing, a draft was not yet available.
2.3 Security and Privacy in IMDs and
BANs
In this section, we first review security and privacy goals for IMDs and BANs. We
then present our adversarial model and discuss security threats.
2.3.1 Security and Privacy Goals
We recognize the following security goals for IMDs and BANs, building on the
models provided by Halperin et al.,27 Burleson et al.,24 and Zhang et al.30 These
properties should hold throughout the entire life cycle of the IMD/BAN devices,
including appropriate disposal of explanted devices.
• Confidentiality : Data, device information, and device systems should be acces-
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sible only to authorized entities (i.e., appropriate entities) and these entities
should be authenticated (i.e., the identity of entities communicating with de-
vices should be verifiable). In particular, data should be kept confidential both
in storage and while in transmission.
• Integrity : Data, device information, and device systems should not be mod-
ifiable by unauthorized entities. The system should also satisfy data origin
authentication; the source of any received data should be verifiable.
• Availability : Data, device information, and device systems should be accessible
when requested by authorized entities.
IMDs and BANs should also satisfy the following privacy goals; we include cri-
teria from Halperin et al.,27 Denning et al.,49 and Kumar et al.50 for completeness.
Although these goals bear some overlap with confidentiality, we include the full list
in order to allow for a more comprehensive treatment of privacy (apart from security)
in the context of IMDs and BANs. We refer the reader to the work of Avancha et al51
for a policy-oriented treatment of privacy issues in health-related mobile technology.
• Device-existence privacy : Unauthorized entities should not be able to determine
that a patient has an IMD/BAN.
• Device-type privacy : If device-existence privacy is not possible, unauthorized
entities should not be able to determine what type of IMD/BAN is in use.
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• Specific-device ID privacy : Unauthorized entities should not be able to deter-
mine the unique ID of an IMD/BAN sensor.
• Measurement and log privacy : Unauthorized entities should not be able to de-
termine private telemetry or access stored data about the patient. The system
design phase should include a privacy assessment to determine appropriate poli-
cies with respect to data access.
• Bearer privacy : Unauthorized entities should not be able to exploit IMD/BAN
properties to identify the patient.
• Tracking : Unauthorized entities should not be able to leverage the physical
layer (e.g., by monitoring analog sensors or matching a radio fingerprint52–54)
to track or locate a patient.
2.3.2 Adversarial Model
Following the standard approach in computer security literature, adversaries may
be distinguished based on their goals, capabilities, and relationship to the system in
question. We have the following classification criteria.
1. An adversary is either active or passive:
• Passive adversaries are able to eavesdrop on all communication channels
in the network, including side channels, or unintentional communication
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channels.
• Active adversaries are able to read, modify, and inject data over the com-
munication channel.
2. An adversary is either an external or internal entity with respect to the system.
That is, an adversary may either be an outsider or an insider with a legitimate
system role (e.g., manufacturer employees, patient, physician, or hospital ad-
ministrator).
3. An adversary may be either a single entity or a member of a coordinated group
of entities.
4. An adversary may be sophisticated, relying on specialized, custom equipment,
or unsophisticated, relying only on readily available commercial equipment.
All system components of IMDs and BANs may be used as attack surfaces, or
points of potential weakness, by an adversary (e.g., any existing sensors, actuators,
communication networks, or external programming devices). In addition, the adver-
sary may have the following targets and goals with respect to the specified target.
1. The patient : The adversary may wish to obtain private information concern-
ing the patient (e.g., whereabouts, diagnosis, or blackmail-worthy material), or
cause physical or psychological harm to the patient.
26
CHAPTER 2. SYSTEMIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE
2. The device or system manufacturer : The adversary may wish to engage in
corporate espionage or fraud.
3. System resources : The adversary may wish to utilize system resources and
may be unaware of the type of device or network compromised. That is, the
adversary does not knowingly target an IMD/BAN.
2.3.3 Threats
We classify IMD and BAN security and privacy threats found in the literature
into the following categories:
• The telemetry interface, which is typically wireless. Threats include a passive
adversary who eavesdrops on wireless communications and an active adversary
who attempts to jam, replay, modify, forge, or drop wireless communications.
• Software threats, which consider an adversary that can alter the logic of the
system (e.g., through software vulnerabilities) to affect expected operation.
• Hardware and sensor interface threats. An adversary may have knowledge of
the internal hardware architecture or analog sensors and may use that knowl-
edge to attack the system. Specifically, sensor threats stem from the implicit
trust that the system places on those sensor inputs, under the assumption that
physical contact with the sensor is necessary to alter the signal. An active at-
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tacker, however, may introduce remote interference to sensing in order to affect
actuation.
These categories inform our analysis of security and privacy research trends in
Section 2.4.
2.4 Medical Device Security and Privacy
Trends
We follow the broad categorization of IMD and BAN security and privacy threats
given in Section 2.3.3 in order to analyze research trends in the literature. That is,
we group research according to the relevant attack surface: the telemetry interface,
software, and hardware/sensor inputs. We give an explicit categorization of relevant
research with respect to security threats and goals in Table 2.1. Due to the large
amount of work on the wireless telemetry threats, we separate the wireless threats into
subclasses. An overview of current research, grouped thematically and by publication
year, is given in Figure 2.3.
As Figure 2.3 indicates, the vast majority of results in the literature focus on
threats to the telemetry interface, while a limited number of papers consider software
threats. Since very few papers deal with threats to the sensor interface, we defer
discussion of this emerging threat to Section 2.5.3.
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Figure 2.3: Trends in Security and Privacy Research on IMDs/BANs.
29
CHAPTER 2. SYSTEMIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE
Goal Compromised by Indicated Threat
Threat Attacks Confident. Integrity Avail. Privacy Safety Defenses












Wireless jamming X X 72,79
Analog sensor injection 32 X X 32
Battery depletion 22 X X 22,69,73,79
Protocol Design Flaws 22,28,29,33
60,71
X X X X X Not Applicable
Software Flaws 87 X X X X X 68,87
Side channels 33,65,71 X X X X X 65
Table 2.1: IMD and BAN security and privacy threats and defenses
2.4.1 Securing the Wireless Telemetry Interface
Halperin et al.22 introduce a class of wireless threats against a commercial ICD;
since then, attacks on the telemetry interface of IMDs have received a large amount
of attention.28,88,89 At the physical layer, Halperin et al.,22 targeting an ICD, and
Li et al.,28 targeting an insulin pump system, develop passive and active attacks
against their respective device using an off-the-shelf software defined radio (SDR)
platform. In the devices and programmers analyzed, the communication links do
not use an authenticated channel and transmit unencrypted data without freshness
checks, thereby allowing eavesdropping, replay,22 and injection attacks.28
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Unsurprisingly, many authentication techniques have been proposed to secure the
wireless telemetry of IMDs and BANS, including the use of biometrics, distance-
bounding authentication, out-of-band authentication, external devices, and anomaly
detection. We explore each of these areas individually below.
2.4.1.1 Biometrics
Popular techniques for key generation and key agreement in IMDs/BANs include
the use of biometrics, or physiological values (PVs).55,57,66,67,70,74,78,80–82,84 Electro-
cardiograms (ECGs) are a common choice as a source of key material in these pro-
tocols, although other PVs such as heart rate, blood glucose, blood pressure, and
temperature have been proposed.81
The choice to use ECGs is motivated by a well-cited paper by Poon et al.,82 which
asserts that the time between heartbeats, or interpulse interval (IPI), has a high level
of randomness. IPI has the additional benefit that it can be measured anywhere on
the body and many IMDs in use today can measure IPI without modification.
A typical approach to PV-based key agreement between an IMD and program-
mer, for example, involves both devices taking a measurement of the chosen PV.
This measured PV is used to generate a cryptographic key that is agreed upon by
both devices, which is then used to establish an authenticated channel. The basic
assumption is that physical contact (or at least physical proximity) with the patient
is required in order to precisely measure the chosen PV.
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Security analyses of these protocols have been mostly ad hoc in nature, how-
ever, and in general more comprehensive assessments are required. For example,
Rostami et al.29 demonstrate simple, but damaging attacks against OPFKA57 and
IMDGuard,72 which we discuss in Section 2.4.1.4.
Chang et al.62 also explore the use of IPI, drawing attention to the issue of noise in
real-world measurements. Later work by Rostami et al.55 presents a more robust IPI-
based authentication protocol, which unlike previous work, takes into account both
the impact of measurement noise and provide a more rigorous security analysis. We
discuss the subtleties and potential difficulties of using IPI as part of a key agreement
protocol in more detail in Section 2.5.2 and Section 2.5.3.
2.4.1.2 Distance-Bounding Protocols
Distance bounding90 is a technique that establishes physical distance between two
entities by timing the delay of sent and received transmissions. This distance bound
can be computed over various signals such as RF or ultrasonic sound (which is an
acoustic signal above 20kHz). A number of IMD/BAN access control and authenti-
cation protocols use distance bounding.28,58,62,64,75 However, distance bounding by
itself provides for only weak authentication, in which physical proximity between de-
vices is established but identity and authorization are not, thereby requiring the use
of additional authentication techniques.
A typical distance-bounding protocol between a programmer and IMD, for ex-
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ample, involves the programmer proving to the IMD that it is physically close (e.g.,
within 3cm). Rasmussen et al.75 use ultrasonic sound signals to compute the distance
bound of a programmer and IMD, since it is impossible for an attacker to send audio
data that propagates faster than the speed of sound. Shi et al.58,64 use received signal
strength (RSS) variation to differentiate BAN devices on the same body from external
signals (i.e., attacker transmissions). This technique relies on the observation that the
RSS variation between two BAN devices on the same body is more stable than the
RSS between an on-body device and an external device. Jurik et al.67 make use of
ECG signals to establish the continued proximity of an authenticated mobile device
to a user.
Distance bounds are also computed over body-coupled communication (BCC). BCC
uses the human body as a transmission medium, requiring physical proximity to the
patient in order to communicate. Li et al.28 introduce wireless attacks against BCC
and find that both passive and active attacks are mitigated for distances greater
than 0.5m. Chang et al.62 inject artificial signals through the patient’s body to
authenticate BAN devices on the same body. These signals, however, only achieve
an estimated 0.469 to 5.429 bits per hour, making this technique impractical.
In the related field of RFID, system implementations have inaccurately assumed
distance-bounding guarantees as a result of short read ranges (e.g., 10cm). Kfir et al.91
introduce a relay attack in which two coordinated adversaries fool an RFID reader into
believing that the RFID tag is nearby. Relay attacks can be mitigated with context-
33
CHAPTER 2. SYSTEMIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE
aware communication,92 a method which requires the user to perform an uncommon,
but easily repeatable movement in order to be authenticated. The applicability of
this defense to IMDs is debatable, however, because a patient may not be able to
authenticate in the event of a medical emergency.
Cremers et al.93 provide a classification of distance-bounding attacks that assumes
weak authentication, suggesting additional evaluation is required before such proto-
cols are used in the medical setting; the adversarial capabilities necessary to launch
these attacks are included in our model. Cremers et al. use the terminology verifier
and prover to describe the participants in distance-bounding protocols; the verifier
establishes physical proximity to the prover. The attacks consider various adversarial
capabilities for falsifying physical proximity to the prover. Specifically, the adversary
may modify transmissions between a verifier and prover. He may introduce his own
dishonest prover, or he may collude with other dishonest entities. Lastly, he may
also exploit honest provers (e.g., by first allowing the prover to establish physical
proximity, then jamming subsequent prover transmissions and authenticating in the
prover’s stead).
2.4.1.3 Out-of-Band (OOB) Authentication
OOB techniques make use of auxiliary channels, such as audio, visual, and tactile,
that are outside the established data communication channel.22,49,83,94 Using auxil-
iary channels for authentication obviates the need for trusted third parties and key
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pre-distribution schemes. A common assumption in these schemes is that the chosen
out-of-band channel is resistant to eavesdropping attacks.
Halperin et al.22 propose an OOB authentication scheme that uses a low-frequency
audio channel. The basic idea is that the IMD uses a zero-power RFID device to gen-
erate a random key and transmit it over the audio channel. The patient is alerted
when a key exchange occurs through vibrations produced by a piezo element con-
nected to the RFID device. The programmer, at a distance of no more than 0.6m to
0.9m,71 listens for the key and then establishes a secure authenticated channel with
the IMD.
Halevi et al.71 examine a passive adversary with the ability to deploy (or other-
wise make use of) a general-purpose microphone (e.g., PC microphone) in the vicinity
of the IMD/programmer communication. Halevi et al. show that although the mea-
sured piezo sound accuracy varies with distance, the average key retrieval correctness
at 0.9m, computed for multiple supervised methods, is as high as 99.88%. This
contradicts Halperin et al.’s22 earlier experimental result, which indicates the audio
channel is resistant to eavesdropping.
Alternatively, Denning et al.49 and Li et al.83 opt for visual OOB authentication.
Denning et al. propose the use of ultra-violet or visible tattoos to record permanent
IMD keys. This mechanism allows emergency authentication, but does not allow
for key revocation and may suffer from usability concerns.49 Li et al.83 require the
users to visually inspect simultaneous LED blinking patterns in order to achieve
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authentication in BANs. The usability of this scheme is unclear and it is unlikely to
be appropriate for emergency scenarios, so its applicability to IMDs is limited.
2.4.1.4 External Wearable Devices
A unique approach to securing IMD/BAN telemetry makes use of external devices
worn by the patient. The basic idea is that this external device mediates commu-
nication with the IMD, thereby providing both confidentiality for transmitted data
and protection against unauthenticated communication. One concern with the use
of such devices is their acceptability to the patient, however. Denning et al.49 treat
this issue in some detail and study the usability of several possible authentication
methods, including external devices and password tattoos.
Denning et al.79 propose an external device, called the cloaker, that proxies au-
thorized communication to the IMD. If the cloaker is absent, the IMD communicates
openly (e.g., in case of a medical emergency, the cloaker fails open). A malicious
programmer can exploit this fail-open behavior by selectively jamming the cloaker or
otherwise convincing the IMD of the cloaker’s absence, so Denning et al. suggest ad-
ditional mitigation techniques to prevent such an attacker from communicating with
the IMD.
Gollakota et al.69 and Xu et al.72 use friendly jamming to protect IMD communi-
cation, which uses jamming constructively to prevent unauthorized communication.
IMDGuard72 employs an external wearable device, called the Guardian, to enable
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access control and confidential data transmissions. The Guardian first authenticates
the programmer and then uses an ECG-based key agreement mechanism to authen-
ticate itself to the IMD. Temporary keys can then be issued to allow a secure channel
between the programmer and the IMD. In the event that an attacker jams the mes-
sages from the Guardian device to the IMD, the Guardian initiates an active defense
by jamming all IMD transmissions. However, IMDGuard has the disadvantage of
requiring modifications to the IMD itself (which is difficult in practice with respect
to already-deployed devices) and the suggested ECG-based key agreement scheme
suffers from security flaws. Rostami et al.29 show a simple man-in-the-middle attack
that reduces the effective key length from 129 bits to 86 bits. This attack takes ad-
vantage of a protocol flaw in the second round of reconciliation (in which the two
parties verify they know the same key), which can be spoofed to reveal one bit per
block.
The shield69 works by listening for and jamming all IMD transmissions and unau-
thorized commands. Given the shield’s proximity and jamming power, the assump-
tion is that only the shield can cancel out its own jamming signal and decode IMD
transmissions. This design mitigates both passive and active wireless attacks, but the
security of the system relies on the assumption that an attacker whose distance from
the IMD is greater than the distance between the IMD and the shield will be unable
to recover IMD transmissions, even if the attacker is equipped with multiple input
and multiple output (MIMO)-systems and directional antennas. Tippenhauer et al.60
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challenge this assumption, however, and show that MIMO-based attacks are possible
in the presence of an adversary with two receiving antennas from distances of up to
3m.
2.4.1.5 Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection attempts to automatically identify resource depletion and mali-
cious communication, as well as distinguish between safety and security events.56,61,73
This is generally achieved by observing patterns over time, such as physiological
changes or IMD access patterns (e.g., programmer commands, date, or location).
Hei et al.73 obtain and use normal IMD access patterns as training data for their
supervised learning-based scheme. The resultant classification is used to identify
anomalous IMD access in real time. That is, Hei et al.’s method tries to detect
abnormal access attempts and block such authentication from proceeding, before any
expensive computations take place. In this way, the IMD is protected against denial
of service attacks that deplete the system’s resources. This scheme is designed for
non-emergency settings, however, and Hei et al. recommend that either the IMD
automatically detect emergency conditions and fail open, or that hospitals have access
to a master device key. The feasibility and security provided by these two approaches
is not considered.
Another anomaly detection approach makes use of audits; Henry et al.’s scheme56
observes correlated physiological changes when an insulin bolus is administered by
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tracking acoustic bowel sounds. These observations are recorded as an audit log
for retroactive verifiability of intended system execution. While useful, a limitation
of passive anomaly detection is that such schemes do not provide medical device
integrity, and so need to be used in conjunction with another mechanism that protects
communications.
At the physical layer, wireless transmissions from an attacker are likely to deviate
in physical characteristics from legitimate programmer transmissions. Zhang et al.61
propose a medical security monitor, MedMon, which is an external device that detects
anomalous transmissions by examining physical characteristics of the transmitted
signal; such characteristics include received signal strength, time of arrival, differential
time of arrival, and angle of arrival. When an anomalous transmission is detected,
MedMon can initiate either a passive defense (e.g., by alerting the patient) or an
active defense (e.g., by blocking the transmissions from reaching the medical device).
The characteristics of the device used for anomaly detection (and any associ-
ated audit logs) have important implications for the overall security of the system.
Suggested anomaly detection implementations make use of dedicated devices, such
as analog sensor systems,56 or extend the functionality of personal devices, such as
smartphones.61,73 Offloading heavy computation to another device like a smartphone
might improve the IMD’s battery life, but significantly increases the attack surface,
as malware on mobile devices is common.95 Moreover, regulatory barriers for medical
devices may make this approach difficult. Additional challenges related to the use of
39
CHAPTER 2. SYSTEMIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE
mobile devices and health-related BANs are surveyed by Avancha et al.51
2.4.2 Software Threats
Software running on medical devices spans a wide range of complexity. An increas-
ing number of medical devices are reliant on digital circuits controlled by software,
rather than analog circuits. Faris96 notes that in 2006, a major milestone was crossed
when over half of deployed medical devices contained software. So far there has been
a lack of detailed analysis of IMD software. However, there have been efforts to verify
proper functionality by simulating an artificial heart to interface with cardiac pace-
makers.68,97 Although these testing methods are not directly tailored to security, the
tests reduce software bugs and may therefore reduce possible software vulnerabilities.
Devices communicating over a BAN, in addition to their application code, have to
include a telemetry interface that increases both the amount of code and the number
of possible bugs. It is not surprising, then, that software is one of the main reasons
for FDA recalls of computer-related issues.59 Sandler et al.98 report that in 2010, the
FDA issued 23 recalls of defective devices, six of which were likely caused by software
defects. Alemzadeh et al.59 report that the percentage of computer-related recalls
between 2006 and 2011 was between 30% to 40%. In this study, software defects are
found to be the cause of 33% of computer-related class I recalls (reasonable chance of
patient harm), 66% of class II recalls (temporary or reversible adverse effects), and
75% of class III recalls (non-compliant, but unlikely to cause harm).
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Bugs in medical devices have been a cause of over 500 recalls recorded between
2009 and 2011 by the FDA.63 While there exists no method to extrapolate from the
reported bugs to those existing in deployed devices, the number reported is most
likely only a lower bound. Fu reports that failures in medical device software often
result from a failure to apply known system engineering techniques,99 indicating that
the problem is partially solvable today.
Moreover, the presence of a telemetry interface on the device may expose software
bugs to a remote attacker. Evidence of the brittleness of software implementations
is apparent when investigating security vulnerabilities, including those in proprietary
firmware. Hanna et al.87 perform the first public software security analysis of an
automatic external defibrillator (AED). By reverse engineering the device, the au-
thors successfully target three software packages responsible for programming device
parameters, collecting post-cardiac device data, and updating the AED. The authors
locate four vulnerabilities, one of which enables arbitrary code execution on the de-
vice.
The need for secure coding practices for safety-critical devices is clear. However,
closed source for medical devices make it challenging to run a static analyzer on the
source code, let alone obtain the firmware. With proprietary protocols and the special
MICS band used on the wireless telemetry interface, traditional fuzzing tools such as
Peach Fuzzer100 have not developed modules appropriate for testing medical devices.
A related security vulnerability is the existence of malware on medical devices.
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Regardless of whether the intent of the attacker is to compromise a medical device,
malware can significantly impact the performance and reliability of safety-critical
devices such as IMDs.23
2.5 Research Challenges and Emerging
Threats
In this section, we identify and address challenges computer science researchers
face in examining the security and privacy of medical devices and discuss promising
areas for future work. In particular, we discuss common problems, identifying partial
solutions and highlighting areas where further work is needed. A particularly difficult
issue is the lack of reproducibility of research results in this field; given the safety-
critical nature of IMDs and some BANs, it is critical that proposed attacks and
defenses be thoroughly and independently evaluated in order to accurately assess risk
of the attack and efficacy of the defense. A second area of concern, which we discussed
briefly in Section 2.4.1, is the use of physiological values to secure IMDs/BANs. The
evaluations in the literature are limited in scope, partially because of the lack of
availability of appropriate data sets for use by researchers and partially because the
focus has been on protocol design rather than on a rigorous assessment of the use of
biometrics for cryptographic key establishment.
We first address issues related to reproducibility in Section 2.5.1, before moving
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to a discussion of the use of physiological values in Section 2.5.2.
2.5.1 Reproducibility challenges
Lack of access to devices is a common problem; access to medical devices is ei-
ther non-existent or limited to older, end-of-life models that have been received from
patients, relatives, or physicians. The ICD that Halperin et al.22 study, for example,
is a model introduced to the market five years earlier. Without access to the devices
themselves, researchers are necessarily limited in their ability to analyze potential
attacks and defenses; often device hardware configurations are not public knowledge.
Research results from groups that have managed to acquire and study particular
IMDs are not likely to be validated by others, if only because of lack of equipment.
While there have been some efforts to provide access to medical devices,101 direct
access to devices from manufacturers by the security research community appears to
be limited at present.
A second issue in computer security and privacy experiments on medical devices is
the use of food-grade meat as a phantom, or human tissue simulator.22,60,69 As Clark
and Fu31 observe, this method does not lead to reproducible experiments, possibly
due to the introduction of uncontrolled variables that can affect the impedance of
the tissue or propagation of signals in the phantom. Instead, researchers should use
a calibrated saline solution at 1.8g/L at 21◦C [102, Table 10, p. 30] with electrodes
to inject the appropriate simulated physiological signals. The complete design is de-
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scribed in the ANSI/AAMI PC69:2007 standard [102, Annex G]; this is the accepted
standard for electromagnetic compatibility of medical devices by researchers, device
manufacturers, and regulators.
2.5.2 Physiological values as an entropy source
As mentioned in Section 2.4.1.1, the use of physiological values as a building
block for security and privacy mechanisms is widespread in the literature. In partic-
ular, much research relies on the use of ECGs for security and privacy mechanisms.
ECG measurements have been suggested for use in authentication,55 key establish-
ment,66,72,82 and proximity detection67 protocols (i.e., determining if one or more
devices are in physical contact with the same body). Several systems have devices
generate a shared secret key by reading the ECG signal through physical contact with
the same person.33,57,66,70,72,78,85
Most of these ECG-based mechanisms rely on the reported randomness of the
IPI, or the amount of time between individual heartbeats;55,72 Rostami et al.29,55
suggest that sufficient entropy may be extracted from the least significant bits of
properly quantized IPIs. There are some inconsistencies in the literature with respect
to the quality of randomness it is possible to extract,75,77,81 however, and in studying
this issue, researchers have been limited by a lack of sufficient real-world data. In
particular, it is important to understand the impact of confounding factors such as
health and age on the amount of entropy in IPI, in order to ensure that appropriate
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protocol parameters are chosen for entropy extraction.
In addition, Chang et al.62 draw attention to the fact that the feasibility of these
schemes relies on the ability of two devices to measure (and agree on) IPI in the
presence of noise. Therefore, realizing such schemes may be more difficult using real-
world data, rather than data collected in controlled environments (as measured by
physicians with advanced medical equipment). Chang et al.’s results are indicative
that measurement noise must be taken into account; later work by Rostami et al.55
address this concern by taking into account and optimizing for these error rates.
Most evaluations have relied on an aggregation of heart rate databases from the
MIT PhysioNet portal,103 which provides access to a large number of waveforms
(collected by clinicians) ranging from healthy sinus rhythms to irregular heartbeat
rhythms, or arrhythmias. Many suggested protocols are evaluated using either un-
specified databases33,57,66,72,78,85 or arrhythmia databases.55,70,86,104 To extract ran-
dom bits for a given record, the mean and standard deviation of the record are used
to first quantize the bits, with a subset of the least significant bits treated as random.
For example, Rostami et al.55 quantize the IPI data into 8-bit representations and
take the four least significant bits as random; the amount of entropy is estimated em-
pirically using the classical definition of Shannon entropy (i.e., average entropy). A
statistical battery of tests is then applied to the extracted bits—typically the (basic)
subset of the NIST test suite105 appropriate for the amount of data available.
Following the state of the art,106,107 the assessment of a true random number
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generator (TRNG) for cryptographic purposes requires
a) an assessment of the quality of the entropy source itself (and a justification that
the physical process being measured is random); b) an analysis of the efficiency and
robustness of the extraction method (and the impact of the extraction method on the
statistical properties of the TRNG); and c) cryptanalysis in the suggested use case
(e.g., if an adversary can observe the entropy source or has an advantage in guessing
future bits, this is not good for cryptographic use).
In particular, statistical analysis of the output of a TRNG, such as testing the
output using the NIST test suites, is not sufficient to determine suitability for use
in key agreement. The statistical properties of the physical phenomena need to be
well-understood; properly quantizing the data and extracting bits that are close to
uniform requires an accurate characterization of the distribution. For example, in
the case of IPI, if the suggested methods for bit extraction do not ensure that the
distribution characteristics used at time of authentication are accurate, the resulting
bits may exhibit bias. We discuss the issue of observability of the IPI entropy source
in more detail in the next section.
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2.5.3 Emerging threats: sensors, remote attacks,
and privacy
The traditional assumption with respect to IMDs and BANs is that many physi-
ological signals stay within a patient’s body, limiting the exfiltration of data and the
possibility for signal injection attacks. Recent studies, however, show that both are
possible.
To date, the design constraints of IMDs have carefully dealt with the possibility
of accidental electromagnetic interference, but do not consider the possibility of an
active attacker. Recent work by Foo Kune et al.32 shows that intentional interference
at a CIED sensor interface is possible. By injecting a signal that mimics a cardiac
waveform, Foo Kune et al. show that it is theoretically possible to alter the therapy
delivered by the CIED, although the current range of this attack is very limited
(on the order of a few centimeters). Reliance on sensor readings to achieve accurate
and timely actuation, combined with increasingly sophisticated attacks, highlights the
need to carefully consider adversarial capabilities and how best to achieve trustworthy
systems.
Similarly, if the assumption that certain physiological signals stay within the hu-
man body is incorrect, both the security and privacy of schemes may be affected.
For example, the use of physiological values as a source of entropy in key agreement
schemes relies heavily on the assumption that it is not feasible for an adversary to
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observe the given biometric. A standard assumption in current literature is that the
adversary cannot make physical contact with the target patient. In this sense, pro-
tocols that make use of physiological values to generate a shared key can be viewed
as body-coupled communication protocols, whereby the key is transmitted via the
human body. Although the assumption that an adversary does not have physical
contact has merit in practice, we remark that this adversarial model neglects subtle
classes of attacks by people known to the victim; ideally, new technologies should
not enable “perfect crime” scenarios, even for the most sophisticated of attackers.
As more and more people become active participants in (potentially insecure) BANs,
moreover, it may be possible for a person close to the victim (i.e., with physical con-
tact) to inadvertently aid a remote attacker (e.g., by leaking patient biometrics or
performing signal injection attacks on sensors/wireless telemetry).
Remote attackers are also a concern today, especially with respect to observing
physiological values assumed to be secret. Rostami et al.55 and Chang et al.62 both
recognize the need to consider remote sensing of IPI. Rostami et al. attempt to extract
IPI from video footage of the target, following work by Poh et al.108 on the correlation
between color fluctuations and IPI. Although Rostami et al. fail to replicate these
results, other recent work in this area109,110 indicates that such attacks deserve further
attention.
As a final remark, recent results in Bagade et al.33 show that the ECG data of
one person may be observable from another person’s physiological signals, if the two
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are in physical contact. That is, if two individuals touch, the ECG of one person is
coupled to the EEG of the other person. We conclude that while the use of ECG (and
other physiological values) as a security mechanism appears to hold some promise,
cryptanalysis and entropy assessments need to be undertaken more rigorously.
A related area of research is the study of neurostimulators, which are IMDs de-
signed to send electrical pulses to the nervous system, including the brain. These
devices are used to treat conditions such as epilepsy, Parkinson’s, and obsessive com-
pulsive disorder, with ongoing human trials exploring their efficacy in treating severe
depression. Very little computer security and privacy research has been completed
on these devices, and as the technology progresses, the need for further work in this
area becomes more pressing. Denning et al.76 give a brief overview of potential
security and privacy implications with respect to neurostimulators, but concrete re-
sults in this area are lacking. A related question is explored by Martinovic et al.:65
the authors’ side channel attacks in the context of brain-computer interfaces (BCIs),
which measure and respond dynamically to a user’s brain activities, thereby allow-
ing communication without words or gestures. Although the study is preliminary in
nature, Martinovic et al.’s results support the hypothesis that personal information,
such as passwords and whether or not a particular person is known to the target, may
unintentionally leak through BCI use.
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have given a cohesive narrative of security and privacy research
in IMDs and BANs, analyzing current and emerging research trends: namely the
security of the IMD/BAN telemetry and sensor interfaces and the need for trustworthy
software. Our analysis in Section 2.4.1 shows that much attention has been paid to
securing the telemetry interface and many useful approaches have been developed.
We have identified several areas for future work, such as the need for a more
rigorous assessment of the use of physiological values as a source of entropy for cryp-
tographic keys. As mentioned in Section 2.4.2, the increasing complexity of software
in IMDs and the history of FDA software-related recalls highlights the need for future
work ensuring the trustworthiness of IMD and BAN software.
Finally, as discussed in Section 2.5.3, the possibility of EMI attacks on the sensor
interface and eavesdropping on physiological signals formerly thought to be private is
indicative of the need for a more nuanced approach to security and privacy research for
medical devices. Computing devices that interface with the brain are becoming more
advanced and more popular, both in the entertainment (in the form of BCI-integrated
gaming) and health care industries (in the form of neurostimulators). The ability to
record and analyze brainwaves in real time using implanted computing devices that
alter the brain’s functionality has far-reaching implications for security and privacy,
moving well beyond the traditional treatment of these topics in computer security.
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Dancing on the Lip of the Volcano:
Chosen Ciphertext Attacks on
Apple iMessage
The past several years have seen widespread adoption of end-to-end encrypted text
messaging protocols. In this work we focus on one of the most popular such protocols:
Apple’s iMessage. Introduced in 2011, iMessage is an end-to-end encrypted text
messaging system that supports both iOS and OS X devices. While Apple does not
provide up-to-date statistics on iMessage usage, in February 2016 an Apple executive
noted that the system had a peak transmission rate of more then 200,000 messages
per second, across 1 billion deployed devices.111
The broad adoption of iMessage has been controversial, particularly within the law
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enforcement and national security communities. In 2013, the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency deemed iMessage “a challenge for DEA intercept”,112 while in 2015 the U.S.
Department of Justice accused Apple of thwarting an investigation by refusing to turn
over iMessage plaintext.113 iMessage has been at the center of a months-long debate
initiated by U.S. and overseas officials over the implementation of “exceptional ac-
cess” mechanisms in end-to-end encrypted communication systems,114–116 and some
national ISPs have temporarily blocked the protocol.117 Throughout this contro-
versy, Apple has consistently maintained that iMessage encryption is end-to-end and
that even Apple cannot recover the plaintext for messages transmitted through its
servers.118
Given iMessage’s large installed base and the high stakes riding on its confidential-
ity, one might expect iMessage to have received critical attention from the research
community. Surprisingly, there has been very little analysis of the system, in large
part due to the fact that Apple has declined to publish the details of iMessage’s en-
cryption protocol. In this chapter we aim to remedy this situation. Specifically, we
attempt to answer the following question: how secure is Apple iMessage?
Our contributions. In this work we analyze the iMessage protocol and identify several
weaknesses that an attacker may use to decrypt iMessages and attachments. While
these flaws do not render iMessage completely insecure, some flaws reduce the level
of security to that of the TLS encryption used to secure communications between
end-user devices and Apple’s servers. This finding is surprising given the protection
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claims advertised by Apple.118 Moreover, we determine that the flaws we detect in
iMessage may have implications for other aspects of Apple’s ecosystem, as we discuss
below.
To perform our analysis, we derived a specification for iMessage by conducting
a partial black-box reverse engineering of the protocol as implemented on multiple
iOS and OS X devices. Our efforts extend a high-level protocol overview published
by Apple119 and two existing partial reverse-engineering efforts.120,121 Armed with a
protocol specification, we conducted manual cryptanalysis of the system. Specifically,
we tried to determine the system’s resilience to both back-end infrastructure attacks
and more restricted attacks that subvert only client-local networks.
Our analysis uncovered several previously unreported vulnerabilities in the iMes-
sage protocol. Most significantly, we identified a practical adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attack on the iMessage encryption mechanism that allows us to retrospectively de-
crypt certain iMessage payloads and attachments, provided that a single Sender or
Recipient device is online. To validate this finding, we implemented a proof of con-
cept exploit against our own test devices and show that the attack can be conducted
remotely (and silently) against any party with an online device. This exploit is non-
trivial, and required us to develop novel exploit techniques, including a new chosen
ciphertext attack that operates against ciphertexts containing gzip compressed data.
We refer to this technique as a gzip format oracle attack, and we believe it may have
applications to other encryption protocols. We discuss the details of this attack in
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§3.5.
We also demonstrate weaknesses in the device registration and key distribution
mechanisms of iMessage. One weakness we exploit has been identified by the reverse
engineering efforts in ,120 while another is novel. As they are not the main result of
this work, we include them in Appendix 3.10 for completeness.
Overall, our determination is that while iMessage’s end-to-end encryption pro-
tocol is an improvement over systems that use encryption on network traffic only
(e.g., Google Hangouts), messages sent through iMessage may not be secure against
sophisticated adversaries. Our results show that an attacker who obtains iMessage
ciphertexts can, at least for some types of messages, retrospectively decrypt traffic.
Because Apple stores encrypted, undelivered messages on its servers and retains them
for up to 30 days, such messages are vulnerable to any party who can obtain access
to this infrastructure, e.g., via court order,113 or by compromising Apple’s globally-
distributed server infrastructure.122 Similarly, an attacker who can intercept TLS
using a stolen certificate may be able to intercept iMessages on certain versions of
iOS and Mac OS X that do not employ certificate pinning on Apple Push Network
Services (APNs) connections.
Given the wide deployment of iMessage, and the attention paid to iMessage by
national governments, these threats do not seem unrealistic. Fortunately, the vul-
nerabilities we discovered in iMessage are relatively straightforward to repair. In the
final section of this chapter, we offer a set of mitigations that will restore strong cryp-
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tographic security to the iMessage protocol. Some of these are included in iOS 9.3
and Mac OS X 10.11.4, which shipped in March 2016.
Other uses of the iMessage encryption protocol. While our work primarily consid-
ers the iMessage instant messaging system, we note that the vulnerabilities identified
here go beyond iMessage. Apple documentation notes that Apple’s “Handoff” service,
which transmits personal data between Apple devices over Bluetooth Low Energy, en-
crypts messages “in a similar fashion to iMessage”.119 This raises the possibility that
our attacks on iMessage encryption may also affect intra-device communication chan-
nels used between Apple devices. Attacks on this channel are particularly concerning
because these functions are turned on by default in many new Apple devices. We
did not investigate these attack vectors in this work but subsequent discussions with
Apple have confirmed that Apple uses the same encryption implementation to secure
both iMessage and intra-device communications. Thus, securing these channels is one
side effect of the mitigations we propose in §3.7.
3.1.1 Responsible disclosure
In November 2015 we delivered to Apple a summary of the results in this chapter.
Apple acknowledged the vulnerability in §3.5 and has initiated substantial repairs to
the iMessage system. These repairs include: enforcing certificate pinning across all
channels used by iMessage,1 removing compression from the iMessage composition
1This feature was added to OS X 10.11 in December, as a result of our notification.
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(for attachment messages), and developing a fix based on our proposed “duplicate
ciphertext detection” mitigation (see §3.7). Apple has also made changes to the use
of iMessage in inter-device communications such as Handoff, although the company
has declined to share the details with us. The repairs are included in iOS 9.3 and OS
X 10.11.4, which shipped in March 2016.
3.1.2 Attack Model
Our attacks in §3.5 require the ability to obtain iMessage ciphertexts sent to
or received by a client. Because Apple Push Network Services (APNs) uses TLS to
transmit encrypted messages to Apple’s back-end servers, exploiting iMessage requires
either access to data from Apple’s servers or a forged TLS certificate. We stress that
while this is a strong assumption, it is the appropriate threat model for considering
end-to-end encrypted protocols.
A more interesting objection to this threat model is the perception that iMess-
sage might be too weak to satisfy it. For example, in 2013 Raynal et al. pointed
out a simple attack on Apple’s key distribution that enables a TLS MITM attacker
to replace the public key of a recipient with an attacker-chosen key.120 One finding
of this work is that as of December 2015 such attacks have been entirely mitigated
by Apple through the addition of certificate pinning on key server connections (see
Appendix 3.10). More fundamentally, however, such attacks are prospective – in the
sense that they require the attacker to target a particular individual before the indi-
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vidual begins communicating. By contrast, the attacks we describe in this chapter
are retrospective. They can be run against any stored message content, at any point
subsequent to communication, provided that one target device remains online. More-
over, unlike previous attacks which require access to the target’s local network, our
attacks may be run remotely through Apple’s infrastructure.
3.2 The iMessage Protocol
To obtain the full iMessage specification, we began with the security overview
provided by Apple, as well as a detailed previous software reverse-engineering efforts
conducted by Raynal120 and others.121 While these previous results provide some
details of the protocol, they omit key details of the encryption mechanism, as well
as the complete key registration and notification mechanisms. We conducted addi-
tional black-box reverse engineering efforts to recover these elements. Specifically,
we analyzed and modified protocol exchanges to and from several jailbroken and
non-jailbroken Apple devices.2 In conformity to Apple’s terms of service, we did not
perform any software decompilation.
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          AES encrypted payload
AES key
RSA ciphertext
               compressed payload
iMessage binary plist
huffman table
partial AES ciphertext signature
gzip compress
AES-CTR encrypt (IV=1)




Recipient PK Sender SK
ECDSA-SHA1 sign
sender ID
Figure 3.1: The iMessage encryption mechanism. From the top, each iMessage is
encoded in a binary plist key/value structure. The structure encodes a list of Sender
and Recipient account identifiers, as well as the message contents. This payload
is subsequently gzip compressed, and encrypted under a freshly-generated 128-bit
message key using AES in CTR-mode. The AES key and the first 101 bytes of the
AES ciphertext are concatenated and are encrypted to each Recipient’s public key
using RSA-OAEP. The remaining bytes of the AES ciphertext are concatenated to the
RSA ciphertext and the result is signed using ECDSA under the Sender’s registered
signing key.
3.2.1 System overview
iMessage clients. iMessage clients comprise several pieces of software running on end-
user devices. On iOS and OS X devices, the primary user-facing component is the
Messages application. On OS X computers, this application interacts with at least
three daemons: apsd, the daemon responsible for pushing and pulling application
traffic over the Apple Push Notification Service (APNs) channel; imagent, a daemon
that pulls notifications even if Messages is closed; and identityservicesd, a daemon
which maintains a cache of other users’ keys. iOS devices also contain an apsd
daemon, while other daemons handle the task of managing identities.
2In this analysis we considered iOS 6, 8, and 9 devices, as well as Mac clients running OS X
10.10.3, 10.10.5, and 10.11.1.
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Apple services. iMessage clients interact with multiple back-end services operated
by Apple and its partners. We focus on the two most relevant to our attack. The
Apple directory service (IDS, also known as ESS) maintains a mapping between
user identities and public keys and is responsible for distributing user public keys
on request. iMessage content is transmitted via the Apple Push Notification Service
(APNs). Long iMessages and attachments are transmitted by uploading them to the
iCloud service, which is operated by Apple using both their own servers and virtual
servers provisioned on Amazon AWS, Microsoft Azure, and Google’s Cloud Platform.
3.2.1.0.1 Identity and registration
The basic unit of identity in iMessage is the iCloud account name, which typically
consists of an email address or phone number controlled by the user. End-user de-
vices are registered to the iCloud service by associating them with an account. The
mapping between client devices and accounts is not one-to-one: a single account may
be used across multiple devices, and similarly, multiple accounts can be associated
with a single device. We give further information about the registration process in
Appendix 3.10.
3.2.1.0.2 Message encryption and decryption
To transmit a message to some list of Recipient IDs, the Sender’s iMessage client
first contacts the IDS to obtain the public key(s) PK1, . . . , PKD and a list of APNs
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push tokens associated with the Sender and Recipient identities.3 It then encodes the
Sender and Recipient addresses and plaintext message into a binary plist key-value
data structure and compresses this structure using the gzip compression format. The
client next generates a 128-bit AES session key K and encrypts the resulting com-
pressed message using AES-CTR with IV = 1. This produces a ciphertext c, which
is next partitioned as c = (c1‖c2) where c1 represents the first 101 bytes of c. The
Sender parses each PKi to obtain the public encryption key pkE,i and for i = 1 to D,
calculates Ci = RSA-OAEP(pkE,i, K‖c1) and a signature σi = ECDSASign(skS, Ci‖c2).
For each distinct push token received from IDS, the Sender transmits (Ci, c2, σi) to
the APNs server. This process is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
For each ciphertext, the APNs service delivers the tuple (IDsender, IDrecipient, Ci, c2, σi)
to the intended destination. The receiving device contacts IDS to obtain the Sender’s
public key PK, parses for the signature verification key vkS, then verifies the signa-
ture σ. If verification succeeds, it decrypts Ci to obtain K‖c1, reconstructs c = (c1‖c2)
and decrypts the resulting AES-CTR ciphertext using K. It decompresses the result-
ing gzip ciphertext, parses the resulting plist to obtain the list of Recipient IDs,
and verifies that each of IDsender and IDrecipient are present in this list. If any of
the preceding checks fail, or if the Recipient is unable to parse or decompress the
resulting message, the receiving device silently aborts processing.
3This list includes one entry for each device registered to each Sender and Recipient ID. The
Messages client encrypts the message with each Sender public key to ensure that message transcripts
can be read across all of the Sender’s devices.
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3.2.1.0.3 Attachments and long messages
For long messages and messages containing file attachments (e.g., images or video),
iMessage delivers the encrypted data using a separate mechanism. First, the client
generates a 256-bit AES key K ′ and encrypts the attached data using AES in CTR
mode. It next uploads the resulting encrypted document to Apple’s iCloud service
and obtains a unique icloud.com URL and an access token for the attachment. In
the course of this process, the iCloud service may redirect the client to upload the
encrypted file to a third-party storage server operated by an outside provider such
as Amazon, Microsoft or Google. Having uploaded the attachment, the client now
constructs a standard iMessage plist containing the URL and access token, the
key K ′ and a SHA1 hash of the encrypted document. This plist, which may also
include normal message text, is encrypted and transmitted to the Recipient using
the standard message encryption mechanism. Upon receiving and decrypting the
message, the Recipient downloads the attachment using the provided URL and access
token, verifies that the provided hash matches the received attachment, and decrypts
the attachment using K ′.
3.3 Security goals & Threat model
Apple has stated that iMessage is an end-to-end encryption protocol that should
be secure against all attackers that do not have control of Apple’s network. We base
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our threat model on a recent survey on secure messaging by Unger et al.123 This
threat model includes the following attackers:
Local Adversary. This includes an attacker with control over local networks, either
on the Sender or Recipient side of the connection.
Global Adversary. An attacker controlling large segments of the Internet, such as
powerful nation states or large Internet service providers.
Network operator. Apple operates centralized infrastructure for both public key
distribution and message transmission/storage. Potential adversaries include
Apple, a government, or a malicious party with access to Apple’s servers.
Each of these attackers may be active or passive. A passive attacker simply
observes traffic and does not seek to alter or inject its own messages. An active
attacker may issue arbitrary messages to any party. In many cases, these adversary
classes may interact. As in123 we assume that adversaries also have access to the
messaging system, and can use the system to register accounts and transmit messages
as normal participants. We also assume that the endpoints in the conversation are
secure, although in some cases we allow for the possibility that an attacker might
briefly take physical control of a device and/or convince a user to modify device
configurations.
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3.4 High-level Protocol Analysis
An initial analysis of the iMessage specification shows that the protocol suffers
from a number of defects. In this section we briefly detail several of these limitations.
In the following sections we focus on specific, exploitable flaws in the encryption
mechanism.
3.4.0.0.1 Key server and registration
iMessage key management uses a centralized directory server (IDS) which is oper-
ated by Apple. This server represents a single point of compromise for the iMessage
system. Apple, and any attacker capable of compromising the server, can use this
server to perform a man-in-the-middle attack and obtain complete decryption of iMes-
sages. The current generation of iMessage clients do not provide any means for users
to compare or verify the authenticity of keys received from the server.
Of more concern, Apple’s “new device registration” mechanism does not include
a robust mechanism for notifying users when new devices are registered on their ac-
count. This mechanism is triggered by an Apple push message, which in turn triggers
a query to an Apple-operated server. Our analysis shows that these protections are
fragile; in Appendix 3.10 we implement attacks against both the key server and the
new device registration process.
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Original message from Bob
Attacker replays Bob’s message
Figure 3.2: Example of a simple ciphertext replay.
3.4.0.0.2 Lack of forward secrecy
iMessage does not provide any forward secrecy mechanism for transmitted mes-
sages. This is due to the fact that iMessage encryption keys are long-lived, and are
not replaced automatically through any form of automated process. This exposes
users to the risk that a stolen device may be used to decrypt captured past traffic.
Moreover, the use of long term keys for encryption can increase the impact of
other vulnerabilities in the system. For example, in §3.5, we demonstrate an active
attack on iMessage encryption that exposes current iMessage users to decryption of
past traffic. The risk of such attacks would be greatly mitigated if iMessage clients
periodically generated fresh encryption keys. See §3.7 for proposed mitigations.
64
CHAPTER 3. CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT ATTACKS ON APPLE IMESSAGE
3.4.0.0.3 Replay and reflection attacks
The iMessage encryption protocol does not incorporate any mechanism to prevent
replay or reflection of captured ciphertexts, leading to the possibility that an attacker
can falsify conversation transcripts as illustrated in Figure 3.2. A more serious concern
is the possibility that an attacker, upon physically capturing a device, may replay
previously captured traffic to the device and thus obtain the plaintext.
3.4.0.0.4 Lack of certificate pinning on older iOS versions
iMessage clients interact with many Apple servers. As of December 2015, Apple
has activated certificate pinning on both APNs and ESS/IDS connections in iOS 9
and OS X 10.11. This eliminates a serious attack noted by Raynal et al.120 in which
an MITM attacker who controls the Sender’s local network connection and possesses
an Apple certificate can intercept calls to the ESS/IDS key server and substitute
chosen encryption keys for any Recipient (see Appendix 3.10 for further details). We
note that devices running iOS 8 (and earlier) or versions of OS X released prior to
December 2015 may still be vulnerable to such attacks. For example, at the time of
our initial disclosure in November 2015 to Apple, pinning was not present in OS X
10.11.
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3.4.0.0.5 Non-standard encryption
iMessage encryption does not conform to best cryptographic practices and gener-
ally seems ad hoc. The protocol (see Figure 3.1) insecurely composes a collection of
secure primitives, including RSA, AES and ECDSA. Most critically, iMessage does
not use a proper authenticated symmetric encryption algorithm and instead relies on
a digital signature to prevent tampering. Unfortunately it is well known that in the
multi-user setting this approach may not be sound.124 In the following sections, we
show that an on-path attacker can replace the signature on a given message with that
of another party. This vulnerability gives rise to a practical chosen ciphertext attack
that recovers the full contents of some messages.
3.5 Attacks on the Encryption Mechanism
In this section we describe a practical attack on the iMessage encryption mecha-
nism (Figure 3.1) that allows an attacker to completely decrypt certain messages.
3.5.1 Attack setting
Our attack assumes that an adversary can recover encrypted iMessage payloads,
and subsequently access the iMessage infrastructure in the manner of a normal user.
The first requirement implies one of two conditions: in condition (1) the attacker is
on-path and capable of intercepting encrypted iMessage payloads sent from a client to
66
CHAPTER 3. CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT ATTACKS ON APPLE IMESSAGE
Apple’s Push Notification Service (APNs) servers. Since the APNs protocol employs
TLS to secure connections between the client and APNs server, this attacker must
possess some means to bypass the TLS encryption layer; we discuss TLS interception
in more detail in Appendix 3.11. In condition (2) the attacker can recover iMessage
ciphertexts from within Apple’s network. This requires either a compromise of Ap-
ple’s infrastructure, a rogue employee, or legal compulsion. Figure 3.3 describes the



























Figure 3.3: The process of sending an iMessage through the APNS network. The
steps are as follows: (1) The Sender contacts ESS/IDS to obtain the public keys for
each Recipient; (2) (optional) the Sender contacts iCloud to upload an attachment;
(3) (optional) the Sender uploads the encrypted attachment to an outside storage
provider as directed by iCloud; (4) the Sender’s apsd instance transmits the en-
crypted iMessage payload to Apple’s APNs server; (5) Apple delivers the payload to
a Recipient; (6) the Recipient contacts ESS/IDS to obtain the Sender’s public key;
(7) (optional) the Recipient contacts iCloud if an attachment is present; (8) (optional)
the Recipient downloads the encrypted attachment from an outside storage provider.
Potential attacker locations are labeled A, B and C.
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3.5.2 Attack overview
There are two stages of the attack. The first exploits a weakness in the design of
the iMessage encryption composition: namely, that iMessage does not properly au-
thenticate the symmetrically encrypted portion of the message payload. In a properly-
designed composition, this section of the ciphertext would be authenticated using a
MAC in generic composition125 or via an AEAD mode of operation. Apple, instead,
relies on an ECDSA signature to guarantee the authenticity of this ciphertext. In
practice, a signature is insufficient to prevent an attacker from mauling the ciphertext
since an on-path attacker can simply replace the existing signature with an new signa-
ture using a signing key from an account controlled by the attacker. In practice, the
actual attack is slightly more complex; the first phase includes additional operations
to defeat a countermeasure in the decryption mechanism, which we discuss below.
The second stage of the attack leverages the ability to modify the AES ciphertext
(specifically, the section not contained within the RSA ciphertext). This phase con-
sists of an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack exploiting the structure of the underlying
plaintexts. The attack repeatedly modifies the ciphertext and sends it to either the
Sender or a Recipient for decryption. If the attacker can determine if decryption and
parsing were successful on the target device, she can gradually recover the underlying
iMessage payload.
The attack specifics are reminiscent of Vaudenay’s padding oracle attack,126 but
relies on the usage of compression within the iMessage protocol. Specifically, our at-
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tack takes advantage of the 32-bit CRC checksum, computed over the pre-compressed
message, incorporated into gzip compressed ciphertexts. Since CRCs are linear un-
der XOR we can verify guesses about message content by editing the compressed,
encrypted message and testing if the corresponding correction to the CRC results in
a valid message.
3.5.3 A format oracle attack for gzip compression
The gzip format127 is a variant of DEFLATE compression that combines LZ77128
and Huffman coding to efficiently compress common data types. The format sup-
ports both static and dynamically-generated Huffman tables, though most encoders
use dynamic tables for all but the shortest messages. To compress a message, a
CRC32 C is calculated over the uncompressed input. Next, the encoder identi-
fies repeated strings and replaces each repeated instance with a tuple of the form
〈length, backwards distance〉, where distance indicates the relative position of the pre-
vious instance of the string. The input is encoded using an alphabet of 286 symbols,
comprising the 256 byte literals, an end-of-block (EOB) symbol, and 29 string re-
placement length values.4 If dynamic generation is selected, a Huffman table T is
calculated using the resulting text as a basis (for static tables, T = ε), and the text is
Huffman coded into a string of variable-length symbols S = (s1, . . . , sN) where string
replacement symbols are internally partitioned into a pair 〈length, distance〉. The re-
4A separate Huffman table is used to encode backwards distances.
69
CHAPTER 3. CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT ATTACKS ON APPLE IMESSAGE
sulting compressed message consists of (T, S, C). On decompression the process is
reversed and the CRC of the resulting string is compared to C. If any step fails, the
decompressor outputs ⊥.
Attack intuition. Our attack assumes that the attacker has intercepted a gzip com-
pressed message encrypted using an unauthenticated stream cipher and that we have
access to a decryption oracle that returns 1 if and only if the message decrypts and
successfully decompresses. Our goal is to recover a substantial fraction of the plaintext
message.
For clarity, we assume the attacker knows the Huffman table T and the length in
bits L of the uncompressed input. We further assume the attacker knows the exact
location in the ciphertext corresponding to some (unknown) `-bit Huffman symbol s
that she wishes to recover, as well as the position of the corresponding decoded literal
in the uncompressed text. These are simplifying assumptions and we will remove
them as we proceed.
Given a ciphertext c, our attack works by first selecting a mask M ∈ {0, 1}`,M 6=
0` and perturbing the ciphertext such that the underlying symbol s will decrypt
to s′ = s ⊕ M . This is done by xoring M into the ciphertext at the appropriate
location. Let decode(T, s) and decode(T, s′) represent the Huffman decoding of s
and s′ respectively, and let repeats be a boolean variable that is true if and only if
s (resp. s′) is repeated subsequently via a DEFLATE string replacement reference.
The potential values of these three variables can be categorized into the following
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seven cases:
Case decode(T, s) decode(T, s⊕M) repeats
1 [0, 255] [0, 255] False
2 [0, 255] [0, 255] True
3 [0, 255] [256, 285] (either)
4 [0, 255] ⊥ (either)
5 [256, 285] [0, 255] (either)
6 [256, 285] [256, 285] (either)
7 [256, 285] ⊥ (either)
In the following paragraphs, we consider the outcome of our experiment for each of
the cases above.
Case 1: In this case, when the attacker submits the mauled ciphertext to the de-
cryption oracle, the oracle will internally decode a result that differs from the original
input string in exactly one byte position: the position corresponding to symbol s′.
However, with overwhelming probability, the CRC C ′ of the decompressed string will
not match C and cause the oracle to output 0.
Because CRC is linear under XOR, the attacker may correct the encrypted value
C by further mauling the ciphertext. Let d indicate the bit position of the symbol
associated with s (resp. s′) in the decoded message. For each i ∈ {0, 1}8 the attacker
xors the string C̄ = CRC(0d||i||0L−d) ⊕ CRC(0L) with the ciphertext at the known
location of C and submits each of the resulting ciphertexts for decryption. Since we
have that decode(T, s′) ∈ [0, 255], one of these tests will always result in a successful
CRC comparison.
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Upon receiving a successful result from the decryption oracle, the attacker now
examines the Huffman table T to identify candidate symbols s for which relation
decode(T, s ⊕M) = decode(T, s) ⊕ i holds. If the attacker cannot identify a unique
solution for s, she may select a new M ′ 6= M 6= 0` and repeat the procedure described
above until she has uniquely identified s. The attacker can now increment her position
in the ciphertext by ` bits and repeat this process to obtain the next plaintext symbol.
If this experiment is unsuccessful, it indicates that the ciphertext is not in Case 1
afrom the above table. To determine which case applies, the attacker must conduct
additional experiments as described below. Sometimes recovery of the symbol s will
not be feasible at all; when this occurs, the attacker must simply continue to the
next symbol in S. Occasionally, the adversary may still be able to recover s at some
additional cost.
Cases 3-4: In these cases, the original decoding of s was a byte literal, but the
decoding of s′ is either an invalid symbol or a special symbol (EOB or string re-
placement symbol). The former case always results in decompressor failure, while
the latter will typically cause the decoded string to differ from the original input at
multiple locations, resulting (with high probability) in a CRC comparison failure that
will not be corrected by the procedure described above.
To address these cases, the attacker may select a new mask M ′ 6= M 6= 0` and
repeat the complete experiment described above. Depending on the structure of the
Huffman table T , and provided that s ∈ [0, 255], the new result s⊕M ′ may produce
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an outcome that satisfies the conditions of cases (1) or (2).5
Case 2: In this case, the symbol represented by s (resp s′) is referenced by one or
more subsequent instances of DEFLATE string repetition. The practical impact is
that modifying s will produce an identical alteration at two or more positions in the
decoded string, and with high probability none of the experiments indicated for Case
1 will succeed.
In some circumstances, it may be cost effective for the attacker to skip s and simply
move on to the next symbol in S. Alternatively, the attacker can experimentally
modify the CRC to indicate the same alteration at all positions that could be affected
by modifying s. Since the attacker does not know the locations at which s is repeated
or the number of such locations, this requires the attacker to submit many candidate
ciphertexts to the oracle, one for each possible set of locations where s may repeat.
In the event that s (resp s′) is repeated only once, this requires the attacker to issue
28 · (L−d)/8 queries to the oracle (one for each value of i and for each possible location
for the repeated value of s′). This may be feasible for reasonably short strings.
Cases 5-7: These cases occur when the original symbol represented by decode(T, s)
is a string replacement or EOB symbol. In most instances, replacing s with (s⊕M)
produces a decoded string that differs from the original in many positions, making it
challenging for the attacker to repair the CRC. If s decodes to a string replacement
5In principle, this approach might require as many as 28 · 2|M | = 28+` decryption queries to
obtain a successful result, or rule out these cases. In practice, however, the number of candidate
mask values M ′ is likely to be much more limited.
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token, and the replacement reference points to a location that the attacker has al-
ready recovered, it may be possible for the attacker to detect the alteration using the
technique described under Case 2. Otherwise the attacker must skip s and move on
to the next symbol in S.
Recovering the unknowns. The procedure described so far requires the attacker to
know the Huffman table T , the length of the uncompressed message L, the location
and length of the symbol s, and the byte index of the corresponding decompressed
literal. In practice many of these quantities may be determined experimentally by
iterating through candidate values for L, `, k and the symbol position. This requires
the attacker to issue many candidate decryption requests until one succeeds. In the
case of iMessage attachment messages, the length L is fixed and an attacker can
generate a representative corpus of messages offline and easily estimate the other
parameters without oracle queries.
Recovering the Huffman table is more challenging. If the message is encoded using
a static table, then the table is known to the attacker. However, if T is dynamically
generated, then the attacker learns only the relation decode(T, s⊕M) = decode(T, s)⊕
i, but has no clear way of learning s or decode(T, s). Nonetheless, it might still be
possible to recover enough information from these relations to recover the value of
the underlying literals.
However, in iMessage this proves unnecessary as we take advantage of iMessage’s
structure to recover a large fraction of the dynamic table T . iMessage payloads con-
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taining attachments embed a URL within the encrypted message. Requests to which
can be monitored (described below). In this way, we learn the file path and/or host-
name indicated by the plaintext URL within each ciphertext. Given this information,
and by mauling individual symbols s contained within the URL string, the attacker
can recover the value decode(T, s ⊕M) for many different values of M . This allows
the attacker to identify a relative-distance map of a portion of the Huffman tree. This
proves sufficient to recover much of the Huffman table T .
Detecting successful decryption. Our attack assumes that the attacker can detect suc-
cessful decryption of a modified ciphertext. To simplify this assumption, we focused
on messages containing attachments, such as images and videos. These messages in-
clude a URL for downloading the attachment payload, as well as a 256-bit AES key
to be used in decrypting the attachment. When an iMessage client correctly decrypts
such a message, it automatically initiates an HTTPS POST request to the provided
URL. A local network attacker can view (and intercept) this request to determine
whether decryption has occurred. Moreover, if the attacker blocks the connection,
the device will retry several times and then silently abort. Since the client provides no
indication to the user that a message has been received, this admits silent decryption
of ciphertexts.
This technique can be also extended to situations where the attacker is not on
the target device’s local network. By mauling the URL field to change the requested
hostname (e.g., from icloud.com to a domain that the attacker controls), the at-
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tacker can simply direct the target device to issues HTTPS to a machine that the
attacker controls. This allows the attacker to conduct the attack remotely by trans-
mitting ciphertexts through Apple’s APNs network, at which point she obtains the
full HTTPS POST request from the target device. Since the attacker controls the
request domain, there is no need to MITM the TLS connection.6
3.5.4 An Attack on Attachment Messages
Having provided an overview of the attack components, we will describe each indi-
vidual step of the complete attack. This attack scenario assumes that a target Sender
has transmitted an attachment-bearing message to one or more online receivers, and
the attacker has the ability to monitor the local network connection (and intercept
TLS connections) on one of the Sender or Recipient devices.
Step 1. Removing and replacing the iMessage signature.
Each iMessage is authenticated using an ECDSA signature, formulated using the
private key of the iMessage Sender. This signature prevents the attacker from di-
rectly tampering with the message. However, a limitation of using signatures for
authenticity is that they do not prevent ciphertext mauling when an attacker con-
trols another account in the system. An attacker who intercepts a signed iMessage
may simply remove the existing signature from the message and re-sign the message
6The current versions of Apple’s Messages client do not enforce that this URL contains
icloud.com, and will connect to any hostname provided in the URL. Similarly, the Messages client
does not pin certificates for the HTTPS connection.
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using a different key, corresponding to a separate account that the attacker controls.7
The attacker now transmits the resulting encrypted payload, signed and delivered
as though from a different Sender address. The signature replacement process is
illustrated in Figure 3.4.
In practice, simply replacing the signature on a message proves insufficient. In
iMessage, a full list of Sender and Recipient addresses is specified both in the un-
encrypted metadata for the message, and in the encrypted message payload. Upon
decrypting each message, iMessage clients verify that the message was received from
one of the accounts listed in the Sender/Recipient list, and silently abort processing
if this condition does not hold.8. While it is trivial to replace the unencrypted Sender
field, replacing encrypted envelope information is more challenging. Fortunately, in
most cases this field of the iMessage plist is contained within the malleable AES-
CTR ciphertext, and we are able to alter the contents of the Sender/Recipient list so
that it contains the identity of the replacement Sender account.
Step 2. Altering the Sender identity.
To alter the Sender identity, the attacker must selectively maul the AES-CTR
ciphertext to change specific bytes of the Sender/Recipient plist field to incorporate
the new Sender identity she is using to transmit the mauled ciphertext. This is
challenging for several reasons.
7On Mac OS X, iMessage signing keys are readily accessible from the Apple Keychain.
8Based on our experiments, the participant list does not appear to be ordered, or to distinguish
between Sender and Recipients. It is sufficient that the Sender identity appears somewhere in this
list.
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First, the initial 101 bytes of the AES ciphertext are stored within the RSA-OAEP
ciphertext, which is strongly non-malleable. Thus we are restricted to altering the
subsequent bytes of the ciphertext. Fortunately, the binary plist key-value data
structure is top heavy, in that it stores a list of all key values in the data structure
prior to listing the values associated with each key. In practice, this ensures that the
relevant Sender identity appears some distance into the data structure. Moreover, the
application of gzip compression produces additional header information, including
(in many cases) a dynamic Huffman table. In all of the cases we observed, the symbols
encoding the Sender identity are located subsequent to the first 101 bytes, and are
therefore not included within the OAEP ciphertext.
The use of gzip compression somewhat complicates the attack. Rather than
mauling uncompressed ASCII bytes, the attacker must alter a set of compressed
Huffman symbols which have been encoded using a (dynamically-generated) table
T that the attacker does not know. Fortunately, the attacker knows the original
identity of the Sender, as this value is transmitted in the unencrypted apsd metadata.
Moreover, in all iMessage clients that we examined, the Sender identity is transmitted
as the first string in the Sender/Recipient list, which – due to iMessage’s predictable
format – appears in a relatively restricted range of positions within the ciphertext.
Even with this knowledge, altering the Sender ID involves a large component of
guessing. The attacker first estimates the location of the start of the Sender/Recipient
list, then selectively mauls the appropriate portions of the AES ciphertext, while
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RSA ciphertext partial AES ciphertext sig A
RSA ciphertext modified partial AES ciphertext sig B
Change sender ID (A->B) Modify payload, adjust CRC Sign with skB
Figure 3.4: Modifying the partial AES ciphertext, including the Sender ID and
CRC, and replacing the signature with a new signature corresponding to an account
(and signing key) we control.
simultaneously updating the CRC to contain a guess for the modified (decoded)
symbol. This is a time consuming process, since the attacker must simultaneously
identify (1) the appropriate location in the ciphertext for the symbol she wishes to
modify, (2) a modification that causes the symbol to change to the required symbol.
The target device will silently ignores any incorrect guesses, and will proceed with
attachment download only when the mauled Sender ID in the plist is equal to the
Sender ID from which the the attacker is transmitting.
To simplify the attack, the attacker may restrict her attention to addresses that
differ from the original Sender ID in at most one symbol position. This is accomplished
by registering new iCloud addresses that are “one off” from the target Sender identity.
To increase the likelihood that we will succeed in altering the Sender account to match
one that we have selected, we register multiple new Sender identities that are near
matches to the original identity. For each attempt at mauling the ciphertext, we must
also “repair” the CRC by guessing the effect of our changes on the decompressed
message.
In our experiments, we found that an email address of the form abcdef@icloud.com
could be efficiently modified to a new account of the form abcdef@i8loud.com in ap-
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proximately 217 decryption queries to a target device.9 Since Huffman tables vary
between messages, we cannot mutate every message to the same domain, and thus
we need to control several variants of icloud.com for this strategy to be successful
in all cases. Fortunately, the edits are predictable and our simulations indicate that
we require only one domain to recover most messages.
A side effect of this modification is that, due to string replacement in gzip, the
attachment URL is simultaneously altered to point to i8loud.com, which means that
attachment HTTPS POST requests are sent to a computer under our control. This
makes it possible to conduct the attack remotely.
Step 3. Recovering the Huffman table. Given the ability to intercept the attachment
request POST URL to icloud.com, we now recover information about the dynamic
Huffman tree T used in the message. The attachment path consists of a string of
alphanumeric digits, which in most instances are encoded as Huffman symbols of
length ` ∈ [4, 8].
By intercepting the HTTPS connection to icloud.com, the attacker can view the
decoded the URL path and systematically maul each Huffman symbol in turn, repair-
ing the CRC using the technique described in the previous subsection. This allows the
attacker to gradually recover a portion of the Huffman tree (Figure 3.5). In practice,
the attacker is able to recover only a subset of the tree, however, because the iMessage
client will silently fail on any URL that contains characters outside the allowed URL
9These email addresses are examples, and not the real email addresses we used in our experiments.
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Figure 3.5: Fragment of a Huffman tree from an attachment iMessage.
character set.10 Fortunately this set includes most printable alphanumeric characters.
Our implementation recovers a portion of the Huffman tree that is sufficient to
identify the characters in the set 0 − 9, A − F . Our experiments indicate that this
phase of the process requires an average 217 decryption requests and a maximum of
219
Step 4. Recovering the attachment encryption key. When an iMessage contains an
attachment, the message embeds a 256-bit AES key that can be used to decrypt the
attachment contents. This key is encoded as 64 ASCII hexadecimal characters and
is contained within a field named decryption-key. An attacker with oracle access
to a target device, and information on the Huffman table T , can now systematically
recover bytes from this key. Upon recovering the key, they can use the intercepted
HTTPS request information to download the encrypted attachment and decrypt it
using the recovered key.
10iMessage does not perform URL coding on disallowed characters.
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The approach used in recovering the attachment key is an extension of the general
format oracle attack described above. The attacker first searches the ciphertext to
identify the first position of the decryption key field. The attacker identifies a mask
M (typically a single or double-bit change to the ciphertext) that produces a change
in the decoded message at the first position of the encryption key, which is known
due to the predictable structure of attachment messages. To identify this change,
the attacker “fixes” the CRC to test for each possible result from the decryption key,
then learns whether the decryption/decompression process succeeds. To obtain the
full key, the attacker repeats this process for each of the 64 hexadecimal symbols of
the encryption key.
This process does not reliably produce every bit of the key, due to some complica-
tions described in the general attack description above. Principal among these is the
fact that some Huffman symbols represent string replacement tokens rather than byte
literals. While it seems counterintuitive to expect repeated strings within a random
key, this occurrence is surprisingly common due to the fact gzip will substitute even
short (3 digit) strings. Indeed, on average we encounter 1.9 three-digit repetitions
within each key. In this case, we attempt to identify subsequent appearances of the
symbol by guessing later replacement locations. If this approach fails, our approach
is to simply ignore the symbol and experimentally move forward until we reach the
next symbol.
While it is possible to recover a larger fraction of the symbols in the message
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by issuing more decryption queries (see §3.6 for a discussion of the tradeoffs), in
many cases it is sufficient to simply to guess the missing bits of the key offline after
recovering an encrypted attachment. In practice, the entropy of the missing sections
is usually much lower than would be indicated by the number of missing bits, since
in most cases the replacement string is drawn from either the URL field or earlier
sections of the key, both of which are known to the attacker.
Step 5. Recovering the message contents. Each attachment message may also contain
message text. This text can be read in a manner similar to the way the key is recovered
in the previous step, by mauling the message portion of the text and editing the CRC
appropriately. This approach takes slightly more effort than the hexadecimal key
recovery step, due to the higher number of potential values for each Huffman symbol
in the message text.
3.6 Implementation and Evaluation
3.6.1 Estimating attack duration
To validate the feasibility of the attack described in §3.5.4, we implemented a
prototype of the gzip format oracle attack in Python and executed it against the
Messages client on OS X 10.10.3. Our attack successfully recovered 232 out of 256
key bits after 218 decryption queries to the target device. The main challenge in
running the attack was to determine the correct timeout period after which we can
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be confident that a message has not been successfully decrypted. This timeout period
has a substantial impact on the duration of the attack, as we describe below.
3.6.1.0.1 Experimental Setup
To deliver iMessage payloads to the device, we customized an open-source Python
project called pushproxy (hereinafter called the proxy) and used it to intercept con-
nections from the device to Apple’s APNs server.129 This approach models an attacker
who can either impersonate or control Apple’s APNs servers. While our attack as-
sumed local network interception and did not send messages through Apple’s servers,
we note that if an attacker is able to capture messages in transit (by bypassing TLS)
or by compromising Apple’s servers, the remainder of the attack can in principle be
conducted remotely (see the end of §3.5.3 for details). For ethical and legal reasons,
we explicitly chose not to test attacks that relayed messages via Apple’s production
servers. Thus all of our attacks were conducted via a local network.
To address the use of TLS on apsd connections, we configured our modified proxy
with a forged Apple certificate based on a CA root certificate we created, and change
/etc/hosts to redirect APNs connections intended for Apple towards our local proxy.
We generate the forged certificate by installing our root CA on the target system.11
To monitor and intercept attachment download requests, we configured an in-
stance of a TLS MITM proxy (mitmproxy) using our self-signed root certificate to
11Since OS X 10.10.3 does not include certificate pinning for APNs connections, this allowed us
to intercept and inject iMessage ciphertexts.
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intercept all outbound requests from the device made via HTTP/HTTPS. When the
target device receives an attachment message, it makes two HTTPS POST requests
to {0, . . . , 255}-content.icloud.com. Based on the result of these requests, the de-
vice issues a second HTTP GET request to download the actual attachment. In our
experiments we block both of the POST requests, ensuring that no indication of the
message processing is displayed by the Messages client. For each oracle query, the
attack code waits for mitmproxy to report an attachment POST request as defined
above or, after a set time out, assumes the oracle query resulted in a failed message.
Finally, we created an iMessage account for the attacker that is a single-character
edit of the sender’s address (e.g. if the sender is alice@example.com, the attacker
might be clice@example.com). We only generate one such account for the edit we
expect to be successful, although a real attacker might register a large corpus of
iMessage accounts and thus increase the success probability of this phase of the attack.
3.6.1.0.2 Verifying the existence of the oracle
To ensure that iMessage behavior is as expected, we conducted a series of tests us-
ing hand-generated messages to determine if we were able to detect decryption success
or failure on these messages. Our results were sufficient to confirm the vulnerability
of §3.5, and verify iMessage’s behavior sufficiently well that we could construct a
simulated oracle for our experiments of §3.6.2.
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3.6.1.0.3 Estimating the timeout for failed queries
The main goal of our experiment was to determine the maximum timeout period
after which we can determine that the device has been unable to successfully decrypt
and process a message. To determine this, our attack queries the gzip format oracle
by sending a candidate message and waiting until it either sees a resulting attachment
download (in which case the message decrypted) or some timeout passes. Too long of
a timeout results in unreasonable runtimes and too short of a timeout produces false
negatives, which lead to incorrect key recovery.
Small scale experiments proved unable to reliably estimate the maximum timeout:
the observed wait time distribution seemingly has a long tail and may be dependent
on load not encountered in small experiments (e.g. due to failed decryptions). Using
the full attack code to find the max timeout, on the other hand, is impractical, since
we must run 218 queries, each lasting as long as the timeout. This would take between
18 hours and 3 days depending on the timeout duration we wish to test.
In order to estimate the correct timeout, we ran our attack on the device in tandem
with a local instance of the format oracle which, using the recipient’s private key, also
decrypts the message and emulates iMessage’s behavior. If the candidate message
fails to decrypt against the local oracle, we use a short (400ms) timeout period. If
the candidate message decrypts successfully on this local oracle, then we wait an
unbounded amount of time for the oracle query, and record the necessary delay. We
stress that this local-oracle approach was used only to speed up the process of finding
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the maximum delay; the full attack can be conducted without knowledge of the private
key.
3.6.1.0.4 Results
We ran our main experiment on a real message intercepted using the proxy. It
recovers 232 out of 256 key bits in 218 queries and took 35 hours to run. The maximum
observed delay between a query and the resulting download request was 903ms, while
the average was 390ms with a standard deviation of 100ms. Based on this data, and
without considering further optimizations, we estimate that the full attack would
require approximately 73 hours to run if we naively used 1 second as the timeout.
3.6.1.0.5 Optimizing runtime
The obvious approach to optimizing our attack is to reduce the timeout period
to the minimum period that iMessage requires to successfully process and queue
a message. Through experiment, we determined this to be approximately 400ms.
Thus one avenue to optimizing the experiment is to reduce the timeout period for
all messages to 400ms, using the assumption that a successful experiment may result
in a “late” download. Since we would not be able to neatly determine the specific
message query that occasioned the download, we would need to temporarily increase
the delay period and “backtrack” by repeating the most recent e.g., 10 queries to
determine which one caused the download. We are in the process of implementing
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this optimization and will present the results in the full version of this work. Because
successful queries are quite sparse,12 this does not meaningfully affect the number of
queries needed for the attack. In our estimation, these techniques will reduce the cost
of the full attack down to 35 hours and requires only straightforward modifications
to our proof of concept code.
A second optimization is to run the attack against multiple devices with attack
queries split and conducted in parallel against them. For n devices, the attack time
is reduced by approximately a factor of n. As many users may have 2 or 3 devices,
this can offer substantial reductions.
Finally, we can reduce the raw number of queries needed to mount the attack by
refining the gzip-oracle attack techniques. In particular, we can reduce the number
of queries needed to recover the Huffman table by inferring the structure of the tree
from the partial information we have, and from the observation that the Huffman
trees fall within a fairly limited range of distributions. In particular we note that
for the Huffman trees used in gzip, recovering the symbol lengths alone is sufficient
to recover the tree. An approach drawing from techniques in machine learning to
recover the Huffman table given only a few queries, the distribution of such tables,
and known partial information could offer substantial improvements. We leave a full
exploration of these optimizations to future work.
12Out of the 218, only 418 were successful.
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Figure 3.6: Simulation results for the attachment recovery attack.
3.6.2 Simulation results
Although we have conducted our attack on iMessage, we have not explored its
effectiveness with a large range of messages. Given the time it takes to run an
experiment, doing so is prohibitive. We opt instead to simulate our results.
3.6.2.0.1 Simulation
To evaluate the overall effectiveness of our format oracle attack, we constructed a
simulated message generator and decryption oracle. Messages produced by our gen-
erator are distributed identically to real attachment-bearing messages, but contain
randomly-generated strings in place of the filename, URL path, Sender and Recipi-
ent addresses, decryption key, and “signature” (hash) fields. The decryption oracle
emulates the iMessage client’s parsing of the inner binary plist. For performance,
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it skips encryption and decryption.13 Decompression is done using Python’s gzip
module, which is a wrapper around on zlib. We experimentally validate the oracle’s
correctness against the transcript of a real attack and against separate messages.
3.6.2.0.2 Results
We ran our simulated attack on a corpus of 10,000 generated messages and show
the results in Figure 3.6. In all cases, our experiments completed in at most 219
queries, with an average of approximately 217 queries. For 34% of the experiments we
ran, our attack was able to recover ≥ 216 bits of the attachment AES key. For 23%
of the messages we experimented with, we recovered ≥ 224 bits of the key, enabling
rapid brute-force of the remaining bits on commodity hardware.14
3.6.2.0.3 Optimizing success rate
Many of the failures we experience in key recovery are caused by issues with string
repetition. Recall that repeated substrings in a message are compressed in gzip
by replacing all subsequent repetitions of the substrings with a backwards-pointing
reference. As a result, editing the canonical location of a substring in the compressed
message may cause similar changes to future instances of the same substring in the
decompressed message. Our CRC correction for a given location fails to compensate
13Our implementation prevents the attacker from modifying the first 101 bytes of the message, as
those are normally contained within the RSA ciphertext. Additionally, the oracle enforces that the
alleged Sender identity is included within the plist, which is a condition enforced by iMessage.
14Experiments on an inexpensive Intel Core i7 show that we can recover 32 missing key bits in
approximately 7 minutes using an AES-NI implementation. Therefore recovering 40 missing key
bits should take approximately 28 hours on a single commodity desktop.
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for these later changes because we simply do not know where in the uncompressed
message the second instance of the substring appears. As a result, our current attack
simply skips these bits.
However, we can address this weakness with only a modest increase in the number
of oracle queries. By scanning through the remaining bytes and applying the same
CRC correction at each subsequent location in the uncompressed message, we can
identify the location of the subsequent instances of the substring. This is efficient
mainly for strings that are repeated twice, but our experiments indicate this is the
most common case. Note that we do not need to scan through the entire message. As
a result of the particular format of the messages, there are only a few points where
we can get duplicates: most of the message is in lowercase letters or non-printable
characters, whereas the decryption-key and mmcs-url field (i.e. the locations where
repeats cause the most serious issues) are upper case alpha-numeric and hence will not
contain repeats from the majority of the other fields. For the experiments described
above, this would result in a 14% increase in the number of messages for which we
can recover 224 bits.
3.7 Mitigations
Our main recommendation is that Apple should replace the entirety of iMes-
sage with a messaging system that has been properly designed and formally verified.
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However, we recognize this may not be immediately feasible given the large number
of deployed iMessage clients. Thus we divide our recommendations into short-term
“patches” that preserve compatibility with existing iMessage clients and long-term
recommendations that require breaking changes to the iMessage protocol.
3.7.1 Immediate mitigations
Duplicate RSA ciphertext detection. The attacks we described in §3.5 are pos-
sible because the unauthenticated AES encryption used by iMessage is malleable and
does not provide security under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, unlike RSA-OAEP
encryption.130 Maintaining a list of all previously-received RSA ciphertexts should
prevent these replay and CCA attacks without the need for breaking changes in the
protocol. Upon receiving a stale RSA ciphertext, the Recipient would immediately
abort decryption. This fix does not prevent all possible replays, given that iMes-
sage accounts may be shared across multiple distinct devices. However, it would
substantially reduce the impact of our attacks until a more permanent fix can be
implemented. Note: This modification has been incorporated into iOS 9.3 and Mac
OS X 10.11.4.
Force re-generation of all iMessage keys and destroy message logs. iMessage
uses long-term decryption keys, and offers no mechanism to provide forward secrecy.
If possible, Apple should force all devices to re-generate their iMessage key pairs and
92
CHAPTER 3. CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT ATTACKS ON APPLE IMESSAGE
destroy previously-held secret keys. In addition, Apple should destroy any archives
of encrypted iMessage traffic currently held by the company.
Pin APSD/ESS certificates or sign ESS responses. The current iMessage
protocol relies heavily on the security of TLS, both for communications with the
key server and as an additional layer of protection for iMessage push traffic. Apple
should enhance this security by employing certificate (or public key) pinning within
the Messages application and apsd to prevent compromise of these connections. Al-
ternatively, Apple could extend their proprietary signing mechanisms to authenticate
key server responses as well as requests.
Reorganize message layout. The current layout of encrypted messages includes
approximately 101 bytes of the CTR message within the RSA-OAEP ciphertext,
which is resilient to ciphertext malleability attacks. Modifying sender-side code to
re-organize the layout of the underlying plist data structure to incorporate the
sender and receiver fields within this section of the message would immediately block
our attack. Implementing this change requires two significant modifications: (1)
Apple would need to disable dynamic construction of Huffman tables within the
gzip compression, and (2) restructure the binary plist serialization code to place the
sender address first. We stress that this is a fragile patch: if any portion of the sender
ID is left outside of the RSA ciphertext, the ciphertext again becomes vulnerable
to mauling. Moreover, this fix will not protect group messages where the list of
Recipients is longer than 100 bytes.
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3.7.2 Long term recommendations
Replace the iMessage encryption mechanism. Apple should deprecate the ex-
isting iMessage protocol and replace it with a well-studied construction incorporating
modern cryptographic primitives, forward secrecy and message authentication (e.g.,
OTR131 or the TextSecure/Axolotl protocol132). At minimum, Apple should use a
modern authenticated cipher mode such as AES-GCM for symmetric encryption.
This change alone would eliminate our active attack on iMessage encryption, though
it would still not address any weaknesses in the key distribution mechanism. In addi-
tion, iMessage should place the protocol versioning information within the public key
block and the authenticated portions of the ciphertext, in order to prevent downgrade
attacks.
Implement key transparency. While many of the protocol-level attacks described
in this chapter can be mitigated with protocol changes, iMessage’s dependence on a
centralized key server represents an architectural weakness. Apple should take steps
to harden iMessage against compromise of the ESS/IDS service, either through the
use of key transparency,133 or by exposing key fingerprints to the user for manual
verification.
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3.8 Related Work
There are a three lines of research related to our work: secure message protocols,
attacks on symmetric encryption, and decryptions attacks using compression schemes.
Instant messaging has received a great deal of attention from the research commu-
nity. Borisov et al. introduced OTR,131 and proposed strong properties for messaging,
such as per-message forward secrecy and deniability. Frosh et al. analyze a descen-
dant protocols such as TextSecure.134 More recent work has focused on multi-party
messaging135 and improved key exchange deniability.136 In a related area, Chen et
al. analyzed push messaging integrations, including Apple push networking.137 For a
survey of secure messaging technologies, see.123
A number of works have developed attacks on unauthenticated, or poorly authen-
ticated encryption protocols. In addition to the padding oracle of Vaudenay126 and
later applications,138 padding oracle attacks have been extended to use alternative
side channels such as timing.139,140 Some more recent works have proposed attacks
on more complex data formats such as XML.141,142
Some work has addressed the combination of compression and encryption. Some
attacks use knowledge of a relatively small number of bytes in the plaintext to learn
information about the compression algorithm and eventually recover an encryption
key.143,144 Kelsey145 and others146,147 used compression in the (partially) chosen plain-
text setting to recover information about plaintexts.
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3.9 Conclusion
In this work we analyzed the security of a popular end-to-end encrypted messaging
protocol. Our results help to shed light on the security of deployed messaging systems,
and more generally, provide insight into the state of the art in security mechanisms
currently deployed by industry. This insight raises questions about the way research
results are disseminated an applied in industry and how our community should ensure
that widely-used protocols employ best cryptographic practices.
This work leaves several open questions. First, the gzip format oracle attack
we describe against iMessage may apply to other protocols as well. For example,
OpenPGP encryption (as implemented by GnuPG)148 also employs gzip and may be
vulnerable to similar attacks when it is used for online applications such as instant
messaging.149 Moreover, our attack requires that the adversary have some access to
a portion of the decrypted information. We leave to future work the development of
a pure “blind” attack on gzip encryption, one that does not require this additional
information.
3.10 Attacks on Key Registration
While this work focuses on the retrospective decryption of iMessage payloads, in
the course of our reverse engineering we were able to implement attacks on Apple’s key
registration infrastructure. The first attack is an implementation of attacks previously
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ServerResponse({urii, statusi}i∈N , id, status=0)
Figure 3.7: Profile conversation. usr = username, pass = password, at = authen-
tication token pt = push token, pkclient = client’s public key, st = session token.
AH is an authentication header with the following fields: certdevice = signed by the
Apple Fairplay Certificate, certid = a certificate associated with the client id, id, pt,
noncedevice, nonceid, σdevice, and σid.
noted by Raynal et al.120 In these attacks, which work only against versions of iOS
prior to iOS 9 and Mac devices prior to OS X 10.11.4 (i.e., devices without key
pinning), an attacker with a forged Apple TLS certificate can intercept the connection
to the Apple key server in order to substitute chosen public keys. Additionally, we
find a novel attack against the device registration process that allows an attack with
stolen credentials to circumvent existing protection mechanisms.
The protocol for registering a device is shown in Figure 3.8. The user first estab-
lishes a TLS connection to Apple’s IDS server and authenticates using their iCloud
credentials. The client generates two separate key pairs: a 1280-bit RSA public key
pair (pkE, skE) for use in encrypting and decrypting messages, and an ECDSA key-
pair (vkS, skS) for authenticating messages. The client transmits the public portion
of these keys PK = (pkE, vkE) to the IDS, which registers it to the user’s iCloud
account name. We diagram the full login and registration protocols in Figures 3.7
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Client identity.ess.apple.com
InitializeValidation(pt, session info request)
ServerResponse(ttl, session info, status=0)
Register(AH, device data, PKclient, misc pref, uri, id, σ)
ServerResponse(id, uri, certreg, status=0)
GetDependantRegistrations(AH)
ServerResponse({PKi, sti, pti, device datai, misc prei }i∈D)
Figure 3.8: Identity conversation. pt = push token, pkclient = client’s public key, st
= session token. AH is an authentication header with the following fields: certdevice
= signed by the Apple Fairplay Certificate, certid = a certificate associated with the
client id, id, pt, noncedevice, nonceid, σdevice, and σid.
and 3.8. To support multiple devices on a single account, the IDS will store and
return all public keys associated with a given account.
3.10.1 Key Substitution Attack
The Apple key distribution systems are accessed each time a legitimate user
wants to send an iMessage to a new Recipient. The Messages client first contacts
query.ess.apple.com to look up the keys for a given username. In response, the
server returns the user’s public key(s), status, and push tokens for addressing APNs
communications to the user. A fragment of the request and response is shown in
Figure 3.9.
The query.ess.apple.com response message contains public keys, along with
push tokens, for each of the devices registered to an account. Each of the key entries
is a 332 character long base64 encoded binary payload. When decoded, they takes
the form shown in Figure 3.10.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>







      <key>client-data</key>
      <dict>







        <key>public-message-identity-version</key><real>2</real>
      </dict>
      <key>push-token</key><data>CI/    









Figure 3.9: Excerpts from an ESS/IDS directory lookup request (top) and response
(bottom). The request address and a portion of the response Push token have been
redacted.
Upon receiving the RSA public key in the above diagram, the Messages client uses
this key to encrypt the outgoing iMessage payload. The ECDSA key is not used when
sending a message, but is used to verify the integrity of a message when it is received
from that user. iMessage clients appear to accept the most recent key delivered by
ESS/IDS even if it disagrees with previous entries cached by the device.
Notably, the only security measures embedded in this conversation are authen-
tication fields in the header of the request; the server does not sign the response.
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0x30 0x81 0xF6 0x81 0x43 0x00 0x41 0x04 488 Bits (ECDSA Key Material) 0x82 0x81 0xAE 0x00 0xAC 
Public Exponent 1280 Bit RSA Key 0x30 0x81 0xA9 0x02 0x81 0xA1 0x00 0x02 0x03 0x01 0x00 0x01
Figure 3.10: Format of public key payload in ESS server response.
Thus the authenticity of the response depends entirely on the security of the TLS
connection. This seems like an oversight, given that many other fields in the Apple
protocols are explicitly authenticated. Worse, in iOS 8 and versions of OS X 10.11
released prior to December 2015, the Messages client does not use certificate pinning
to ensure that the connection terminated by an Apple server. Thus an attacker with
a stolen TLS root certificate can intercept key requests and substitute their own key
as a response. This degrades the security of iMessage to that of TLS.
We implemented this attack by installing a self-signed X.509 root certificate into
the local root certificate store of a Mac device. This allowed us to verify that there
were no warning mechanisms that might alert a user to the key substitution. By
further intercepting messages transmitted via the APNs network, we were able to
respond to all key lookup requests with our own attacker key, and subsequently
decrypt any iMessages transmitted via the device.
Our experiments demonstrate that iOS 9 is no longer subject to simple key sub-
stitution attacks, due to the addition of certificate pinning on TLS connections. This
increases the relative impact of our novel decryption attacks. Surprisingly, our exper-
iments demonstrated that OS X 10.11.1 remained vulnerable as of November 2015.
We notified Apple of this oversight, and they have added key pinning as of OS X
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10.11.13.
3.10.2 Credential theft
The first message in the registration process, shown in Figure 3.7, passes the user’s
credentials to the profile.ess.apple.com server to be verified. As noted in previous
sections, OS X 10.10.5 and iOS 8 devices do not employ certificate pinning on this
server, and the credentials are sent in plaintext within the TLS connection.15 By
conducting a TLS MITM attack on this connection, we are able to intercept iCloud
login credentials. Using this information we can register new iMessage devices to an
account, ensuring that we will be able to receive future messages.
Apple’s primary defense against registration of new devices is a notification mes-
sage that is sent to all previously-registered devices. In order to register a new device
to a target account without alerting the victim, we also developed a method to over-
come these notification mechanisms. We observed two such mechanisms:
1. Upon registration of a new device, all devices logged into the account receive a
push notification over the APNs network. In response, each device initiates the
GetDependantRegistrations call shown in Figure 3.8.
2. When an iMessage account is registered to a device that has not previously
been registered to that account, a notification email is generated and sent to
15OS X 10.11 devices do not employ certificate pinning on this connection either, but they do not
appear to send the credentials in plaintext.
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the account’s registered email.
In the first instance, once the APNs push notification signaling that a
GetDependantRegistrations call should be executed has arrived at a client, the
client will continuously send the request until it receives a response. An active at-
tacker on the victim’s network can simply block all these requests, but this is not
sustainable over long periods of time. We discovered that the client is satisfied when
it receives any response — even a poorly formatted unreadable one. Thus, an at-
tacker can edit the server response causing it to decode incorrectly. The client will
accept this response and terminate the repeated GetDependantRegistrations calls.
This blocks notifications that would alert the victim to the fact that a new device
has been registered to their account. All subsequent iMessage traffic, both incoming
and outgoing, will be forwarded to the attack device. Until a user logs out of their
iMessage client, logs into a new iMessage client, or manually checks the list of de-
vices associated with their account, they will never notice that their traffic is being
forwarded to the attack device.
3.10.3 Updates in OS X 10.11
The ESS messaging protocol changed in a number of ways with the 10.11 update
to OS X. The exchange of credentials for an authorization token has moved to point to
gsa.apple.com and that connection has certificate pinning implemented. Due to this
fact, we are unable to MITM this connection, but attempting to login to an account
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with bad credentials will result only in a message to that server and an error message
displayed on the client. Additionally, there is a message sent to setup.icloud.com
with a username and password pair in which the password is no longer transmitted
in plaintext.
The key substitution attack still worked against OS X 10.11 versions as of Novem-
ber 2015, but the additional certificate pinning of apsd made it more difficult to in-
tercept the message. In order to make sure the attack still functioned properly, we
recovered the encrypted payload of the message from the apsd logs and were able
to successfully decrypt the message using our own keys. Although we are not able
to easily intercept the messages as we could with 10.10.5, this attack still effectively
reduces the security of iMessage to that of TLS.
3.11 Bypassing TLS
To execute the attacks described in this chapter, the attacker must obtain en-
crypted iMessages from the APNs link. Since iMessage secures the APNs connection
using TLS, this requires the attacker to penetrate to the TLS encryption on the link
between Apple and the end-device.
We identified three approaches to bypassing the TLS on the APNs connections:
(1) Apple, or an attacker with access to Apple’s infrastructure, can intercept the
contents of push messages as they transit the APNs servers; (2) on certain iOS and
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OS X versions that do not include certificate pinning for APNs, an attacker with
access to a stolen CA root certificate may be able to conduct an MITM attack on
the TLS connection; or (3) on the same versions, an attacker can “sideload” a root
certificate on the target device, by briefly taking physical control of it, or convincing
a victim to install a root certificate via a malicious email or web page. The latter
technique is particularly concerning due to the similarity between Apple’s interface for
installing root CAs, and other non-critical certificate installation requests that may
be presented to the user (see Figure 3.11). Since some Apple operating systems do not
use certificate pinning, installation of a root certificate allows arbitrary interception
of both APNs and HTTPS connections.
We identified attacks (2) and (3) as infeasible on all iOS 9 versions due to the
inclusion of certificate pinning on APNs connections in that operating system. As
of November 2015 when we first notified Apple of the results in this chapter, we
discovered that the then-current version of OS X 10.11 did not include certificate
pinning. In response to our disclosure, Apple added certificate pinning to OS X as of
December 2015.
We stress that given the interest in iMessage expressed by nation-states,115 a
compromise of CA infrastructure cannot be ruled out. Even without such attacks,
there have been several recent examples of CA-signed root or intermediate certificates
being issued for use within corporate middle-boxes, primarily for the purposes of
enterprise TLS interception.150 TLS interception may occur even within Apple OS
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Figure 3.11: On the left is a certificate verification dialog presented on encountering
an unknown wireless access point. On the right is a root CA installation dialog.
distributions: a recent incident involving iOS 9 allowed ad-blocking software to install




Modern computers contain a variety of special purpose, “auxiliary” processors de-
signed to offload specific tasks from the CPU, freeing the CPU to perform other work.
Conceptually, the CPU copies data from main memory to the auxiliary processor and
requests that it perform its function. When the auxiliary processor has completed its
task, it signals the CPU that it is finished. In reality, if the CPU were responsible
for copying the data, it would spend most of its time performing data transfers, for
example, copying memory to the GPU or network controller. Instead, computers
have specialized hardware called direct memory access (DMA) engines that perform
the copying to and from the auxiliary processors. The DMA engines perform the
data transfers in parallel with the computation performed by the various processors
by utilizing otherwise-free memory-bus cycles. In this chapter, we show that DMA




At the same time that computer systems have been gaining additional proces-
sors, computer security researchers and practitioners have begun to recognize that
the once bright-line separation of code and data is perhaps not so bright. For ex-
ample, the threat of software exploitation has undergone a paradigm shift from a
malicious code model (i.e., attacker-delivered payloads), to a malicious computation
model where the attacker crafts data inputs to induce arbitrary computation on a
target system.152 This style of data-only attack goes by various names including
return-oriented programming (ROP)153–162 and weird machines.152,163–165
The ability to induce arbitrary computation from nothing more than copying
bytes from one address to another may be surprising to those who are not steeped
in the arcana of weird machines.1 And indeed, it is a surprisingly strong statement:
Any function that can be computed by a Turing machine can be computed using
DMA.2 The induced computation of ROP or weird machines generally takes the form
of a sequence of “gadgets” which the attacker strings together to perform the desired
computation. Each gadget typically performs some discrete action such as “add two
numbers together” or “store a value to memory.” Once a Turing-complete set of
gadgets has been constructed, any desired behavior can be “programmed” in terms
of the gadgets.
Turing-complete behavior in unexpected places is not sufficient to write programs
1For example, the x86 mov instruction is Turing-complete.166




that are interesting from a security (as opposed to a computability) perspective.
To be useful, a programming language needs to be what Atkinson et al.168 call
“resource complete.” That is, the language needs to “be[] able to access all resources
of the system [. . . ] from within the language”.168 By design, DMA has direct access
to (some) hardware peripherals and RAM, including kernel memory and memory-
mapped I/O registers.3 Thus, a Turing-complete set of DMA gadgets should also be
resource-complete.
In order to build DMA gadgets, we require several capabilities of the DMA engine.
In particular, the DMA engine (1) must be capable of performing memory-to-memory
copies; (2) can be programmed by loading the address of DMA control blocks or
descriptors into memory-mapped registers; and (3) supports a scatter/gather mode
where DMA transfers can be chained together, typically by providing the address of
the next control block or descriptor.
Some DMA engines lack capability 1; for example, the Intel Platform Controller
Hub EG20T DMA controller only supports transferring data between main memory
and PCI memory [169, Chapter 12]. For DMA engines with similar restrictions,
capability 1 can be relaxed as long as the restricted source/target memory contains
a byte that could be used as a staging area enabling memory-to-memory copies by
transferring data first to the restricted space and then back to memory.
For ease of implementation and testing, our work targets the Raspberry Pi 2’s
3In some systems an IOMMU unit may restrict DMA access to certain regions of memory.
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DMA engine (see Section 4.2) and thus we make no claim that our results hold for
other systems. That said, we believe that the three required capabilities listed above
are satisfied by modern DMA engines. For example, the following appear to meet
our requirements: Intel 8237 (e.g., legacy IBM PC/ATs), CoreLink 330170 (i.e., ARM
Advanced Bus Architecture compliant SoCs), Cell multi-core microprocessor171 (e.g.,
Sony Playstation 3), and Intel’s I/O Acceleration Technology172 (e.g., Intel Xeon
Server).
Our work differs from traditional DMA malware — that is, malware that runs on
an auxiliary processor such as a GPU and leverages that processor’s DMA access —
in that it runs entirely in the DMA engine. An attacker need only access hardware
registers to exhibit control. This can be achieved in user space with administrator
permissions on the Raspberry Pi 2 by mapping the appropriate region of physical
memory [173, Chapter 4].
In this chapter, we are concerned with the art of crafting Turing- and resource-
complete gadget sets using a DMA engine. In particular, we do not discuss how an
attacker would gain permission to reprogram a DMA engine, which typically requires
administrator access, nor do we discuss the full power of so-called DMA malware as
both topics are well described in prior work (see Section 4.7). Concretely, we
• describe the theory behind the construction of DMA gadgets (Section 4.3);
• build an interpreter for a known Turing-complete language and demonstrate
resource-completeness (Section 4.4); and
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• build a proof-of-concept DMA rootkit (Section 4.5).
4.2 Background
Direct memory access (DMA), is a memory bus architectural feature that enables
peripheral devices, such as GPUs, drive controller or network controllers, to access
physical memory independently of the CPU. In particular, DMA frees the CPU from
I/O data transfer by offloading memory operations (i.e., memory-to-memory copying
or moving) to the DMA engine.
In general, each DMA engine has several control registers that specify the opera-
tion of DMA transfer, including the direction of data transfer, unit size in which to
transfer (e.g., a word or a byte), and the total number of bytes to transfer. DMA
transfers are typically configured by the operating system but may be initiated by
hardware signals.
Our work targets the Raspberry Pi 2 for implementation and testing. Specifically,
the Pi is equipped with the BCM2836 ARM processor which contains a 16-channel
Broadcom DMA controller [173, Chapter 4]. DMA transfers are initiated by loading
the address of a control block data structure into one of the channel’s memory-mapped
control registers. This causes the DMA engine to load the rest of its control registers
from the control block.
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Figure 1: Square gadget. This simple gadget loads a byte
x from address src, computes x2 mod 256 by using x as an
index into the square_tbl, and stores the result at address
dest. The next control block to be loaded into the DMA
engine is at address next_cb.
In the next section, we describe how to build a Turing-
complete set of DMA gadgets which we use to build an
interpreter for a simple programming language.
4 A Turing-complete gadget set
In 1964, Böhm described the simple programming lan-
guageP 00 and showed that it is Turing-complete. That is,
it can compute every Turing-computable function [5, 6].
It holds that a program written in the language can simu-
late any other computational device or language. In fact,
such a program can be written using only six distinct
expressions inP 00.
The toy programming language Brainfuck (hereafter
referred to as BF) consists of six instructions semantically
equivalent to the sixP 00 expressions and two additional
instructions used for input and output. To show that we
can compute any arbitrary, Turing-computable function,
we build an interpreter for BF out of DMA gadgets. In
order to implement the I/O instructions, we use DMA
gadgets which interact directly with memory-mapped reg-
isters for a UART, thus demonstrating that DMA gadgets
are resource-complete as well.
4.1 BF details
In this section, we give a brief overview of the BF pro-
gramming language. Readers familiar with BF are en-
couraged to skip to the following section.
BF is a minimalistic programming language consisting
of eight one-character instructions +-><[],.. All other
characters act as a no-op. BF instructions operate on a
tape divided into cells, much like the tape of a Turing ma-
chine. Each cell holds one of 256 values 00,01, . . . ,ff
and is initially empty. There is an implicit tape head,
head, which points to the current cell on the tape. The
eight instructions have the follow semantics.
+ increment the cell pointed to by head
- decrement the cell pointed to by head
> increment head to point to the next cell
< decrement head to point to the previous cell
+ + +
Program
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Figure 2: BF example. The program is in mid-execution
with head currently pointing to cell 0 on the tape. The cur-
rent instruction is a -, which decrements the byte pointed
to by head, setting it to zero. Next, the right condition
checks if the byte pointed to by head is zero; it is, so the
program executes the next instruction which moves head
one cell to the right. Cell 1 is then decremented twice,
setting its value to 0x44. Finally, the program outputs the
ASCII character ‘D’ and halts.
[ if the cell pointed to by head is nonzero, execute the
next instruction; otherwise, jump to the instruction
following the matching ]
] if the cell pointed to by head is zero, execute the
next instruction; otherwise, jump to the instruction
following the matching [
, store input to the cell pointed to by head
. output the cell pointed to by head
The increment and decrement instructions +/- operate
modulo 256 and the loop instructions [] nest as expected.
Except for the loop instructions which behave as de-
scribed above, BF instructions are executed sequentially.
A program counter, pc, keeps track of the currently ex-
ecuting instruction. The program terminates when the
pc moves past the last instruction. Figure 2 illustrates an
example program that outputs the ASCII character D.
4.2 Basic building blocks
We construct our BF interpreter (Section 4.3) using the
basic building blocks described in this section. These
building blocks can be used to implement a wide variety
of gadgets beyond those needed for the BF interpreter.
Some of these are described in Section 4.4.
Unary functions. The basic operation of most gad-
gets involves mapping some input to output. Section 3
and Figure 1 illustrate the construction of 8-bit, unary
functions. It is frequently useful to compute a function
g : {0,1}8 ! {0,1}32. We can do this by constructing
a table of the 32-bit output values and using a function
f : {0,1}8 ! {0,4, . . . ,252} as an offset into the table.
I.e., g(n) = table[ f (n)].
Variable dereferencing. In order to operate on data
stored at a location pointed to by a pointer, we can use a
control block to copy the value pointed to by the pointer
3
Figure 4.1: Square gadget. This simple gadget loads a byte x from address src,
computes x2 mod 256 by using x as an inde int the square tbl , a d stores the result
at address dest . Th next control block to be load d into th DMA engine is at
address next cb.
operation to perform, but also the address of the control block to be loaded next.
The control block forms the basis of our DMA gadget construction.
4.3 Constructing DMA gadgets
A single DMA transfer is little more than a glorified, hardware-assisted memcpy(dest,
src, size). As described in Section 4.2, on the Raspberry Pi 2, DMA transfers are
initiated by loading the address of a control block into a memory-mapped register.
Each control block contains a source address, a target address, a transfer length, and
the address of the next control block to load into the engine. In addition, there are
fields that control aspects of DMA transfers that are relevant to reading from/writing
to DMA-supported peripherals as well as a variety of options such as 2D transfers.
However, to make our results more general, we do not make use of any of these
features.
Unlike traditional computer programming, constructing a DMA “program” funda-
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mentally requires using self-modifying constructs. Each of our DMA gadgets consists
of a collection of control blocks, chained together using the next control block fields,
and zero or more tables of constant data. Most of the control blocks in each gadget
modify one of the source, destination, or next control block fields in a subsequently-
executed control block. For gadgets that perform basic operations such as increment
values in memory, the final control block will copy the result to memory and then
transition to the next gadget. For gadgets that perform control flow, the initial con-
trol blocks compute the address of the next control block to “execute” and store it in
the next control block field of the final control block — a trampoline — which performs
no memory transfer.
In order to compute simple functions f : {0, 1}8 → {0, 1}8, we use 256-byte tables
where the nth entry in the table corresponds to f(n). These tables are stored 256-
byte aligned in memory. By putting the address of the table in the source field of
a control block with a transfer length of 1, a preceding control block can select the
index n by copying a byte to the least significant byte of the source address pointing
to the table. Figure 4.1 demonstrates this by giving the control blocks and table for
computing the function n 7→ n2 mod 256.
In Figure 4.1 and subsequent figures, the source, destination, transfer length, and
next control block fields of the control blocks are drawn as follows. Arrows represent
pointers and shaded fields or partial fields are modified by previous DMA transfers.
In the next section, we describe how to build a Turing-complete set of DMA
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pabilities listed above satisfied by modern DMA engines.
In this paper, we are concerned with the art of crafting
Turing- and resource-complete gadget sets using a DMA
engine. In particular, we do not discuss how an attacker
would gain permission to reprogram a DMA engine which
typically requires administrator access nor do we discuss
the full power of so-called DMA malware2 as both topics
are well described in prior work (see Section 7). Con-
cretely, we
• describe the theory behind the construction of DMA
gadgets (Section 3);
• build an interpreter for a known Turing-complete
language and demonstrate resource-completeness
(Section 4); and
• build a proof-of-concept DMA rootkit (Section 5).
2 Background
Direct memory access, or DMA, is a computer bus ar-
chitecture feature that enables peripheral devices, such
as a disk drive controller, to access physical memory in-
dependently of the CPU. In particular, DMA frees the
CPU from I/O data transfer and can offload memory op-
erations (i.e., memory-to-memory copying or moving) to
it’s registers or dedicated engine; a process called DMA
transfer.
The DMA controller is the hardware component that
interfaces with the peripheral device to generate physical
memory addresses and initiate DMA transfer. Peripherals
typically program the DMA using third-party DMA, or
more specifically, a DMA engine resident on the system
board. Peripherals can also program the DMA using
Bus-Master DMA in which the peripheral programs the
DMA registers directly, and First-Party DMA in which
the peripheral takes control of the system bus.
In general, the DMA controller has a memory address
register and several control registers. Control registers
specify the operation of DMA transfer, including the di-
rection of data transfer, unit size in which to transfer (e.g.,
a byte), and number of bytes to transfer in a burst. DMA
transfer is initiated by software via a request for data
whereas hardware will push data directly to the system.
Our work targets the Raspberry Pi 2 for implementa-
tion and testing. Specifically, the Pi is equipped with
the BCM2836 ARM processor which contains a third-
party DMA controller [9]. We initiate DMA transfer in
software by loading a control block data structure from
memory into DMA registers. Specifically, a control block
is composed of 8 32-bit members that correspond to their
respective register, thus specifying operation on load.
2Traditional DMA malware is malware that runs on an auxiliary
processor such as a GPU and leverages that processor’s DMA access.
In contrast, our work runs entirely in the DMA engine.
3 Constructing DMA gadgets
A single DMA transfer is little more than a
glorified, hardware-assisted memcpy(dest, src,
size). As described in Section 2, on the Raspberry
Pi 2, DMA transfers are initiated by loading the address
of a control block into a memory-mapped register. Each
control block contains a source address, a target address,
a transfer length, and the address of the next control block
to load into the engine. In addition, there are fields that
control aspects of DMA transfers that are relevant to read-
ing from/writing to DMA-supported peripherals as well
as a variety of options such as 2D transfers. However, to
make our results more general, we do not make use of
any of these features.
Unlike traditional computer programming, construct-
ing a DMA “program” fundamentally requires using self-
modifying constructs. Each of our DMA gadgets consists
of a collection of control blocks, chained together using
the next control block fields, and zero or more tables of
constant data. Most of the control blocks in each gadget
modify one of the source, destination, or next control
block fields in a subsequently-executed control block. For
gadgets that perform basic operations such as increment
values in memory, the final control block will copy the
result to memory and then transition to the next gadget.
For gadgets that perform control flow, the initial control
blocks compute the address of the next control block to
“execute” and store it in the next control block field of the
final control block—a trampoline—which performs no
memory transfer.
In order to compute simple functions f : {0,1}8 !
{0,1}8, we use 256-byte tables where the nth entry in
the table corresponds to f (n). These tables are stored
256-byte aligned in memory. By putting the address of
the table in the source field of a control block with a
transfer length of 1, a preceding control block can select
the index n by copying a byte to the least significant
byte of the source address pointing to the table. Figure 1
demonstrates this by giving the control blocks and table
for computing the function n 7! n2 mod 256.
In Figure 1 and subsequent figures, the source, destina-
tion, transfer length, and next control block fields of the





Arrows represent pointers and shaded fields or partial
fields are modified by previous DMA transfers.
2
gadgets which we use to build an interpreter for a simple programming language.
4.4 A Turing-complete gadget set
In 1964, Böhm described the simple programming language P ′′ and showed that it
is Turing-complete. That is, it can compute every Turing-computable function.174,175
It holds that a program written in the language can simulate any other computational
device or language. In fact, such a program can be written using only six distinct
expressions in P ′′.
The toy programming language Brainfuck (hereafter referred to as BF) consists of
six instructions semantically equivalent to the six P ′′ expressions and two additional
instructions used for input and output. To show that we can compute any arbitrary,
Turing-computable function, we build an interpreter for BF out of DMA gadgets. In
order to implement the I/O instructions, we use DMA gadgets which interact directly
with memory-mapped registers for a UART, thus demonstrating that DMA gadgets




In this section, we give a brief overview of the BF programming language. Readers
familiar with BF are encouraged to skip to the following section.
BF is a minimalistic programming language consisting of eight one-character in-
structions +-><[],.. All other characters act as a no-op. BF instructions operate
on a tape divided into cells, much like the tape of a Turing machine. Each cell holds
one of 256 values 00, 01, . . . , ff and is initially empty. There is an implicit tape head,
head , which points to the current cell on the tape. The eight instructions have the
follow semantics.
+ increment the cell pointed to by head
- decrement the cell pointed to by head
> increment head to point to the next cell
< decrement head to point to the previous cell
[ if the cell pointed to by head is nonzero, execute the next instruction; otherwise,
jump to the instruction following the matching ]
] if the cell pointed to by head is zero, execute the next instruction; otherwise, jump
to the instruction following the matching [
, store input to the cell pointed to by head
. output the cell pointed to by head
The increment and decrement instructions +/- operate modulo 256 and the loop
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Figure 4.2: BF example. The program is in mid-execution with head currently
pointing to cell 0 on the tape. The current instruction is a -, which decrements the
byte pointed to by head , setting it to zero. Next, the right condition checks if the
byte pointed to by head is zero; it is, so the program executes the next instruction
which moves head one cell to the right. Cell 1 is then decremented twice, setting its
value to 0x44. Finally, the program outputs the ASCII character ‘D’ and halts.
Except for the loop instructions which behave as described above, BF instructions
are executed sequentially. A program counter, pc, keeps track of the currently execut-
ing instruction. The program terminates when the pc moves past the last instruction.
Figure 4.2 illustrates an example program that outputs the ASCII character D.
4.4.2 Basic building blocks
We construct our BF interpreter (Section 4.4.3) using the basic building blocks
described in this section. These building blocks can be used to implement a wide
variety of gadgets beyond those needed for the BF interpreter. Some of these are
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Figure 3: Increment gadget. The tape head is stored in a fixed location, head_addr. The first two control blocks copy head to
cb2’s source and cb3’s destination, respectively. Then, cb2 copies the cell pointed to by head into the least significant byte of
cb3’s source which acts as an offset into the increment table. Finally, cb3 stores the selected value back into the tape.
into the source or destination fields of a subsequent con-
trol block. Figure 3 performs the operation
⇤head ⇤head+1
by first copying the 32-bit address pointed to by head into
the source field of cb2 and the destination field of cb3.
Conditional goto. Conditional computation is achieved
by writing the address of a control block to the next con-
trol block field of a trampoline control block. Which
address is written is data-dependent. These conditional
gotos can be used to implement if-then-else statements as
well as while and do-while loops.
As a minor space-optimization, we implement condi-
tionals using a 512-byte aligned, 512-byte address table
consisting of 128 addresses paired with a 256-byte con-
dition table. The mth conditional goto in the program
is associated with a pair of addresses: the addresses of
the control blocks corresponding to the false condition,
cbm,F , and the true condition, cbm,T . The two addresses
are stored 256-bytes apart in the address table. For exam-
ple, if the address table is stored in memory at address
0x2000, then cbm,F is stored at address 0x2000+4m
and cbm,T is stored at address 0x2100+ 4m. Each en-
try in the condition table stores either the second least
significant byte of the address of the table or that value
plus 256. In the previous example, for each n for which
the condition is false, the nth entry in the condition table
would be 0x20 and for each n for which the condition is
true, the nth entry would be 0x21.
By overwriting the second least significant byte of the
source field of a control block—whose source is the
address table—with the value from the conditional table,
that control block can copy the address of either cbF or
cbT into the next control block field of the trampoline.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.
Switch. The switch building block branches to different
control blocks depending on a data value. The value is
used as an index into a 256-byte offset table. The entries
in the offset table are the offsets into an address table
which holds the addresses of the various control blocks
associated with the switch cases.
Control blocks cb1 through cb3 in Figure 5 along with
the dispatch and instruction tables are an example of a
simple switch statement. ASCII values are mapped to
their corresponding BF gadgets by using the dispatch
table as the lookup table and the instruction table as the
address table.
Memory-mapped I/O registers. Memory-mapped I/O
registers are used to control hardware peripherals such
as general purpose I/O (GPIO) pins, UARTs, I2C or SPI
buses, and yes, DMA engines. Interacting with such pe-
ripherals typically consists of looping, where we read a
memory-mapped flag or status register over and over until
a particular status is indicated (e.g., transmit buffer not
full or receive buffer not empty), and then read or write
a value to a memory-mapped data register. This building
block is straight-forward to construct using condition-
als for the loop and unary functions for the condition
test.
4.3 BF interpreter gadgets
In this section, we use the basic building blocks defined
in Section 4.2 to construct BF instruction and interpreter-
specific gadgets. In addition to the gadgets described
below, the BF interpreter requires a BF program to inter-
pret, a region of memory to act as a tape, and three words
at known addresses: a program counter, pc, a tape head
head, and a loop counter, lc. The program counter and
tape head behave as described in Section 4.1. The loop
counter is used to find matching brackets in the imple-
mentation of the loop instructions.
Dispatch gadget. This specific gadget dispatches a BF
instruction. We use the switch building block with the
dispatch table as the offset table and the instruction table
as the address table. The dispatch gadget is shown in
Figure 5.
Increment word and decrement word gadgets. We
implement generic 4-byte increment and decrement gad-
gets which take as input the address of the value to incre-
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Figure 4.3: Increment gadget. The tape head is stored in a fixed location, head addr .
The first two control blocks copy head to cb2’s source and cb3’s desti ation, respec-
tively. Then, cb2 copies e cell pointed to by head into t leas significant byte of
cb3’s source which acts as an offset into the increment table. Finally, cb3 stores the
selected value back into the tape.
4.4.2.0.1 Unary functions.
The basic operation of most gadgets involves mapping some input to output.
Section 4.3 and Figure 4.1 illustrate the construction of 8-bit, unary functions. It is
frequently useful t compute a functi g : {0, 1}8 → {0, 1}32. W can do this by
constructing a tabl of t 32-bit output values and using a function f : {0, 1}8 →
{0, 4, . . . , 252} as an offset into the table. I.e., g(n) = able[f(n)].
4.4.2.0.2 Variable dereferencing.
In order to operate on data stored at a location pointed to by a pointer, we can
use a control block to copy the value pointed to by the pointer into the source or
destination fields of a subsequent control block. Figure 4.3 performs the operatio
∗head ← ∗head + 1
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by first copying the 32-bit address pointed to by head into the source field of cb2 and
the destination field of cb3.
4.4.2.0.3 Conditional goto.
Conditional computation is achieved by writing the address of a control block to
the next control block field of a trampoline control block. Which address is written
is data-dependent. These conditional gotos can be used to implement if-then-else
statements as well as while and do-while loops.
As a minor space-optimization, we implement conditionals using a 512-byte aligned,
512-byte address table consisting of 128 addresses paired with a 256-byte condition
table. The mth conditional goto in the program is associated with a pair of addresses:
the addresses of the control blocks corresponding to the false condition, cbm,F , and
the true condition, cbm,T . The two addresses are stored 256-bytes apart in the address
table. For example, if the address table is stored in memory at address 0x2000, then
cbm,F is stored at address 0x2000 + 4m and cbm,T is stored at address 0x2100 + 4m.
Each entry in the condition table stores either the second least significant byte of the
address of the table or that value plus 256. Continuing the example, for each value n
for which the condition is false, the nth entry in the condition table would be 0x20
and for each n for which the condition is true, the nth entry would be 0x21.
By overwriting the second least significant byte of the source field of a control
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Figure 4: Conditional goto gadget. First, cb0 copies the byte pointed to by cond_ptr into the least significant byte of cb1’s
source to use as an index into the conditional table. Then, cb1 copies the selected byte into the second least significant byte of
cb2’s source. This byte selects which of cbT or cbF are copied into tramp’s next control block field. If the address table is at
address 0x2000, then if the byte pointed to by cond_ptr is even, then cb1,T will be the next control block executed. Otherwise,
cb1,F will be.
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Figure 5: Dispatch gadget. The byte pointed to by the program counter is used as an offset into the dispatch table. The dispatch
table contains the offset into the instruction table for the corresponding instruction. For example, the byte ‘+’ has ASCII
value 43; the 43rd entry of the dispatch table is 8; and the address of the increment gadget (see Figure 3) is stored at offset 8 in
the instruction table. The control block cb3 copies the corresponding entry from the instruction table into the next control block
field of a trampoline control block.
ment (resp. decrement) and the address of the next control
block to execute when the operation is complete. These
work by operating on a byte at a time. First, we increment
(resp. decrement) the least significant byte of the 4-byte
word. If the result is 00 (resp. ff), then we repeat with
the second least significant byte, and so on. This is a
straight-forward application of unary functions, variable
dereferencing, and conditionals.
Next instruction gadget. The next instruction gadget
increments the pc by one using the increment word gadget
and then jumps to the dispatch gadget.
Increment and decrement instruction gadgets.
These gadgets increment or decrement the cell pointed to
by pc using the generic increment and decrement word
gadgets and then jump to the next instruction gadget.
Move right and left instruction gadgets. These gad-
gets move the head right or left by incrementing or decre-
menting head using the generic increment and decrement
word gadgets and then jump to the next instruction gad-
get.
Loop instruction gadgets. The left and right loop in-
struction gadgets use the increment/decrement byte and
word, conditional, and switch gadgets in its implemen-
tation. We use the switch gadget and define our lookup
table, or bracket table, to contain an offset into two dis-
tinct address tables, or scan right table and scan left table,
at the nth index, where n equals 0 or the ASCII byte rep-
resentation of ‘[’, or ‘]’. The scan right table assigns
its indexes with the following control block addresses in
order: scan right, increment loop counter, decrement loop
counter, and quit. The scan left table simply inverts all
operations.
We implement the left condition to first check whether
the cell pointed to by head is zero. If it is, the gadget
5
Figure 4.4: Conditional goto gadget. First, cb0 copies the byte pointed to by
cond ptr into t leas significant byte of cb1’s source to use as an index in o the
conditional table. T en, cb1 copies the s lected byte i to the second least significant
byte of cb2’s source. This byte selects which of cb or cbF ar copied into tramp’s
next control block field. If the address table is at address 0x2000, then if the byte
pointed to by cond ptr is even, then cb1,T will be the next control block executed.
Otherwise, cb1,F will be.
that control block can copy the address of either cbF or cbT into the next control block
field of the trampoline. This is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
4.4.2.0.4 Switch.
The switch building block branches to different control blocks depending on a
data value. The value is used as an index into a 256-byte offset table. The entries in
the offset table are the offsets into an address table whic holds he addresses of the
various control blocks associated with the switch cases.
Control blocks cb1 through cb3 in Figure 4.5 along with the dispatch and instruc-
tion tables are an example of a simple switch statement. ASCII values are mapped to
their corresponding BF gadgets by using the dispatch table as the lookup table and
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the instruction table as the address table.
4.4.2.0.5 Memory-mapped I/O registers.
Memory-mapped I/O registers are used to control hardware peripherals such as
general purpose I/O (GPIO) pins, UARTs, I2C or SPI buses, and yes, DMA en-
gines. Interacting with such peripherals typically consists of looping, where we read a
memory-mapped flag or status register over and over until a particular status is indi-
cated (e.g., transmit buffer not full or receive buffer not empty), and then read or write
a value to a memory-mapped data register. This building block is straight-forward
to construct using conditionals for the loop and unary functions for the condition
test.
4.4.3 BF interpreter gadgets
In this section, we use the basic building blocks defined in Section 4.4.2 to con-
struct BF instruction and interpreter-specific gadgets. In addition to the gadgets
described below, the BF interpreter requires a BF program to interpret, a region of
memory to act as a tape, and three words at known addresses: a program counter, pc,
a tape head head , and a loop counter, lc. The program counter and tape head behave
as described in Section 4.4.1. The loop counter is used to find matching brackets in




01 00 00 00
cb0
01 00 00 00
cb1
04 00 00 00
cb2
00 00 00 00
tramp









Figure 4: Conditional goto gadget. First, cb0 copies the byte pointed to by cond_ptr into the least significant byte of cb1’s
source to use as an index into the conditional table. Then, cb1 copies the selected byte into the second least significant byte of
cb2’s source. This byte selects which of cbT or cbF are copied into tramp’s next control block field. If the address table is at
address 0x2000, then if the byte pointed to by cond_ptr is even, then cb1,T will be the next control block executed. Otherwise,
cb1,F will be.
pc
04 00 00 00
cb0
01 00 00 00
cb1
01 00 00 00
cb2
04 00 00 00
cb3
00 00 00 00
tramp









Figure 5: Dispatch gadget. The byte pointed to by the program counter is used as an offset into the dispatch table. The dispatch
table contains the offset into the instruction table for the corresponding instruction. For example, the byte ‘+’ has ASCII
value 43; the 43rd entry of the dispatch table is 8; and the address of the increment gadget (see Figure 3) is stored at offset 8 in
the instruction table. The control block cb3 copies the corresponding entry from the instruction table into the next control block
field of a trampoline control block.
ment (resp. decrement) and the address of the next control
block to execute when the operation is complete. These
work by operating on a byte at a time. First, we increment
(resp. decrement) the least significant byte of the 4-byte
word. If the result is 00 (resp. ff), then we repeat with
the second least significant byte, and so on. This is a
straight-forward application of unary functions, variable
dereferencing, and conditionals.
Next instruction gadget. The next instruction gadget
increments the pc by one using the increment word gadget
and then jumps to the dispatch gadget.
Increment and decrement instruction gadgets.
These gadgets increment or decrement the cell pointed to
by pc using the generic increment and decrement word
gadgets and then jump to the next instruction gadget.
Move right and left instruction gadgets. These gad-
gets move the head right or left by incrementing or decre-
menting head using the generic increment and decrement
word gadgets and then jump to the next instruction gad-
get.
Loop instruction gadgets. The left and right loop in-
struction gadgets use the increment/decrement byte and
word, conditional, and switch gadgets in its implemen-
tation. We use the switch gadget and define our lookup
table, or bracket table, to contain an offset into two dis-
tinct address tables, or scan right table and scan left table,
at the nth index, where n equals 0 or the ASCII byte rep-
resentation of ‘[’, or ‘]’. The scan right table assigns
its indexes with the following control block addresses in
order: scan right, increment loop counter, decrement loop
counter, and quit. The scan left table simply inverts all
operations.
We implement the left condition to first check whether
the cell pointed to by head is zero. If it is, the gadget
5
Figure 4.5: Dispatch gadget. The byte p i ted to by the pr gram counter is used
as an offset into the dispatch table. The dispatch table contains the offset into the
instr tion tabl fo the orresponding instruc ion. For example, the byte ‘+’ has
ASCII value 43; the 43rd entry of the dispatch table is 8; and the address of the
increment gadget (see Figure 4.3) is stored at offset 8 in the instruction table. The
control block cb3 copies the corr sp ding entry from the instructio table i to the
next con rol block fi ld f a trampolin contr l block.
4.4.3.0.1 Dispatch gadget.
This specific gadget dispatches a BF instruction. We use the switch building
block with the dispatch table as the offset able a d the instr ction table as the
address table. The dispatch gadget is shown in Figure 4.5.
4.4.3.0.2 Increment/ ecrement word gadgets.
We implement generic 4-byte increment and decrement gadgets which take as in-
put the address of the value to increment (resp. decrement) and the address of the
next control block to execute when the operation is complete. These work by oper-
ating on a byte at a time. First, we increment (resp. decrement) the least significant
byte of the 4-byte word. If the result is 00 (resp. ff), then we repeat with the sec-
ond least significant byte, and so on. This is a straight-forward application of unary
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functions, variable dereferencing, and conditionals.
4.4.3.0.3 Next instruction gadget.
The next instruction gadget increments the pc by one using the increment word
gadget and then jumps to the dispatch gadget.
4.4.3.0.4 Increment/decrement instruction gadgets.
These gadgets increment or decrement the cell pointed to by pc using the generic
increment and decrement word gadgets and then jump to the next instruction gadget.
4.4.3.0.5 Move right/left instruction gadgets.
These gadgets move the head right or left by incrementing or decrementing head
using the generic increment and decrement word gadgets and then jump to the next
instruction gadget.
4.4.3.0.6 Loop instruction gadgets.
The left and right loop instruction gadgets use the increment/decrement byte
and word, conditional, and switch gadgets in its implementation. We use the switch
gadget and define our lookup table, or bracket table, to contain an offset into two
distinct address tables, or scan right table and scan left table, at the nth index, where n
equals 0 or the ASCII byte representation of ‘[’, or ‘]’. The scan right table assigns its
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indexes with the following control block addresses in order: scan right, increment loop
counter, decrement loop counter, and quit. The scan left table inverts all operations.
We implement the left condition to first check whether the cell pointed to by
head is zero. If it is, the gadget jumps to the next instruction gadget. Otherwise,
it increments lc using the increment word gadget and scans right, incrementing and
decrementing lc as brackets are encountered until lc = 0 at which point it jumps to
the next instruction gadget.
The right condition is similar with a few exceptions. First, we jump to the next
instruction if the cell pointed to by head is zero. At the start of scan left we decrement
the pc using the decrement word gadget. The scan left table, as stated above, simply
inverts all operations of the scan right table. This has the effect of scanning left until
the matching bracket is found at which point it jumps to the next instruction gadget.
4.4.3.0.7 Input/output instruction gadgets.
Using the memory-mapped I/O building block, the input and output instruction
gadgets use the Pi’s UART to receive a byte and store it in the cell pointed to by
head or to transmit the byte in the cell.
4.4.4 Other gadgets
In previous sections, we demonstrated that DMA transfers are Turing- and resource-
complete by building gadgets to interpret the BF programming language and interact
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with memory-mapped I/O registers. In this section we sketch the construction of a
handful of building blocks that could be used to implement more efficient programs
than those built using BF.
Similar to the unary function building block, we can construct arbitrary binary
functions f : {0, 1}8 × {0, 1}8 → {0, 1}8 by using a 64-kilobyte table, appropriately
aligned such that concatenation of the left and right operands forms an offset into
the table. Larger binary operations can be constructed by operating 8-bits at a time.
For arithmetic operations such as addition, an additional table containing a carryout
bit could be used to implement carries.
Relational operators can be implemented in much the same way or they can lever-
age a subtraction.
Finally, DMA-specific features can be used to easily implement functionality which
would otherwise be more difficult to implement or be less performant. For one exam-
ple, the DMA engine on the Raspberry Pi 2 is capable of zeroing regions of memory.
Another example is the Pi is capable of performing moderately complex copying
modes including nonconsecutive 2D copies. Lastly, as mentioned above, the DMA is
usually responsible for communicating directly with hardware peripherals and DMA
engines typically support gating the transfers between devices and memory using a




4.5 A DMA rootkit
The most common operating system used on the Raspberry Pi is a Debian-derived
distribution called Raspbian which has a Linux kernel. Linux maintains a circular
linked list of task structs each of which holds information about a process. The
head of the list, init task, is an exported kernel symbol which is exposed using the
ksymtab mechanism. Each task struct contains a pointer to cred structure which
contains various credentials, including the user ID (UID) of the process.
We implemented a DMA rootkit that first finds the address of init task and
then continually walks the linked list. For each process, the rootkit examines the
process’s UID. If the UID matches the target UID, then the UID is changed to 0,
effectively giving the process super user privileges. Any processes with the target
UID that are running are modified shortly after the rootkit is started. Similarly, any
processes with the target UID that are started after the rootkit are quickly modified.
Unlike the DMA gadgets described in Section 4.4, for the rootkit we utilize the
DMA engine’s ability to perform a 2D transfer. This enables the rootkit to copy
the task struct’s next struct pointer and its cred pointer to a known location in
memory given only the address of the next task struct pointer.4
In more detail, starting with a four-byte kernel virtual address, va for a task struct’s
next struct pointer which is stored in a fixed location p, the rootkit first converts va
4Lists in the Linux kernel contain pointers to the next element’s next element pointer rather
than to the beginning of the structure. In normal kernel code, this leads to an additional arithmetic
instruction to recover a pointer to the structure.
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to a bus address ba. Next, it loads the two words at ba and ba + ∆ — where ba + ∆
is the bus address of the cred pointer — to p and p + 4 using a 2D transfer with an
appropriate stride constant ∆. After this transfer, location p contains a kernel virtual
address for a task struct’s next struct pointer and p + 4 contains a kernel virtual
address for the current task struct’s cred struct. The latter address is converted
to a bus address, the UID is loaded, compared to the target UID, and on a match, 0
is written. In either case, the loop repeats.
Since the list is circular, the rootkit’s logic is particularly simple. It consists of
two DMA control blocks to get the address of init task and an additional 18 to
implement the loop, UID test, and UID setting.
4.6 Implementation
We implemented the BF interpreter described in Section 4.4.3 and the rootkit
described in Section 4.5 on a Raspberry Pi 2. We were running the common Debian-
based operating system, Raspbian. By default, Raspbian exposes the physical address
space — including both the SDRAM main memory and the memory-mapped I/O
registers — through the psuedo device file /dev/mem.
Our code is setuid root. It opens /dev/mem, maps pages of physical memory and
I/O memory into the process’s virtual address space, then closes the file and drops
privileges. Next, it crafts DMA control blocks and tables as described above in an
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unused region of physical memory. Finally, a run dma() function loads the address
of the first control block in the DMA engine’s memory-mapped I/O control block
register which begins execution of the DMA program. All of our code is available at
https://github.com/stevecheckoway/rundma.
For input and output, we connected an FTDI UART to USB cable to the UART
pins on the Pi.
4.7 Related work
There are two, mostly disjoint, lines of research related to our work: the security of
auxiliary processors inside computers, and unintended, Turing-complete computation.
4.7.0.0.1 Auxiliary processors.
Security researchers have only recently begun examining the security of auxiliary
processors and the firmware that runs on them. The most obvious example of an
auxiliary processor is the GPU which uses DMA to transfer graphics data between
the graphics card and main memory. Vasiliadis et al.176 use the GPU to implement
malware unpacking and runtime polymorphism in order to harden malware against
detection. Ladakis et al.177 use the GPU to build akey logger that monitors the
system’s keyboard buffer.
Duflot and Perez178 examine the processor that runs on network interface cards (NICs).
They exploit a vulnerability in the NIC’s firmware to achieve arbitrary code execution
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and mount a DMA attack to add a backdoor in the kernel. Triulzi179,180 uses both
the NIC and video card in concert to recover sensitive data in memory such as cryp-
tographic keys. In follow-up work, Duflot et al.181 construct an anomaly detection
system that uses an IOMMU mechanism to limit access to main memory.
The IEEE 1394 FireWire specification allows the FireWire bus to communicate
via DMA to minimize interrupts and buffer copies. Numerous researchers exploit this
feature to access main memory directly.182–185 Kalenderidis and Collinson186 exploit
Intel Thunderbolt in a similar fashion.
The Intel Management Engine (ME) is a microcontroller embedded in the Intel
chip set with a separate NIC, DMA access to main memory, and remote out-of-
band management technology called Intel Active Management Technology (AMT).
Stewin and Bystrov187 use the ME to build a DMA key logger, and Tereshkin and
Wojtczuk188 use AMT to construct a “Ring −3” rootkit. Similarly, Farmer189 and
Moore190 examine vulnerabilities in the Intelligent Platform Management Interface
(IPMI).
Other exploitable auxiliary processors include laptop batteries191 and webcams.192
4.7.0.0.2 Unintended computation.
The ability to craft input data to drive programs in the target system has been dis-
cussed by the hacker community as far back as Aleph One’s seminal article on buffer
overflows.193 Return-to-libc,194 Krahmers borrowed code chunks technique,195 and
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return-oriented programming (ROP)153 represent an evolution of exploitation tech-
niques leading to Turing-complete computation built by borrowing existing program
code.
ROP was first introduced by Shacham153 as a technique to perform arbitrary,
Turing-complete computation by executing a string of gadgets: short sequences of
instructions, linked together by an “update-load-branch” mechanism,158 that exist
within the program or linked library. ROP has since been extended to various archi-
tectures.154–157,159 More recent work has focused on the automation of each step in
the technique.160–162,196 For example, Bittau et al.162 explores the limits of ROP by
crafting an exploit without possessing the target’s binary.
Turing-complete gadget sets need not be comprised of misappropriated CPU in-
structions. Indeed, parsers for complex file and record formats can be abused to
provide Turing-complete computation. Oakley and Bratus197 uses the Debugging
With Attribute Records Format (DWARF) to perform arbitrary computation with
the DWARF bytecode. Shapiro et al.152 use the ELF loader mechanism to effect
computation.
The prior work most similar to ours combines specialized hardware and unintended
computation. Bangert et al.163 demonstrate a Turing-complete execution environ-
ment using the IA32 arcitecture’s page fault handling mechanism. Neither the page
fault handling hardware nor the DMA hardware was designed with computation in




In this work, we have shown that DMA engines can be used to perform Turing-
complete computation even though it is not their intended function. In particular, we
have crafted DMA Turing- and resource-complete gadget sets that we used to build
an interpreter for BF. In addition, we built a DMA rootkit to performs privilege
escalation for targeted programs.
Although we are the first to build malware entirely out of DMA transfers, we are
not the first to consider the capabilities DMA provides to auxiliary processors running
in the system (see Section 4.2). Indeed, researchers have considered various counter-
measures to such DMA malware. These countermeasures are applicable to our work
as well. Example countermeasures include using the input/out memory management
unit (IOMMU),198 peripheral firmware load-time integrity,187,199 anomaly detection
systems,181 and bus agent runtime monitors (BARMs).198
Several of these defenses have been found lacking. Researchers have noted that
peripheral firmware load-time integrity is inadequate because it does not provide run-
time integrity.181,187 Stewin and Bystrov187 further describes the IOMMU as lacking
because it can be configured improperly, and it cannot be applied if there are memory
access policy conflicts.
Given the current lack of strong defenses against DMA abuse and the ability of
DMA to do both Turing-complete and resource-complete computation, it is clear that




Computation and Covert Channels
using Web Workers
Adobe Flash is an example third-party plugin that was necessary to extend func-
tionality like video streaming to web applications. HTML5 eliminates this neces-
sity by providing new APIs that improve core functionality of the web browser
(herein browser). Web Workers is one such API specified by the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C)200 and Web Hypertext Application Technology Working Group
(WHATWG).201 Web Workers enable web applications to spawn background workers
(i.e., threads) in parallel to the main page. Workers are intended for long-lived and
computationally intensive operations that would otherwise block the UI.
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Encryption, motion detection, and simulated annealing are some use cases for
workers. In general, any application that has to have its execution broken up to
avoid being prematurely terminated by the browser is a candidate for workers.
Despite the usefulness of concurrency in JavaScript, permissive execution of work-
ers enables stealthy computation. Specifically, workers are instantiated unbeknownst
to the user of a web application and can perform any number of computations. An
attacker can cause a user to perform work for her by exploiting a cross-site scripting
(XSS) vulnerability on a legitimate website or by placing an advertisement that hides
the work in a worker.
We demonstrate the feasibility of stealthy computation using workers by imple-
menting a distributed password cracker that uses the Web Workers API. We can
compute 500,000 MD5 hashes per second using the Chrome browser on a 2012 Mac-
Book Air. We also implement a denial-of-service (DoS) attack that is unique to OS X.
We define wasteful stealthy computations that exploit garbage collection mechanisms
in Chrome, Firefox, and Safari. The result is high CPU and memory utilization that
eventually fills the swap partition and causes a deadlock.
We again use wasteful stealthy computations against the Android Chrome browser.
This time, we find exploiting garbage collection results in a resource depletion attack.
We did not attempt this on the mobile Safari browser for iOS but believe that it is
also susceptible because it is built on WebKit much like its browser counterpart.
A natural criticism to both the DoS and resource depletion attack is that a worker
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is unnecessary to perform either attack. However, we attempted all stealthy com-
putation attacks in the single JavaScript and UI thread. The result was the page
becoming unresponsive, followed by the Browser terminating the process. Neither of
which happen in our worker implementations.
We describe and implement a covert channel that is not unique to workers but
is easily implemented using them. Our covert channel uses CPU and memory throt-
tling to transmit bits to an unauthorized application. We find that CPU throttling
is noisier than memory throttling because other processes can obscure our covertly
transmitted bits (i.e., a random peak can corrupt bits or semantic structures such as
a preamble). We throttle memory by exploiting garbage collection to create a peak
and then terminating the web worker to force garbage collection anyway.
We scanned 7000 websites from Alexa’s top sites to determine the prevalence of
worker use. We found that 1.2% of them use workers to perform some computation.
Websites such as yahoo.com, usbank.com, and mediafire.com use workers for vari-
ous reasons. For example, usbank.com uses a worker defined in foresee-worker.js to
compress session event logs.
In this paper, we are concerned with using the Web Workers API to create workers
that enable stealthy computation and covert channels. We demonstrate the feasibility
of these by implementing our own distributed password cracker using workers, a DoS
attack against OS X, a resource depletion attack against Android, and a covert chan-
nel using memory throttling. We provide the necessary background for JavaScript
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code execution and Web Workers, discuss related work focused on HTML5 vulnera-
bilities, and we give the first mitigation strategy for the misuse of workers.
5.2 Background
Web browsers typically have one thread that JavaScript and the UI share. There-
fore, UI updates are blocked while the JavaScript interpreter executes code and vice
versa. A shared task queue enables asynchronous execution of JavaScript and UI
updates, allowing either to execute when the thread is available. Asynchronous exe-
cution does not solve the problem of an arbitrary script taking unusually long. The
browser attempts to terminate any script that takes longer than some threshold re-
gardless of its purpose or importance. The user is aware of this when the UI freezes.
Not much later, the browser presents a status (i.e., terminate or continue) or crash
message.
The browser’s approach to ending long-running scripts is undesirable because it
provides no context per the scripts execution. The user is unaware of what the
script is meant to do and how long it has been running. Web application developers
approach this issue by leveraging asynchronous execution and dividing their scripts
into logical chunks that execute on some period. This method does not benefit from
parallel execution where a computation is uninterrupted until it finishes.
HTML5 addresses these limitations with the Web Workers API. This API enables
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Figure 5.1: Web Worker JavaScript Runtime.
web applications to spawn background workers in parallel to the main page. We show
in Figure 5.1 that workers are unable to access the Dynamic Object Model (DOM)
or the callers (i.e., parent object) variables and functions. Workers are instantiated
as one of two types: shared or dedicated.
Shared workers can be accessed by multiple web applications but dedicated work-
ers cannot. Web applications instantiate both shared and dedicated workers by pro-
viding a script object to the Worker constructor. The script object is either an
externally loaded file or defined inline as a string description of the web worker.
The string description is provided as input to the blob constructor, a file-like
object, and is referenced by an output URL handle. This URL handle is provided to
the Worker constructor. See Listing 5.1 an example inline instantiation.
<script id="mw" type="javascript/worker">
self.onmessage = function(event) {
self.postMessage ({’msg’: ’hello.’ ,});
}
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</script >
<script language="javascript">
var blob = new Blob([ document.querySelector(’#mw’).textContext ]);
var m_worker = new Worker(window.URL.createObjectURL(blob));
</script >
Listing 5.1: Instantiate worker using blob.
Workers support communication with each other and its parent object via message
passing. The onMessage method listens for messages and upon receiving one it will
call the postMessage method to send a message. Workers continue to listen for
messages until the user navigates away from the web application, or the parent object
calls the terminate method on the worker. Terminating a web worker causes garbage
collection on all allocated memory.
5.3 Threat Model
We use the definition of a web attacker and gadget attacker by Akhawe et al.202
to define an attacker that maliciously misuses workers. A web attacker operates a
malicious web application but has no visibility into the network beyond the requests
directed to her application. A gadget attacker can inject content into otherwise
legitimate web applications.
A web attacker that misuses workers hosts a web application with a mechanism for
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generating traffic (e.g., misleading domain name or social engineering). Every time
a user visits the web application, stealthy computation is performed via a worker or
workers. A gadget attacker that misuses workers exploits web vulnerabilities such as
cross-site scripting to inject her workers. She may also purchase a web advertisement
and bundle her workers in the ad. A user that visits a legitimate site will now perform
some stealthy computation.
A web attacker is considered an insider threat; for example, a web application
administrator. A gadget attacker is an outside threat. She is simply a web application
user. We consider both attackers to be unsophisticated as neither has visibility or
control of the network. Also, both attackers rely on generally accessible tools such as
a laptop, internet access, and at most a web server.
The goals of both a web attacker and gadget attacker that misuse workers include:
performing stealthy computation, mounting a DoS or resource depletion attack, and
establishing a covert channel with an unauthorized application.
5.4 Web Worker Primitives
While creating stealthy computation is as simple as writing function x, a wasteful
computation needs to exploit garbage collection mechanisms for multiple browsers.
Covert channels also require a mechanism for throttling a system’s CPU and Mem-
ory. We introduce three primitives to achieve wasteful stealthy computation, CPU
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throttling, and memory throttling.
5.4.0.0.1 Infinite Loop Sequences.
An infinite loop is a sequence of instructions which loops endlessly because the
boolean condition never changes (e.g., it always evaluates true). If an infinite loop
is executed by the JavaScript interpreter, the browser UI will freeze due to blocking
on the shared thread. However, blocking does not occur if this loop is executed in a
worker.
We use an infinite loop such as while(true){} to perform a wasteful stealthy
computation. This type of computation enables CPU and memory throttling. Again,
the execution of this loop is unknown to the user because it does not block the UI
thread.
5.4.0.0.2 CPU Throttling.
Executing an empty infinite loop alone will not throttle a modern CPU. Instead,
we achieve throttling by looping on intensive operations such as recursive function
calls and large data manipulation. Listing 5.2 implements a data manipulation loop
that randomly fills two 1024-byte arrays and then concatenates them.
var cpu_work = function () {
var scratch = [];
// Fill the ArrayBuffer with random values.
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for(var j = 0; j < 1024; j++) {
scratch.push(Math.random ());
}
var firstArr = new Uint8Array(scratch);
var secondArr = new Uint8Array(scratch);
// ArrayBuffer concatenation.





Listing 5.2: Browser CPU throttling.
5.4.0.0.3 Memory Throttling.
Throttling memory is browser specific as it exploits corner-cases not yet handled
by the browser’s garbage collection. We note that the browser does, in fact, do
garbage collection correctly; however, the process is approximate as deciding whether
memory can be freed is undecidable. We use this knowledge to our advantage to
discover browser-specific memory leaks and use them to throttle system memory.
In Listing 5.3 we use a technique outlined by Glasser203 to demonstrate a memory
leak in Firefox. This technique relies on JavaScript closures. Specifically, both unused
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and bucket are both defined inside of RD ATTACK FIREFOX SAFARI scope, and if both
functions access the variable leak it’s imperative that both get the same object. So
leak is never garbage collected.
In our experimentation with these primitives, we crashed Firefox and Chrome
when throttling CPU and memory. We mitigate this by using the worker method
terminate(). This method helps us avoid crashing the browser and completes our
throttling primitives by exposing a mechanism for quickly freeing system resources.
var bucket = null;
var RD_ATTACK_FIREFOX_SAFARI = function () {
var leak = bucket;
var unused = function () {
if (leak) {




longStr: new Array (10000000).join(Math.random ()),
someMethod: function () {
var hole_in_bucket = 2;
}
};
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Listing 5.3: Firefox memory throttling.
5.5 Stealthy Computation
We demonstrate the feasibility of stealthy computation using workers by imple-
menting a distributed password cracker that uses the Web Workers API. We imple-
ment the main HTML page to define a target MD5 password hash, a worker instan-
tiation, and an event listener to receive the result of password cracking (i.e., an MD5
collision was found).
The worker instantiation is on input md5cracker.js. This worker script defines
the MD5 hashing algorithm, a dictionary download method, and the event listeners
start and stop.
The start listener waits to receive the string start. When it receives the string, it
downloads an array of passwords using the method importScripts(). This method
synchronously imports a script into the worker’s scope. We use it to import an array
of passwords because we want the worker to be self-contained. Specifically, if an
attacker should inject a worker or upload an advertisement with a worker, she can
not rely on the calling parent object to pass in any data such as an array of passwords.
After downloading the array, the worker selects a random index into the array
and begins to hash each password and compare it to the target hash. If it finds a
140
CHAPTER 5. STEALTHY COMPUTATION AND COVERT CHANNELS
collision, it returns the result to the parent object, or it could use a web socket to
send it elsewhere (e.g., the attacker’s server).
The stop listener simply kills the worker once it is no longer useful.
We send 1 million passwords to the worker using importScripts() which is ap-
proximately 13MB. This step adds approximately 50% latency on the dataset and
takes 3 seconds to download. We can minimize this time by compressing the pass-
word array and partitioning the array into multiple arrays. The password cracker
performs 500K hashes per second on a 2012 MacBook Air.
The average user visits a website for no longer than 15 seconds. Thus, one criti-
cism we receive is that stealthy computation doesn’t have the much time to do any
worthwhile computation. We argue that stealthy computation on video streaming
sites such as Youtube is plausible. In addition, there exist other projects on the
internet that do stealthy computation using workers such as bitcoin mining.204
5.5.1 Denial-of-Service
We use our loop and memory throttle primitives to mount a DoS attack against
all OS X devices. This DoS is unique to OS X because of the way virtual memory is
handled. Specifically, OS X can grow its swap file to the maximum available size of
the hard disk. If we exploit garbage collection for a very long period, OS X will grow
the size of its swap to the point that it deadlocks.
The steadily growing swap in Figure 5.2 depicts our exploitation of garbage col-
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Figure 5.2: OS X Firefox DoS attack.
lection on Firefox. OS X needs to be hard rebooted when it deadlocks. Fortunately,
disk space is recovered and the swap returns to its original size.
5.5.2 Resource Depletion
The mobile Chrome browser also supports the Web Workers API. Figure 5.3
depicts user memory usage as it steadily increases from the stealthy computation.
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Figure 5.3: Android Chrome resource depletion attack.
The over usage of memory results in I/O waiting toward the end of our experiment.
Stealthy computation can excacerbate resource depletion as it uses system resources
to perform wasteful work.
5.6 Covert Channel
A covert channel is a communication mechanism for two processes that are not
supposed to be able or allowed to communicate. We use our CPU throttling and mem-
ory throttling primitives to create a covert channel between a visited web application
and some unauthorized application on the user’s system using workers.
We first try CPU throttling to observe messages with a simple structure. Specif-
ically, we do not define a pre or postamble; rather, we define a period in which to
observe a bit based upon a CPU usage spike. We find that the CPU channel is
noisy, as seen in Figure 5.4, and we can only achieve good accuracy by employing a
143
CHAPTER 5. STEALTHY COMPUTATION AND COVERT CHANNELS
Figure 5.4: CPU noise during regular use.
high sampling rate. Unfortunately, we use PSUTIL to get current CPU usage and
it imposes a sampling rate with a minimum bound of 100 milliseconds. Also due to
JavaScript runtime limitations, anything less than one millisecond isn’t feasible.
We attempt to minimize CPU noise by increasing the length between CPU spikes
to 500 milliseconds and 1 second. We can obtain bits in the covert channel but under
ideal conditions. For example, if any other work is done in the browser it significantly
impacts our ability to discern relevant CPU spikes.
Next, we try our memory throttling primitive. Memory usage is a more deter-
ministic channel and thus less noisy than CPU usage. This makes it more viable as
a covert channel. We use our memory throttling primitive to fill a 40MB array and
then clear the memory with a terminate worker method call. We can successfully
send 1 bit per 5 seconds. We send the bits for ”hello world“ in Figure 5.5. Unlike the
CPU covert channel, the memory covert channel is usable when the user browses the
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Figure 5.5: Memory covert channel sending hello world.
internet or stream videos. This finding is a consequence of the amount of memory
used which far exceeds the memory needed to buffer a video in our tests.
We note that our covert channel does not require a web worker. However, when
executing the covert channel in the UI thread, the browser is less responsive due to the
looping execution of the memory primitive. In addition, our ability to force garbage
collection by terminating the worker must be exactly emulated in the UI thread or it
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will break the covert channel (i.e., no discernable memory usage peaks).
We implement and test this covert channel on OS X using the Firefox and Chrome
browsers. The covert channel is inefficient regarding channel bandwidth; we can send
approximately 1 bit per 5 seconds. We can speed this up by reducing the amount of
memory throttled (e.g., less than 40MB). We could also use more than worker.
5.7 Potential Mitigations
The challenge for the Web Workers API is how to inform users a worker is execut-
ing, what the intent of the execution is, and how the execution is impacting system
resources. We assert that the most effective solution is to provide fine-grained con-
trols for workers similar to pop-up controls, and to restrict the Web Workers API
in the ECMAScript specification. For instance, requiring an explicit intent for every
worker would provide context to what the purpose of the worker is and enable a user
to decide whether to allow it. A Google Chrome extension is a good example because
it uses a manifest file to specify the capabilities of the extension. These capabilities
are analogous to a worker intent.
In the interim, we implement a browser extension to mitigate worker stealthy
computations partially. This mitigation is partial because the browser extension only
informs the user of when a worker has executed. If the worker is named appropriately,
the user is provided with some context of the workers intent, but name mangling and
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poor coding practices will undo this. We call our browser extension wAudit.
wAudit is a Google Chrome content script. Content scripts use the Document
Object Model (DOM) to read and modify details of a visited web page. These scripts,
however, cannot use or modify variables or functions defined by the visited web page.
For wAudit to determine whether a worker exists it must be able to the later.
We programatically inject wAudit as a script into visited web pages using documen-
t.createElement. This function creates an HTML script element that we append to
the document object’s root element using the function document.documentElement.-
appendChild. The injected script recursively searches all DOM objects and identifies
object types of [object Worker].
The script alerts the user if it finds a worker or workers by drawing a banner at
the bottom of the browser window. This banner includes the name of the worker and
a UI button for terminating a selected worker. We implement the terminate function
by crafting the string "workers[i]+".terminate(). This string contains the worker
name and the method call to terminate. We call eval on the string input to execute.
5.8 Related work
Security researchers have found numerous vulnerabilities in the HTML5 APIs
that enable traditional web application attacks such as CSRF and clickjacking, and
HTML5-specific attacks such as cache poisoning and botnets.
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Tian et al.205 show that the HTML5 screen-sharing API can allow for cross-site
request forgery (CSRF) attacks, even if the target website utilizes CSRF defenses
such SSL and secure random tokens. The authors are also able to sniff user account,
autocomplete, and browsing history data because it can be viewed directly on the
user’s screen. Potential defenses are enumerated as restrict the loading of view-source
links, enable fine-grained sharing, and constrain cross-origin content.
The HTML5 FullScreen API displays web content that fills the user’s entire screen.
Aboukhadijeh206 describes how a malicious website can trick users into clicking a link
to a legitimate website (e.g., https://www.bankofamerica.com/), and then display a
malicious website in fullscreen. The malicious website imitates the legitimate website
and obscures the domain name and SSL visual indicator.
Kuppan207 overviews multiple HTML5-specific attacks. For example, an attacker
can use the HTML5 Drag and Drop API to trick users into setting target form
fields with attacker controlled data, a clickjacking attack. An attacker can poison
HTML5 caches designed to enable offline browsing with her own pages that recover
user supplied data. Specific to our work, workers enable HTML5 botnets. These
botnets can mount distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks by sending cross-
domain XMLHttpRequests.
Anibal Sacco et al.208 use workers to optimize heap-spray attacks. By employ-
ing multiple workers, the authors show that they can populate the target systems’
memory faster than conventional heap-spray attacks. They leverage HTML5 can-
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vas objects to obtain both full control over consecutive heap pages and to provide
byte-level access to pixel information. This gives four bytes per pixel for use in spray
contents – typically a use-after-free exploit, heap-based buffer overflow, or ROP chain.
Also, due to the increasing prevalence of browser-based devices with HTML5 support
(smartphones, smart TVs, game consoles, etc.) the use of workers as an attack vector
are largely platform and browser agnostic.
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) blog209 mentions the use
of workers to perform denial-of-service attacks. The post gives a cursory treatment of
these vulnerabilities and does not provide any concrete details regarding implemen-
tation, measurement, or countermeasures.
In general, defenses for HTML5 API vulnerabilities include modifications to the
APIs. Son and Shmatikov210 find that many web applications perform origin checks
incorrectly, if at all. The lack of stringent checking allows for cross-site scripting (XSS)
attacks, as well as data injection into local storage. The authors propose accepting
only messages from the origin of the page that loaded a frame and the parent of that
frame.
Akhawe et al.211 find that HTML5 web applications need better privilege sepa-
ration. Rather than advocate for browser redesign or artificial limits on partitions,
the authors propose a way for HTML5 applications to create an arbitrary number of
unprivileged components. Each component executes with its own temporary origin,
isolated from the rest of the components. Unprivileged components interact via a
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privileged component that executes priviledged calls in the main origin of the web
application. The authors show that their system helps reduce the amount of trusted
code by a factor of 6 to 10000.
5.9 Conclusions
We described how the Web Workers API can be used to create workers that
enable stealthy computation and covert channels. We demonstrated the feasibility of
stealthy computation by implementing a distributed password cracker using workers,
a DoS attack against OS X, and a resource depletion attack against Android. We
evaluated the feasibility of a covert channel using CPU and memory throttling, and
implemented the later. Lastly, we gave the first mitigation strategy for the misuse of
workers.
5.10 Health and Medical Systems
Health and medical systems are increasingly becoming networked. An industry
report by Parks Associates predicts that networked medical systems will exceed 14
million sales in 2018.212 These medical systems often employ commodity operating
systems such as Windows Embedded and can access and be accessed over the internet.
Manufacturers troubleshoot and upgrade health and medical systems remotely
using this internet access while physicians control or modify settings. Some of the
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devices host web-based UIs to interact with users locally or over the network.
We investigate the effects of running stealthy computation on Baxa ExactaMix.
The Baxa ExactaMix is an embedded health and medical system that mixes to-
tal parenteral nutrition and other multi-ingredient solutions. The compounder runs
Windows XP Embedded 2002 Service Pack 2 and has a 664 MHz VIA C5 x86 CPU
with 496 MB of memory.213
5.10.1 Experimental Setup
Since our Baxa ExactaMix is running Windows XP Embedded 2002, it has In-
ternet Explorer version 6.0, which does not support HTML5 APIs. However, since
the Baxa ExactaMix can access the internet, we can install a modern browser. We
installed Firefox 29 at the time of this experiment. We note that modern medical
systems use more recent operating systems and thus support Web Workers without
installing a third-party browser.
In our experiment, we first start the Baxa ExactaMix and wait for it to run its
clinical software. We then begin measuring the CPU, memory, and swap usage of
the device to establish a baseline of activity. Next, we launch Firefox and navigate
to a website that we control. This website uses a worker to perform our stealthy
computation, specifically, the DoS attack we describe earlier in Section 5.5. We
continue our measurements for 3 minutes.
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Figure 5.6: Stealthy computation on Baxa ExactaMix.
5.10.2 Results
We note a clear delineation between pre- and post-worker computation in Fig-
ure 5.6. Memory and swap usage are at 60% and 20%, respectively, when the Baxa
ExactaMix first starts. As this is a single-core device, the CPU utilization remains
high for the entire experiment because all processes are scheduled to execute on the
same core. We note linearly increasing memory usage and a near-instantaneous spike
in swap usage to 60% when we visit our website that performs the stealthy compu-
tation.
We also quantitatively evaluated the impact of stealthy computation on the Baxa
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ExactaMix. We define the qualitative metric as a measure of the device’s usability;
specifically, if the Baxa ExactaMix becomes noticeably unresponsive. Repeating the
experimental setup, we attempt to use the clinical software. We measure at a coarse
granularity the time it takes for the clinical software to output a report about its
configuration. With no stealthy computation performed, report generation takes
approximately 5.5 seconds. The execution time increases by a factor of two with
stealthy computation.
5.11 Linux Stealthy Computation
We experiment with stealthy computation and other operating systems. We find
that Chrome and Firefox in Ubuntu 15.10 both allow stealthy computation using web
workers. However, the DoS attack against OS X does not apply here. See Figures 5.7
and 5.8.
153
CHAPTER 5. STEALTHY COMPUTATION AND COVERT CHANNELS
Figure 5.7: Stealthy computation on Ubuntu 15.10 using Chrome.
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The use of modern computer systems almost always requires that a user proves
their identity through some process of authentication. A user can authenticate using
methods such as public key authentication, biometrics, and passwords; something
you have, are, or know, respectively. Password-based authentication remains the
most widely used option for authentication because of its ease of use and simple
design.
However, passwords have a human factor weakness as users often choose passwords
that are too simplistic and easily guessed.214 Administrators and systems require users
to select more complex passwords as a consequence; thus, decreasing user satisfaction
as password selection becomes seemingly difficult. Worst yet, complex passwords
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interfere in critical workflow such as clinical care where a patient’s need is most
urgent.
In this chapter we describe an authentication system that requires the user to enter
a password as infrequently as once a day. Specifically, authentication information is
stored on a wearable device, a bracelet in our case, and is transmitted to devices to
which the user wishes to authenticate. The transmission between the bracelet and
device is achieved via using the user’s body as a communication medium.62,215 Our
goal is to reduce the impact on user satisfaction and workflow (i.e., usability) by
removing most of the difficulty of using a complex password.
While we focus on authentication in the medical community use case, we antic-
ipate that other areas such as the financial sector may benefit from our system. In
addition, it is important to note that this system is not a two-factor authentication
solution. The bracelet is not a biometric component and does not provide any addi-
tional information outside of what it stores. It is meant to enhance the user experience
and encourage the use of complex passwords.
6.2 Background
KBID originates from the idea of integrating a wearable device to achieve some
additional property in an authentication system (e.g., de-authentication). In partic-
ular, we are inspired by the design of zero-effort bilateral recurring authentication
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(ZEBRA) by Mare et al.216 In ZEBRA, a user wears a bracelet that encapsulates a
wireless radio, accelerometer, and gyroscope; these components record and transmit
wrist movements to a currently used computer system. This system continually com-
pares received measurements to input it receives from its keyboard and mouse. If
these two measurements are not correlated, the current session is de-authenticated.
At the time, ZEBRA was only envisioned as a method to de-authenticate a user
from a computer system and did not include a way to authenticate the user to the
system. Assuming that the user has already accepted wearing a device that will ef-
fectively de-authenticate them, adding functionality to authenticate rapidly increases
the usefulness of the system.
We avoided using radio frequency (RF) emissions for two reasons. First, RF by
its nature emits information into the environment. That information, once emitted,
can be received by various means. Second, RF relies on the underlying communica-
tion being secure. If an attacker discovers a security flaw in an RF communication
framework, e.g. Bluetooth low energy (BLE),217 then the systems as it exists could
be vulnerable to the flaw. Specifically, there is no need to alter or even monitor the
information exchanged between the system and a wearable device. An attacker would
only need to extend the range of the wireless communication to gain access to the
system.
We instead use body-coupled communication (BCC), or transmission of informa-
tion over the human body as a medium. We are not the first to use BCC to transmit
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a secret. For example, Chang et al. introduce a system for key exchange over a body
area network.62 By applying a small voltage to the tissue of a dead mouse, they were
able to communicate at a rate of 5Hz or 5 bits per second. However, this data rate
is not acceptable for our work as we would need to communicate authentication data
of at least 256 bits, and this would take nearly a minute to transmit.
We designed our authenticated bracelet to be non-transferrable (i.e., authenticat-
ing and then giving the bracelet to someone else). To support this feature, we zero
all authentication information upon bracelet removal.
6.3 Related Work
In addition to the ZEBRA, which we have described previously, there have been
several previous attempts at developing wearable-authentication technology. Two
of note include the Bionym Nymi218 and the Intel Authentication Bracelet.219 The
Bionym Nymi is an authentication wristband that broadcasts a digitally signed au-
thentication signal derived from a user’s heartbeat to nearby devices using BLE.220
The Intel Authentication Bracelet requires a user to log in to a system with a standard
password. A credential is then transmitted to the bracelet using BLE. This credential
is then broadcast to nearby bracelet-enabled devices in order to allow password-less
login.
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6.3.0.1 Limitations of Existing Work
Existing authentication wearables use wireless communication technology (typi-
cally BLE) to broadcast their authentication credentials. Thus the devices are likely
vulnerable to ghost-and-leech attacks.221 Ghost-and-leech attacks occur when an at-
tacker uses a more powerful radio transmitter than the transmitter found on a wireless
device in order to capture and rebroadcast the wireless signal in order to fool a target
into believing that the wireless device is in closer proximity to the target than it
actually is.
6.4 Threat Model
We describe KBID as an authentication mechanism that requires a wearable device
that transmits short-range authentication data via BCC. We recognize confidentiality,
integrity, and availability as security goals specific to KBID. Specifically, data stored
on the device and transmitted to the authentication module should be kept secret
from and not modifiable by unauthorized entities, and the data should be accessible to
both bracelet and authentication module. We omit the privacy of the authenticating
user because the system must validate her access to the system or resource.
Adversaries are typically distinguished based on their goals, capabilities, and rela-
tion to a system. We define the following adversarial classification criteria for KBID:
active adversaries that can read, modify, and inject communication between the device
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and authentication module, and passive adversaries that can eavesdrop on the com-
munication; internal entities that have legitimate access to the device, and external
entities that do not; single or coordinated group entities, and; sophisticated adver-
saries with specialized equipment (e.g., high-gain directional antenna or unauthorized
authentication module), and unsophisticated adversaries with common equipment.
The KBID device or authentication module may both be used as attack surfaces.
For example, an adversary may disrupt KBID authentication by physically damag-
ing the wearable device or authenticator module. We classify this and other KBID
security threats into the following categories: BCC threats, whereby the adversary
can passively eavesdrop on communication, or actively jam, replay, modify, forge, or
drop communication; hardware threats, whereby the adversary can induce incorrect
outputs from a valid device, and; software threats, whereby the adversary can alter
the logic of KBID’s device, authentication module, or client software through software
vulnerabilities.
As a hardware and software solution, the threat model for KBID includes many
subjects that apply to any such system. These include attack types (denial of service,
message forging or tampering, hardware tampering, and others) as well as a study of
potential adversaries and other topics. Here we focus on two threats that are unique
to KBID.
As a hardware and software system, KBID has two unique threats that both
require an active adversary to be within close physical proximity of KBID and an
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authentication module. First, it is possible to impersonate an authentication module.
An attacker could use a counterfeit authentication module that issues Get Status
commands when a user touches something connected to it, e.g. a doorknob. Second,
while we are using body coupled communication to transmit data without emitting
RF, it could be the case that the user’s body acts as a broadcast antenna and emits
the data into the environment. An attacker then intercepts the data.
6.5 Design
Here we describe in detail the design and implementation of the KBID system.
First, we discuss the high-level design where we explain the four major components of
the system. Next, we discuss the interface designs and the communication protocols
between the major components. Finally, we discuss the system workflow.
6.5.1 High Level Design
The system is composed of four main parts: a bracelet (Figure 6.1), an authenti-
cation module (Figure 6.2) an authentication client, and a Kerberos authentication
server. The bracelet is a wearable device that fastened to the user’s wrist. The
bracelet makes contact with the user’s skin and applies a signal directly to the user’s
skin. The authentication module has a sensor with a button under it. When the
user touches the sensor and depresses the button, the authentication module initiates
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Figure 6.1: KBID Prototype Bracelet.
communication with the bracelet. An RS-232 serial cable attaches the authentication
module to the computer system which the user wants to authenticate. A workstation
hosts the authentication client. The client monitors the serial connection for data and
when necessary, opens a connection to the Kerberos server for authentication. Finally,
the Kerberos server is a default installation and uses the default implementation of
the authentication protocol.
6.5.2 Interfaces and Communication
The KBID system includes three interfaces. The interface between the bracelet
and the authentication module takes place over the user’s skin. The interface between
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Figure 6.2: KBID Prototype Authentication Module.
the authentication module and the authentication client takes place over RS-232
serial. Finally, the interface between the authentication client and the Kerberos server
uses the network. As Kerberos server and client communication is well documented,
we will not discuss it in this chapter.
6.5.2.1 Bracelet to Authentication Module
The communication protocol between the bracelet and the authentication module
is a lightweight protocol. The messages that the bracelet sends to the authentication
modules are called statuses. Messages that the authentication module sends to the
bracelet are called commands. Each message sent over this interface is a length
164
CHAPTER 6. KERBEROS BRACELET IDENTIFICATION
delimited series of bytes. A status message had the following structure: [Status ID]
[Device ID] [Data Size (in bytes)] [Data]. The bracelet will send one of two statuses,
authenticated or un-authenticated. Authenticated data is transmitted in the data field
if and only if the status message returns authenticated.
A command message has the following structure: [Command ID] [Device ID]
[Payload Size (in bytes)] [Payload]. The authentication module will send three com-
mands: Get Status, Set Token, and De-authenticate. A Get Status command causes
the bracelet to respond with a status message. A Set Token command causes the
bracelet to store the payload in memory as authentication data and set its status to
authenticated. A De-authenticate command causes the bracelet to clear any token it
has and set its status to un-authenticated.
6.5.2.2 Authentication Module to Authentication Client
The authentication module and the authentication client communicate status and
command messages as well. The authentication module can send three statuses to the
authentication client. First is the Un-authenticated Bracelet message. This message
is sent to the authentication client when the authentication module receives an un-
authenticated status from a bracelet.
Next, the authentication module can send an Authenticated Bracelet status to the
authentication client. It will send this status when the bracelet sends a status of
authenticated. The Authenticated Bracelet status will contain the ticket information
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that was in the token section of the bracelet’s message.
Finally, the authentication module can send a Ticket Written status to the authen-
tication client. This is a message that lets the client know that the ticket information
has been successfully written to the bracelet.
The authentication client sends two commands to the authentication module.
First the Write Ticket command. This command instructs the authentication module
to pass the ticket included in the command to the bracelet with a Set Token command.
The authentication client can also send a De-authenticate Bracelet command. This
command instructs the authentication module to issue a De-Authenticate command
to the bracelet.
6.5.3 System Workflow
We describe the system workflow in two use cases. For the sake of brevity, we do
not include any error handling. In the first use case (Figure 6.3) the user is wearing
a bracelet but the bracelet is not yet authenticated. The user touches the sensor on
the authentication module; the authentication module sees that the user’s bracelet
is not authenticated and relays this information to the authentication client. The
client prompts the user for their username and password. The client verifies this
information with the Kerberos server, then instructs the user to touch the sensor on
the authentication module again. The client then instructs the authentication module
to write the ticket to the bracelet. The client unlocks the workstation once the ticket
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Figure 6.3: Un-authenticated Message Exchange.
is written.
In the second use case (Figure 6.4) the user has an authenticated bracelet. The
user touches the sensor on the authentication module. The module asks for a status,
and the bracelet provides it with the token it has stored. The module passes this
information along to the client which interprets the token as a Kerberos ticket. The
client verifies the ticket with the Kerberos server and unlocks the workstation. Our
goal is to perform this use case in less than one second.
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Figure 6.4: Authenticated Message Exchange.
6.6 Experiments and Results
6.6.1 Prototype
The hardware prototypes for the bracelet and the authentication module are based
on the Atmel ATMega328 microcontroller operating at 20 MHz and an LM358AN
Amplifier. Both the bracelet and the authentication module have copper pads that
make contact with the user’s skin. The signal from the skin is fed into the amplifier
and the signal to the skin is driven by setting a pin on the microcontroller. We
also built a resistive analogue to represent the resistance from a user’s wrist to their
fingertip. The authentication client is written in Python.
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6.6.2 Results
Initial results are encouraging. We can send commands from the authentication
module to the bracelet. The bracelet can correctly interpret those commands, and it
responds when issued a Get Status command. The time elapsed for a Get Status com-
mand and a status message with a 256-byte token is approximately 500 milliseconds.
We also implemented the functionality that clears the authentication information
when the bracelet is removed. We do this by using one of the hardware interrupts on
the microcontroller.
6.7 Future Work
We encountered two major hurdles during the development of the first prototype.
First, to successfully send a signal, the bracelet, and the authentication module must
have a common reference for voltage. Second, while we have been able to get the
signal to transmit from the authentication module to the bracelet, we have not been
able to get the signal to travel in the opposite direction. In particular, we need the
signal to be interpreted by the authentication module. To solve both of these issues,
we plan on using capacitive coupling to transmit the signal over the user’s skin.
We also plan to implement the system using a microcontroller that can store larger
keys. The Atmel ATMega328 only has 2 kilobytes of ram. Since the system requires
some memory to perform general operations, the remaining memory to store a key is
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approximately 1 kilobyte. This memory size is not sufficient to store authentication
information in real world environments. We also plan on hardening the system by
adding pre-shared message authentication codes (MACs) to protect against replay
attacks.
6.8 Conclusion
Complex passwords interfere in critical workflow such as clinical care where a pa-
tient’s need is most urgent. In this work, We described an authentication system that
requires the user to enter a password as infrequently as once a day. We implemented
this authentication system using a bracelet and contact-based authentication mod-
ule. The bracelet stores authentication information, and the authentication module
receives this information to authenticate a user to a given device. Our authentica-
tion system reduces the impact on user satisfaction and workflow (i.e., usability) by
removing most of the difficulty of using a complex password.
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Applications of Secure Location
Sensing in Healthcare
Tracking and managing assets in real-time are critical for large organizations such
as Hospitals. For example, “more than [one-third] of nurses spend at least 1 hour
per shift searching for equipment and the average hospital owns 35,000 inventory
SKUs and utilization hovers around 32-48%, with nearly $4,000 of equipment per
bed, lost of stolen each year”.222 Moreover, tracking needs to be secure; specifically,
it needs to be resilient to active and passive attacks that aid in the misappropriation
of assets. We implement a real-time tracking system using low-cost Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE) devices that provide authenticated wireless communication to track
securely assets and people.
We track assets in our system with an external device that can receive BLE trans-
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missions containing location data1, and send location data to a trusted server via
Wi-Fi. We implement a device we call Beacon+ to broadcast location data via BLE.
This type of BLE beacon extends the design of Apple’s popular iBeacon specifica-
tion223 by modifying the advertisement, or unidirectional broadcast, to contain a
monotonically increasing sequence number and message authentication code (MAC).
In particular, the sequence number provides temporal freshness that is resilient
to clock skew without synchronization. The MAC authenticates the Beacon+ to
a trusted server, where the trusted server maintains the absolute location of each
Beacon+. Upon receiving the Beacon+ advertisement, the server updates the location
of an asset.
We use the real-time tracking system as a foundation for secure location sensing
applications. One such example is access control that enforces location-based restric-
tions. This application relies on the authenticity of received Beacon+ advertisements
to compute the relative location to an asset and provide access to asset data if and
only if the accessor (i.e., the person who requires the data) is within close physical
proximity. Location here is only one factor in a multi-factor access control scheme.
For example, nurses and physicians who are away from their personal computer but
moving around with a hospital-issued tablet must log in to the tablet with their cre-
dentials and be within close physical proximity of a patient to access her medical
record.
1Assets that support BLE do not require an additional device.
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Another secure location sensing application we describe is BCMA physical prox-
imity enforcement. BCMAs typically involve scanning barcodes on patients and med-
ications to interface with electronic records. Koppel et al.224 identify 31 unique causes
where healthcare professionals use workarounds to BCMA processes that they con-
sider impractical (e.g., time). However, these workarounds can result in the wrong
administration of medication which impacts patient safety. Therefore, physical prox-
imity enforcement can integrate BLE receivers into scanning devices and require the
user to be in an approved location to enable scanning.
The linchpin of our applications is Beacon+. To build a secure and interopera-
ble Beacon+ device we require the following capabilities: (1) perform symmetric key
operations; (2) modify advertisement fields; (3) transmit unidirectional advertise-
ments, and; (4) retain traditional beacon (e.g., iBeacon) advertisement structure. We
are aware of only one similar, authenticated beacon called Trusted Beacon (TB).225
Beacon+ differs from TB in its choice of cryptographic primitive and number of
advertisements for a single transmission. Specifically, TB lacks (1), (2) and (4).
Moreover, TB uses a weak, factorable226,227 320-bit asymmetric RSA private to
sign a random value that is valid for 5 minutes. An attacker can, therefore, replay
a capture advertisement for up to 5 minutes. In contrast, Beacon+ uses a 128-
bit symmetric AES key to compute a MAC on a monotonically increasing sequence
number that is only valid for 1 second. Beacon+ conforms to the iBeacon standard
because it fits in a single advertisement whereas TB requires multiple advertisements
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(i.e., the signature is longer than the message to be signed).
7.1 Background
While prior work exists for the design of location-based access control proto-
cols,228–230 there has, to the best of our knowledge, been little work done regarding
their implementation and evaluation. Existing technologies such as RFID,231 GPS,232
and WiFi222 have had varying levels of success on tracking and managing assets. In
this section, we will explore the functionality of these technologies, and discuss how
their limitations necessitated Beacon+.
7.1.1 Radio Frequency Identification
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) provides short-range asset tracking using
tags and readers. Readers interrogate tags and receive unique identifiers along with
other data, and typically placed at ingress and egress points of a particular area.233
The readers then read all tags entering or leaving the monitored area. Communica-
tion range for RFID is limited to tens of centimeters, and different bands of RFID
communication (low frequency, high frequency, ultra high frequency) can increase the
range up to 12 meters.234 However, higher frequency RFID requires expensive anten-
nas to extend the range. Deploying these antennas throughout an extensive area is
impractical and can be considered unsafe depending on hospital RF safety policies.
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7.1.2 Global Positioning System
Global Positioning System (GPS) is a reliable global satellite system for providing
time and location information to any receiver with a clear view of at least four satel-
lites. GPS is well-suited to outdoor tracking applications, but it does not function
well when there is no direct line of sight to at least four satellites. Thus, GPS is not
suitable for establishing indoor positioning235 because it is often not accurate enough
within buildings.
7.1.3 Wi-Fi
Wi-Fi facilitates wireless networking over mid-ranged distances. Multiple wireless
access points are often used to provide coverage to large areas.These access points each
have unique identifiers that bind to specific locations. Therefore, an administrator
could track the location of individual clients by observing the order and location in
which the clients connect with access points over a given period.
Wi-Fi meets the accuracy, timeliness, and communication range requirements for
indoor position management and tracking. Previous work has looked at using Wi-Fi
tags for exactly this purpose.236 One of the benefits of Wi-Fi-based solutions is easy
adoption; Wi-Fi tags are attached to devices or staff and communicate with existing
access points. However, adhesive Wi-Fi tags are not securely integrated with the
devices they manage as tags can be mixed up or maliciously removed. Also, Wi-Fi is
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not as power efficient as other technologies, it requires an additional layer of manage-
ment (e.g., password, SSID, etc.), and it requires bidirectional communication that
increases the attack surface. For example, an attacker can continuously communicate
with the Wi-Fi device, attempting to authenticate and gain access.
7.1.4 Near Field Communication
Near field communication (NFC)237 was invented for extremely short-range com-
munication, on the order of several inches. Therefore, for the applications considered
in this work, NFC is infeasible, as it would require an unreasonable number of NFC
devices.
7.1.5 Bluetooth
Bluetooth238 is a short-range communication protocol supported by most mobile
devices (i.e., smartphones and laptops). Bluetooth-enabled devices initiate connec-
tions to host devices by entering discoverable mode and waiting for a scanning device
to make a connection inquiry. The device then responds to the connection inquiry by
sending information including a device name and a device class. If the host chooses
to connect to the client device, then the two devices go through a pairing process.
Bluetooth technology has been used to build tracking systems .239–242 Previous
work has generally used older Bluetooth versions (older than v4.0) and did not con-
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sider security as a design goal. Some tracking systems required tracked entities to
establish connections with Bluetooth infrastructure devices resulting in two-way com-
munication with potentially untrusted entities .242
Beacons. Nokia introduced Bluetooth low energy (BLE) in 2004 as a wireless per-
sonal area network that later integrated into the Bluetooth 4.0 standard in 2010.243
BLE uses significantly less power than classic Bluetooth, and BLE devices can adver-
tise information to a host device (receiver herein) without requiring the host device
to pair. Conceptually, BLE is similar to NFC, but it is capable of operating at much
longer ranges than NFC. In short, devices that need to broadcast small snippets of
data at irregular intervals use BLE.
Beacon is one implementation of BLE. A beacon is an inexpensive BLE device
(in the range of $5244 to $30245) that repeatedly broadcasts a fixed unique identifier.
Applications interpret these identifiers for a variety of purposes. For example, Apple’s
iBeacon246 broadcasts what it calls an advertisement. The packet structure of an
advertisement reveals a tuple of fixed identifiers that are interpreted by as coupon
data.
Beacon+ bases itself on the iBeacon protocol and thus we adopt their advertise-
ment structure. In particular, this structure is composed of the following fields:246
• UUID: a sixteen-byte unique number used to identify all iBeacons in a particular
deployment.
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• Major: a two-byte number used to identify groups of iBeacons within a deploy-
ment from other groups.
• Minor: a two-byte string used to identify individual iBeacons in a particular
cluster of devices.
Although previous work has looked at using Beacons for indoor tracking,247–250 the
insecurity of the iBeacon protocol makes it poorly suited for this task in the presence
of an attacker.
7.2 Threat Model
We describe Beacon+ as having unspoofable, temporal and authenticated adver-
tisements; as such, we recognize the following security goals unique to Beacon+.
1. Integrity. Advertisements should not be modifiable by an unauthorized entity.
2. Availability. Advertisements should be accessible.
We omit confidentiality because Beacon+ advertisements contain no private data.
Moreover, we do not claim any privacy goals for Beacon+ as the application of track-
ing relinquishes the privacy of an asset or person inherently.
Attackers are distinguished based on their goals, capabilities, and relation to Bea-
con+. Thus, we have the following classification criteria.
178
CHAPTER 7. SECURE LOCATION SENSING
1. Active/Passive Attacker. Active attackers can read, modify, and inject adver-
tisements (i.e., BLE communication). Passive attackers can eavesdrop adver-
tisements.
2. Internal/External entity. Internal entities have legitimate Beacon+ access (e.g.,
hospital administrator).
3. Single/Coordinated group entities.
4. Sophisticated/Unsophisticated Attacker. Sophisticated attackers have access to
specialized equipment (e.g., high gain antennas). Unsophisticated attackers
have access to conventional equipment (e.g., BLE sniffers).
An attacker may use Beacon+, the BLE device, smartphone, and the trusted
server as attack surfaces. For example, an attacker may disrupt Beacon+ advertise-
ments by physically destroying Beacon+ devices, or jamming or dropping advertise-
ments. We classify Beacon+ security threats into the following categories:
1. BLE interface threats. An attacker can passively eavesdrop on advertisements,
or actively jam, replay, modify, forge, or drop advertisements.
2. Software threats. An attacker can alter the logic of Beacon+ through software
vulnerabilities.
3. Application threats. An attacker can compromise the intended functionality of
an application.
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Application-specific threats are unique to Beacon+ and non-obvious. For example,
an active attacker may attempt to circumvent location-based restrictions by physically
moving all Beacon+s to one central location. There exists threats to BLE devices,
smartphones, and trusted servers that we do not cover because it is beyond the scope
of Beacon+.
7.3 Beacon+
Apple’s iBeacon and the majority of other beacons lack authentication and there-
fore are susceptible to spoofing; i.e., an attacker can advertise another beacons UUID
to trick receivers into believing that the beacon is within range. These beacons also
lack a mechanism to provide receivers with a notion of time or, specifically, the notion
of advertisement generation (temporal freshness).
Beacon+ prevents spoofing by adding lightweight authentication by way of a
MAC, and it provides temporal freshness via a monotonically increasing sequence
number. Each BLE advertisement has both MAC and sequence number appended to
it. This advertisement maintains the single 27-byte payload structure and unidirec-
tional broadcast protocol defined in the iBeacon specification.223
Upon initialization, each Beacon+ is assigned a unique identification number that
we distinguish from the UUID of regular beacons by labeling it as ID, an initial value
for the monotonically increasing sequence number, and a secret key that is used to
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Figure 7.1: iBeacon and Beacon+ advertisement formats. BLE advertisements can
support up to a 31-byte payload – 4 bytes are reserved for BLE structures and flags,
leaving 27 bytes for user-defined data.
compute a MAC. The secret key is assigned a priori to deployment. As with current
beacons, the TX Power (i.e., signal strength) to the Beacon+ at 1 meter in Decibel-
milliwatts (dBm) is measured and set. The ID, current sequence number, secret key,
and TX Power are stored in non-volatile memory on the Beacon+ to ensure that the
values persist even if removing power.
The trusted server maintains both the initial sequence number and the secret
key that will authenticate Beacon+ advertisements and check for temporal freshness.
Beacon+ computes a MAC on the concatenation of TX Power, ID, and current se-
quence number with padding. Each second, Beacon+ increments it sequence number,
computes a new MAC, and replaces the previous advertisement with the current one.
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Figure 7.1 compares the advertisement format of Beacon+ and iBeacon. Beacon+
uses 2 bytes for the ID and 8 bytes for the monotonically increasing sequence number.
One restriction of this specific byte allocation is that it supports only 216 or 65535
IDs. We choose to use 2 bytes for the ID in order to allocate 8 bytes for the sequence
number.
Beacon+ broadcasts advertisements at a predetermined rate. Faster rates (e.g.,
eight times per second) improve the likelihood that receivers detect Beacon+ devices
in range but increase the power consumption. Slower rates conserve power consump-
tion but may result in receivers failing to detect Beacon+s in range. We configure
Beacon+ to broadcast advertisements at a rate of eight times per second (i.e., every
125µs) which matches the rate of iBeacon.
We represent time using monotonically increasing sequence numbers that incre-
ment at a regular timeout of once per second. The trusted server maintains the
initial and subsequent sequence numbers, and upon receiving an authenticated ad-
vertisement, it will compare the received sequence number with the highest seen so
far. The advertisement is accepted if the received number is not more than some
threshold below the highest seen.
7.3.1 Implementation
We implemented the Beacon+ specification using the Texas Instruments MSP430FR5969
LaunchPad Development Kit251 and Bluegiga Bluetooth Low Energy BoosterPack for
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Figure 7.2: Beacon+ is implemented using the TI MSP430 LaunchPad (underlying
red board) and Bluegiga Bluetooth BLE BoosterPack.
the LaunchPad252 (see Figure 7.2). The MSP430 board runs the control logic of Bea-
con+. During initialization, each MSP430 board is assigned an ID, starting sequence
number (usually 1), secret key, and the appropriately calibrated TX Power. We place
the MSP430 board at a chosen location in the environment, and we share the ID,
starting sequence number, secret key, and chosen location with the trusted server.
Once per the timeout rate, the MSP430 board increments the sequence number,
computes the MAC using AES-128 bit CBC-MAC, and sends the new advertisement
to the BLE BoosterPack via the UART communication interface. The BLE Booster-
Pack receives the latest advertisement from the MSP430 and sends it out at a regular
interval of eight times per second. The transmitted advertisements are then collected
by devices moving throughout the environment and passed to the trusted server for
validation (see Section 7.4).
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7.4 Applications
Beacon+ serves as a foundation for building many secure location sensing appli-
cations. We describe and implement two such applications, namely secure real-time
asset tracking and location-based restrictions on access control. We also describe
BCMA physical proximity enforcement.
7.4.1 Secure Real-Time Asset Tracking System
The tracking system is composed of three components: (1) Beacon+, (2) BLE–
speaking devices that will be tracked (e.g. smartphone or tablet), and (3) backend
server (trusted server hereon) that validates Beacon+ advertisements and calculates
tracked devices’ positions. The system is initialized by placing Beacon+s throughout
the environment at chosen locations that provide good coverage of the area. This cho-
sen location and the Beacon+’s assigned unique ID, secret key, and starting sequence
number is shared with the trusted server, which is run by the system administrator 2.
As per the specification, each Beacon+ periodically broadcasts the authenticated BLE
advertisement containing its unique ID, monotonically increasing sequence number,
TX Power, and the corresponding MAC of the data.
Tracked BLE–speaking devices periodically collect the authenticated BLE adver-
tisements and corresponding received signal strength (RSSI) from all Beacon+ within
2Administer can return to a Beacon+ to refresh keys, apply firmware updates, or even replace it
entirely.
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range. The device then sends a device update that contains the latest collected Bea-
con+ advertisements to the server using some other communication medium such as
Wi-Fi, cellular, or wired LAN. This device functionality can be added to existing
medical devices that support BLE with only a small modification, while older devices
can use a BLE module or data collector (e.g., smartphone or computer).
To track personnel, each individual can carry their own smartphone or borrowed
hospital-issued tablet. These types of computing devices are increasingly used in
health-related environments due to the adoption of health information technology
and Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD).253 An App is installed on the devices that
collects Beacon+ advertisements and sends them over Wi-Fi or cellular networks to
the trusted server.
Figure 7.3 shows an example of two different devices that are tracked. The first
device is a physician’s iPhone, which can communicate directly to the trusted server.
The second device is a heart rate monitor that cannot communicate directly with the
trusted server, and relies on a data collection computer to forward communication.
In both cases, the devices collect the authenticated BLE advertisements from the
Beacon+ within range, aggregate the advertisements and corresponding RSSI values,
and send them to the backend server, which will use this information to determine
the location of the device.
Upon receiving a device update, the trusted server validates each of the Beacon+
advertisements contained within that update. The trusted server checks, using the
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Figure 7.3: Secure Real-Time Asset Tracking System based on Beacon+.
shared secret key for each Beacon+, that the MAC appended on an advertisement
matches the computed MAC over the data. If the MAC does not match, that ad-
vertisement is discarded and not included in the location calculation. In addition,
each advertisement is checked for freshness by comparing the monotonically increas-
ing sequence number on the advertisement with the highest received sequence number
received so far from that Beacon+. If the sequence number on the advertisement is
not within a valid range of the highest sequence number seen to date (e.g., more than
X sequence numbers older), that advertisement is not valid.
After Beacon+ advertisements in a device update are validated, the trusted server

































Figure 7.4: Trilateration Example. r1, r2, and r3 (radius of the b1, b2, and b3
circles respectively) correspond to the calculated distance between the tracked device
and each Beacon+. The intersection of the three circles (marked by an X) determines
the location of the device.
tracked device, acceptable boundaries for each device, and a log of system events.
A web application reads the database an displays the location of each Beacon+ and
tracked devices, the boundaries of each device, and the system events as they occur
in real-time. The trusted server and web application can take action (e.g., raise an
alarm, send an email or text message) in response to problematic events, such as
when a device has left or is close to leaving the acceptable boundary.
Figure 7.5 shows a snapshot of an example web application that visualizes the
location of 10 Beacon+ (blue circles), one device being tracked (solid red block), and
the acceptable boundary of that device (red square outline) on a single floor of a
university building. The web application enforces access control to ensure that the
location of devices (and Beacon+) can only be seen by authorized individuals.
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Figure 7.5: Example Web Application Showing Secure Real-Time Tracking System.
The blue circles are Beacon+, the solid red block is a tracked device, and the red
square outline is the acceptable boundary of that device.
Attack Mitigations. An active attacker may steal a device. However, since devices
are tracked in real-time, the appropriate authority is notified if the device moves
outside its intended location. The attacker may also physically damage a Beacon+,
remove the power source, or perform a sophisticated wireless jamming attack. The
tracking system expects Beacon+ advertisements and device updates (i.e., heartbeat)
at regular intervals; therefore, the trusted server can implement a detection policy
(much like a network intrusion detection system) that generates alerts. Or, the trusted
server can generate audit logs for retroactive analysis.
189
CHAPTER 7. SECURE LOCATION SENSING
7.4.2 Location–Based Restrictions
Sensitive data such as electronic medical records are protected using encryption
and single-factor access control mechanisms (e.g., PIN numbers, passwords) to limit
access to authorized individuals. However, this approach raises a major security
concern as an attacker that is able to bypass or break the access control security
gains access to all of the sensitive data in the database with a single breach. This
threat is made worse in the context of a hospital, where computing devices are often
used to access sensitive patient information, and a stolen or compromised device can
provide an attacker with a large portion of private data.
To address this threat, we implement a prototype application that provides an
access control mechanism that enforces location-based restrictions. The application
relies on the authenticity of received Beacon+ advertisements to compute the relative
location of an authenticated device compared to an asset and provides access to the
asset data if and only if the device is within close physical proximity. In the hospital
setting, nurses and physicians who are away from their personal computer but moving
around with their smartphone must be within close physical proximity of a patient to
access her medical record. With this scheme, an access control breach only results in a
small fraction of sensitive data leakage, since an attacker that steals an authenticated
device only gets access to data that is within proximity. The location is only one
factor in a multi-factor access control scheme to authenticate a user.
Implementing the location-based restrictions application requires only minor addi-
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tions to the secure real-time tracking system. Personnel can use the same smartphone
or BLE device they sign into for the tracking system to access sensitive data. As per-
sonnel move about the organization, the trusted server tracks their location. When
the tracked device enters the close proximity of assets, the trusted server checks the
credentials of the device and authenticity of the Beacon+ advertisements and sends
the device the appropriate data from assets in range. Similarly, when devices leave
proximity of an asset, the trusted server revokes access to that asset’s data and the
App removes the record3. The trusted server can choose the level of granularity on
which to enforce location-based restrictions. For example, in the hospital context,
the trusted server may choose to organize patient records based on room, rather than
solely using distance as the metric. In addition, the trusted server can tailor the
information sent to the devices based on the credentials of the user (e.g., physicians
may be sent more sensitive information about a patient than nurses).
This approach provides location-based restrictions without the need of additional
authentication at every step. While an attacker that steals one of these authenticated
devices can see the sensitive information about nearby patients, the threat is not much
different from the existing accepted threat in which an attacker could walk around
the hospital and take the paper medical records that often sit unattended outside of
patient rooms. One possibility is to have physicians re-authenticate upon entering
each room which prevents an attacker from walking around with a device to get basic
3The App is also setup to remove data from the display after a configurable timeout, which
protects against an attacker that cuts network communication in an effort to force an asset’s data
to persist on the screen even after moving out of range of the asset.
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patient information but puts a burden on physicians and nurses. This is a trade-off
between privacy and usability which can be set as desired, and the App supports both
configurations.
In some cases, a physician might require accessing more details of a patient’s
health records or may require accessing a medical record for a patient that is not
in the same room. In this case, the App on the device allows physicians to provide
further forms of authentication (e.g., fingerprint, additional password) to increase
their access. Note that this access is only provided temporarily each time additional
authentication is provided, preventing an attacker from breaking the location-based
restrictions if she steals the device. Additionally, physicians can always return to
their private offices to use traditional access control techniques to gain access to a
wider range of medical records.
By using location-based restrictions for access control, hospitals get the techno-
logical and convenience benefits of electronic medical records with the traditional
privacy model of paper medical records, in that successful attackers only get access
to localized sensitive information rather than access to a large database of many
records.
Attack Mitigations. An active attacker may perform a denial-of-service attack
on the tracking system to cause patient harm or thwart productivity. This attack
is mitigated by having authorized individuals use additional authentication meth-
192
CHAPTER 7. SECURE LOCATION SENSING
ods to bypass the location-based restrictions and temporarily gain access to patient
records, or return to an authorized computer system (e.g., office computer). This
type of adversary can also steal an authenticated device (i.e., a physician logged in
and misplaced the device) and use it to obtain patient records via the location-based
restrictions application. The application mitigates this attack by deleting patient
records on a set time interval and when it moves outside the range of patients.
Note that the location-based restrictions application requires that the trusted
server have knowledge of patient locations in the hospital (either at a physical loca-
tion or room-level granularity). The tracking system can be made to track patient
locations by associating BLE devices with patients, or the trusted server can link
with existing hospital management techniques that track patient locations.
7.5 Experiments
We deployed eight evenly spaced Beacon+ prototypes of one side of the floor in our
building to emulate a setup that would be used in typical hospital settings. Each Bea-
con+ was placed at its chosen location and assigned a unique ID and secret key that is
shared with the trusted server. Upon startup, each Beacon+ begins broadcasting an
authenticated BLE advertisement containing its unique ID, latest sequence number
(monotonically increasing once per second), calibrated transmit power at 1 meter,
and MAC. Advertisements are broadcast every 125µs. We experimented with several
193
CHAPTER 7. SECURE LOCATION SENSING
values for n, the propagation constant from equation 7.1, and ultimately decided on
n = 2.7 for our experiments. It provided the most accurate measured distance from
compared with the actual location of tracked devices.
We used a Google Nexus 4 smart phone as the tracked device. We created an
Android App to periodically scan and collect all Beacon+ advertisements within
range (aggregating the measured RSSI values for each Beacon+ ID). The collected
advertisements are then bundled into a device update and sent via Wi-Fi to the
trusted server, which authenticates each of the advertisements in the update and
calculates the position of the device.
7.5.1 Tracking System Accuracy
To measure the accuracy of our Beacon+ tracking system, we placed the device
at various locations and compared the calculated location from the tracking system
with the actual location in the building. Initially, we measured the accuracy using the
trilateration approach, using the measurements from the three Beacon+ prototypes
with the strongest received signal strength for that update. However, we found that
the measured signal strength from our BLE hardware contained a fair amount of noise,
often causing the trilateration calculation to fail (i.e., the resulting circles created from
the distance measurements did not intersect). Rather than using trilateration in our
experiments, we calculated the position of devices using an approach that is less
accurate, but more flexible.
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Translated Midpoint Method. For each device update received, the trusted server
sorts the valid Beacon+ advertisements in order of received signal strength and can
calculate the device’s position for this update as long as at least two advertisements
are valid. If there are three or more valid advertisements, the trusted server uses the
top three Beacon+ ads (based on RSSI values) and forms a triangle, with one vertex
corresponding to each of the Beacon+ locations in the environment. Each vertex
is then translated toward the midpoint of the opposite side of the triangle, with
translation distance proportional (or in our case, equal) to the measured distance
between the device and that Beacon+.
If there are only two advertisements, a line is formed between the two Beacon+
locations, and each point is translated toward the other point with a distance equal
to the measured distance from the device to that Beacon+. Finally, the device’s
position is calculated as the centroid of the resulting triangle (in the case of three
valid Beacon+ advertisements) or midpoint of the resulting line (in the case of two
Beacon+ advertisements). Using the new approach resulted in position calculation
with precision 1-2 meters in the best case and 9-10 meters in the worst case.
Using the translated midpoint method, the resulting Beacon+ tracking system is
flexible and accurate, providing a position calculation with the precision of 1-2 meters
in the best case and 9-10 meters in the worst case. Compared to the trilateration
approach, the translated midpoint method achieves a better overall tracking system
in the environment of our experimentation.
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Figure 7.6: Translated Midpoint Method to calculate device position.
7.5.2 Power Consumption
We connected an MSP-430 LaunchPad to an Agilent programmable power supply.
Since the MSP430 LaunchPad runs off of a +5V power source, we set the output
voltage to 5 volts and maximum current to 1A. Our power supply showed that in the
case of the MSP430 emulating an iBeacon, the power draw was between 15 and 20
mA. In the case of the MSP430 emulating a Beacon+, the power draw was between
22 and 25 mA. Therefore, the overhead of Beacon+ over a standard Beacon running
on our test platform was between 20% and 46%.
7.5.3 Location-Based Restrictions
We created an Android App that collects and forwards Beacon+ advertisements
to the trusted server and displays patient records sent in return. After validating a
device and calculating its position, the trusted server compares the device position
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with the location of patients in the building and only sends records of nearby patients
(10 meters in our experiments). When a device moves out of range of a patient, that
patient record is removed from the list in the App.
For this experiment, we created a mock patient record database on the trusted
server based on the OpenMRS Demo Data,257 and set the location of four of the
patients in the database to locations in the building environment (yellow squares are
shown in Figure 7.9). Then, we walked around the building with the smartphone
running the App to view the records of the nearby patients, i.e., the patients that
were within 10 meters of the device’s tracked position.
Figure 7.9 shows four snapshots (a through d) of the experiment in action. The
visual GUI of the Beacon+ tracking system is shown on the right. The GUI shows
the location of the Beacon+ prototypes (blue circles), the patients in the building
(yellow squares), and where the device is located at each snapshot (a through d). For
each snapshot in Figure 7.9, we also include the screen capture of the device running
the patient record access App at its respective location.
7.6 No Central Trusted Authority
We assume a central trusted authority (i.e., the trusted server) in our secure
location sensing application architecture. However, this assumption is susceptible to
an attacker who gains unauthorized access to the trusted server. If this should happen,
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Figure 7.7: Location-Based Restrictions on Access Control.
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all security guarantees are invalidated because the attacker would have access to the
private keys of every Beacon+. Removing the trusted server is a complicated problem
because Beacon+ supports unidirectional communication only; therefore, we cannot
use a two-way protocol to assert trust nor can we introduce an out-of-band channel
for weak authentication.71,75
To remove the trusted server we construct a protocol based on the timed efficient
stream loss-tolerant authentication (TESLA) broadcast protocol. This protocol as-
sumes a large set of mutually untrusted receivers in a sensor network with packet loss.
A sender computes the MAC t of a message with a key k known only to itself. The
sender broadcasts the authenticated message m, t, and some set of receivers buffer the
message. Time t later, the sender discloses the key k and the receiver authenticates
the packet. This protocol is unlike our previous Beacon+ protocol because it assumes
that the sender and receiver clocks can be loosely synchronized. It also introduces
hash chains to authenticate keys at the receiver.
A hash chain is generated by selecting a random element s and repeatedly applying
a one-way function F . We can verify any element of the chain through commitment
si by performing F
j−i(sj) = si, where i < j. TESLA uses hash chains to generate
authentication values, k from the above, and discloses k at time t (e.g., one key per
second).
We design Beacon+’s new protocol without a trusted server as follows. We initially
generate a random secret s and unique ID. We then calculate HN = H
N(s) where
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HN is the hash of s, N times. We put HN and ID into a digital certificate C and
sign it with a certificate authority’s private key. C, s, and ID are placed on the
Beacon+. At each time period i, the Beacon+ sends an advertisement containing
C, ID, a message M containing the value i, a MAC on M computed with the key
HN−(i+1)(s), and the value HN−i.
The verifier in this protocol is the smartphone or medical device. The verifier
collects advertisements from two adjacent time periods (i initial and j final) and
checks that the advertisements are current based on its own internal clock. Next, the
verifier validates C and hashes HN−j(s), j times, to obtain HN . This value is in C,
thus, it can be validated. The verifier then verifies time period i’s MAC using the
key output from time period j. We diagram this protocol in Figure 7.8.
We differ from TESLA in how we do synchronization. Specifically, TESLA requires
a digital signature key pair on the sender and a nonce from the receiver. The receiver
records the current time and sends the sender a nonce. The sender replies with its
clock time and the nonce signed with its public key. Clock synchronization is useful
for the receiver because it can check that the key k received has been disclosed yet.
Beacon+ is strictly unidirectional, thus, cannot receive a nonce like the sender in
TESLA. Instead, the verifier in our protocol can check if two adjacent time periods
are current by querying the tracking server described below.
Removing the trusted server in our architecture adds new entities and roles. For
example, the secure real-time asset tracking system adds a certificate authority, track-
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 [Sender] Beacon+ [Verifier] Phone
ID = {0,1}128
S = {0,1} 256
HN = H
N(s)
C = {ID, HN, sig{ID, HN}}
1
Collect M from time period iAt time period i, send Message M:
i, ID
tagi = MAC(M, H
N-(i+1)(s))
 ki = H
N-i(s)
2
At time period j, send Message M:
j, ID
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{i, ID, tagi, ki}
{j, ID, tagj, kj}
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Hj(HN-j(s)) =? HN
Verify tagi with kj
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Load unique secret (S), unique 





Figure 7.8: Beacon+ protocol without central trusted authority.
ing server, and map authority (i.e., database server). We logically separate the track-
ing server and map authority because these components could be distributed. The
certificate authority issues a signed certificate to every Beacon+. The medical device
and smartphone later verify the signature on the Beacon+ certificate when receiving
Beacon+ advertisements.
The tracking server allows both the medical device and smartphone to make
application-specific queries to the map authority. For example, a medical device
would send a location query 4 that contains a set of unique Beacon+ IDs, the lat-
est time period j and kj where kj = H
N−j(s). The tracking server would verify
Hj(HN−j(s)) = HN where HN is in the Beacon+ certificate. If and only if verifica-
tion succeeds and kj has not been previously seen, the tracking server processes the
4We expect other queries such as location-based access queries.
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Figure 7.9: Secure Real-Time Asset Tracking System with no Trusted Server.
query using the map authority and returns a result.
There exists an implicit assumption that devices that can verify Beacon+ adver-
tisements are also trusted. We can make this an explicit assumption by requiring
mutual authentication between the smartphone or medical device and the tracking
server. In this case, only trusted devices can communicate with the tracking server.
7.7 Conclusion
In this work, we have shown that Beacon+ can be used to implement secure
location sensing applications that have the potential to improve healthcare processes
in terms of security, efficiency, and safety. We implemented a secure real-time tracking
system for hospitals that also provides a foundation for a novel application that applies
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In this dissertation, we have examined a particular set of challenges in health
and medical systems and introduced new systems that improve security, privacy, and
usability. We presented a survey of related work in embedded health and medical
systems that uncover and motivate research challenges. We performed an analysis
of Apple iMessage and found significant vulnerabilities that exemplify the challenges
of BYOD and protocol development. We showed that memory copying performed
by DMA engines could be chained together to perform arbitrary computation on
numerous computer systems. We implemented and exploited stealthy computation
and covert channels using the HTML5 Web Workers API. Health and medical systems
such as patient portals and pharmaceutical compounders are directly affected by
this finding. We introduced an authentication system that addresses the problem of
complex passwords and poor usability. And, we implemented a real-time tracking
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system that uses a custom-built security device called Beacon+. This device enabled
other secure location sensing applications such as location-based access restrictions.
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